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This Article offers a genealogy of domestic relations law (later renamed
family law). It comes in two Parts. Part I is an account of how  it emerged
as  a  distinct  field  in  American  law  in  the  latter  half of the  nineteenth
century.'  This Part, Part II, is an account of its successive transformations
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over  the  course  of  the  twentieth  century.  I  argue  that  domestic
relations/family  law did not always  exist;  rather, it was  invented,  and  the
ideological  implications  of that  act of creation  remain  embedded  in  the
field today. The  central  idea which, I argue,  recurrently  characterizes  the
field  is that the family and  its law  are the  opposites of the market  and its
law.  Born  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  as  the  notorious
status/contract  distinction,  it  has  shown  amazing  powers  of resilience,
surviving three  highly  intentional  and collectively  organized  attacks  and
gathering  to  itself  new  ideological  and  practical  implications  as  the
presuppositions  about  law  that  permeate  legal  consciousness  have
changed and changed again over time.
The idea that the family and its  law are the opposites of the market and
its  law is just one  form of family  law exceptionalism  (FLE).2  But it  is a
crucial one:  it travelled the globe  in the middle of the nineteenth century,
originating  in  the  thought  of  the  immensely  influential  jurist  Friedrich
Carl von  Savigny and diffusing, along with capitalism  and colonialism, all
around  the  world.  3 It became  a  fit vessel  for  the  ideologies  of laissez
faire and  the  separate  spheres  when  they  emerged.  All  of this  was  a
product  of classical  legal  thought  (CLT),  which,  as  Duncan  Kennedy
shows  in  an  article  from  which  this  one  draws  its  basic  historical
template,4  venerated  contract  as  the  legal  space  in  which  to  maximize
space for the will of the parties,  and venerated  family law as  its opposite,
the  space  for  the  untrammeled  will  of  the  state  imposing  ascriptive
statuses  saturated  with  duty.  Savigny  also  taught  that  contract  law  was
universal,  while family  law gave  voice  to the  spirit of the people,  which
was inevitably local.  This  formulation became an  apt explanation  for the
development  of a transnational  body of law governing  commerce  and a
2.  For a fuller statement of the vast range of meanings  that have  accumulated  around the idea that
the  family  and  its  law  are  exceptional,  see  J.  Halley  &  Kerry  Rittich,  Critical Directions in
Comparative  Family  Law: Genealogies and  Contemporary  Studies ofFamily Law Exceptionalism, 58
AM.  J. COMP. L. 753 (2010)  [hereinafter Halley & Rittich, Critical  Directions].
3.  For an  account of Savigny's family law/contract  law distinction and his influence,  see Duncan
Kennedy, Savigny's Family/Patrimony  Distinction  and  Its Place in the Global Genealogy of  Classical
Legal Thought, 56 AM.  J. COMP. L. 811  (2010) [hereinafter Kennedy, Savigny's Distinction].  Kennedy
construes  FRIEDRICH  CARL  VON  SAVIGNY,  SYSTEM  OF THE  MODERN  ROMAN  LAW (Hyperion  Press
1979)  (William Holloway trans.,  1867).  See also Halley & Rittich, Critical  Directions,  supra note 2,
at 757-58,  771-75.
4.  Duncan Kennedy,  Three Globalizations  ofLaw and Legal Thought: 1850-2000,  in THE NEW
LAW  AND  ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT:  A  CRITICAL  APPRAISAL  (David Trubek  & Alvaro  Santos eds.
2006)  [herinafter  Kennedy,  Three Globalizations]. The  same  basic  periodization  receives  different
explanations  in Ugo Mattei,  Why the Wind Changed Intellectual  Leadership in Western Law, 42  AM.
J. COMP. L.  195 (1994).
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complementary deference  to national difference with respect to the family
and  was  widely  deployed  in  colonial  as  well  as  postcolonial  nationalist
projects.I
Kennedy  dates  CLT as a global phenomenon  to the period from  1850 to
1914.  It  has  never entirely  disappeared;  instead,  its ideas broke  up from
the  systematic,  conceptualist,  abstract  armature  which  CLT  eventually
built for  imagining  all of law,  becoming  fragments  which  survived  into
two  large  subsequent  forms  of legal  consciousness  which  succeeded  it.
My  argument  in  this Part  of this  Article  is  that  FLE  in  its  form  as  the
status/contract,  family/contract,  family/market  distinction  is  one  such
durable fragment.
The  two  subsequent  forms  of  legal  consciousness  which  Kennedy
identifies  as  spreading  throughout  the  world  in  globalizations  of legal
thought  spanning  the  twentieth  century  are,  first, "the  social,"  emerging
by  1900 and  losing its grip on legal minds by  19686; and second, the era
of  conflicting  considerations,  which  I will  dub  concon,  emerging  after
World  War  II  and  persisting  today.7  Here  is  how  Kennedy  introduces
these two successive but also overlapping  brainwaves:
Between  1900  and  1968,  what globalized  was  The  Social,  . . . a
way of thinking without an essence, but with, as  an important trait,
preoccupation  with  rethinking  law  as  a purposive  activity,  as  a
regulatory  mechanism  that  could  and  should  facilitate  the
evolution  of social  life  in accordance  with ever greater perceived
social interdependence  at every level, from the family to the world
of nations....
Between  1945  and  2000,  one  trend  was  to  think  about  legal
technique,  in the  aftermath  of the critiques of CLT and the  social,
as  the  pragmatic  balancing  of  conflicting  considerations  in
administering  the system created by the social jurists. At the  same
time, there was a seemingly  contrary trend to envisage  law as  the
guarantor of human  and property  rights and of intergovernmental
order through the gradual  extension of the rule of law, understood
as judicial supremacy.'
Whereas  the  social  emanated  originally  from Europe,  and  was  received
eagerly  by Americans  still  hungry  to receive  intellectual  influence  from
5.  See Halley & Rittich,  Critical  Directions,  supra note 2,  at 771-75.
6.  Kennedy, Three Globalizations,  supra note 4, at 21,  37-62.
7.  Id. at 21,  63-71.
8.  Id. at 22.
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abroad,  Kennedy's  concon  consciousness  is  a  largely  American  export,
and  indeed  in  this  Part  we  will  see  American  legal  elites  gaining
confidence  in their  own powers  to reconstruct  all of law in  the  interwar
period, during  the rise  of the social.  Today, American  legal  influence  is
everywhere,  carrying not only the pragmatic balancing  impulse but also a
neoformalist  "identity/rights  complex"  putting faith in rights  as  enforced
by judges. Both of these elements of concon will play  an important part in
our story here:
Public  law  neoformalism  strongly  resembles the  practices  of late
nineteenth-century  U.S.  courts,  which  took the  CLT  construction
of private  law and applied it to the U.S.  Constitution. After WWII,
liberal  civil  libertarians  who  had  strongly  criticized  the
conservative public law neoformalism of the earlier period took up
the  same practice  through the  Warren  Court. Policy  analysis  and
balancing  were post-Realist  U.S.  developments, and the advocates
of balancing were  already debating public  law neoformalists  in the
early  1950s.
The  identity/rights  complex,  as  a template  for  thinking  about  a
vast  range  of  legal  issues,  seems  foreshadowed  in  the  United
States  by  the  post-WWII  alliance  of  elite  WASPS,  Jews,  and
blacks  in the construction of the category  of ethnicity,  linking the
evils of the  Holocaust  to  those of racism  in the  United  States  as
illegal  discrimination.  U.S.  second-wave  feminism  is  responsible
for  the  abstraction  and  generalization  of  the  category  by
transforming  it  into  "identity."  And  it  is  familiar  since  de
Toqueville that Unitedstateseans tend toward juristocracy.9
At three points, twice  during the  social and once in the explosive  birth
of concon  identity politics, vanguard  groups took direct aim  at FLE. The
first  attacks  came  from  social  jurists:  Roscoe  Pound  and  the  Columbia
Law  School  faculty  pursuing  radical  reform  of  their  curriculum  in  the
1920's. They sought to reconnect  domestic relations/family  law not only
with  the  market  but with  the  vast array  of regulatory  orders,  inside and
outside the  state, that condition its lifeways.  That effort failed, only to be
taken  up again  in the waning days of the social era by a group  I will call
the  professionalizers.  They  produced  an  important  casebook  that  fully
delivers upon the most innovative  ideas of the Columbia  reformers,  with
some distinctive  mid-1960's changes.  But this erasure  of FLE was not to
last  for long.  The  third  group  was  feminists  attacking the  private/public
9.  Id. at 67-68.
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distinction,  and  within  that  the  family/market  and  family/state
distinctions,  as  a  crucial  tool  for  male  dominance  throughout  the  legal
order.  Their  law  reform  efforts  were  partially  successful,  though  their
commitment  to  women's  interests  uber alles meant  that  they  could  not
track the wide-open  inquiry into the distributive role of the family that the
Columbia  reformers  had  envisioned.  By  the  time  gay-rights  advocates
stepped into their shoes  as the  vanguard identity-political  critic of family
law rules,  the  status/contract,  family/market  distinction had reasserted  its
sway: marriage as  status was decidedly back, both for the proponents  and
the opponents  of gay  marriage. This  Part thus tells how FLE came under
attack  three  times,  but  each  time  resituated  itself  in  the  ever-evolving
legal order. We have  it still today,  in a way  that sediments  fragments  of
CLT, the social,  and concon in a conception of family law that is strongly
dedicated to the status/contract distinction.
This Part  has  five  sections,  each  focusing on legal  interventions  that I
have  selected  for  close  examination  because  they  were  highly
symptomatic  of the  brainwaves reshaping  legal  consciousness  generally,
and domestic  relations/family  law  in particular, in  successive  periods  of
twentieth-century  American legal  life.  I first tell how, between  1870  and
1940, the authors  and publishers of legal treatises and, later on, casebooks
struggled  to  operationalize  the classical mandate  to  divide  contract  from
status,  the law  of the market  from the law  of domestic relations  (Section
I). I then tell how the social  emerged as an all-out attack on the resulting
classical legal  order. My  example  will be  articles published in the  1910s
by a young  Roscoe Pound, setting  out an agenda  for a new,  sociological
jurisprudence  that  completely  changed  the  focus  of  domestic  relations
law.  Pound  turned  against  CLT's  conceptualist  emphasis  on  abstract
doctrine  to  a method  which  Fernanda  Nicola  helpfully  names  "social-
purpose functionalism""o:  the job of the jurist was to identify  correctly the
social  functions  served  by  law,  compare  the  rules  that  subserve  those
functions, and with  cool hauteur, from position of high  epistemic control,
chose  the  right  rule.  Pound  was  also  profoundly  hostile  to  CLT's
preference  for individualism  and  saw FLE, correctly,  as  a warrant  for it:
he  was  the  first  to  attack  FLE  as  an  ideologically  and  socially  malign
support for laissez  faire (Section II).
The  idea  of a  de-exceptionalized  family  law,  ranging  across  all  the
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topics of law that have things to say about family  life, seems to have been
born not in the academy but in practice,  in the Family Court movement of
the  social  era.  They  struggled  to  free  themselves  of  the  constraints  of
domestic relations  law  (husband and wife,  parent and child), so that they
could reach all  the bodies of law that attended to families in trouble. They
sought  to become  less adversarial  and more  administrative,  and  to  work
with  other  administrative  agencies,  to  unite  expertise  with  expertise.
These ideas emerged inside the Columbia Law School's curricular reform
project  in  the  1920's  and early  1930's,  and the desire  for  a new topic  -
family  law  shorn  of FLE - now  burned.  Initially  mandated  to  pursue
Pound's  social-purpose  functionalism  and  to  mechanize  ways  of
discerning  the  best  rule  in  the  three  great  domains  of public  law,
commercial  law  and  domestic  relations  law,  the  Columbia  curricular
reform  turned  so  strongly  to  sociological  data  and the  infinitely  diverse
social  consequences  of  legal  regulation  that  it  soon  undermined  the
epistemic  control  that  is  so  characteristic  of  Pound's  sociological
jurisprudence  idea. They discovered that Is  and Ought were not nearly so
seamlessly  inter-implicated  as Pound had promised:  in the  course of this
disenchantment  - originally  experienced  as  profoundly  exciting  and
liberating  - they  became  genuinely  legal  realist.  My  exemplar  of these
shifts  to  what  I will  call  real  realism  will  be  the  intervention  of Karl
Llewellyn into the Columbia reform projects.  Inspired by real realism and
following  the  example  of the  Family  Court  movement,  the  Columbia
family  law  team  quickly  discerned  that  FLE  stood  in  the  way  of
understanding  the  economic  functions  of  family  law,  which  they
identified  as  a key topic.  FLE also blocked understanding the role of law
in the administrative mode  so crucial  to proponents of the  social.  So they
attacked FLE head on - and then overwhelmed themselves  with the sheer
difficulty of the research program they had set out for themselves. As they
lost  confidence  in  their  agenda,  FLE  visibly  flowed  back  into  the
casebook tradition,  in a  dispirited  and  dispiriting  process  conducted  by
one  of the original  Columbia realists. Section III thus tells of the rise and
fall of the legal realist assault on FLE.
After  World  War  II,  the  American  workforce  was  flooded  with  the
energy  of young  returning  troops;  America was  suddenly  an undeniable
world  power;  and  the  social  era  entered  its  last phase.  The  impulse  for
FLE once  again  emerged  from  practice  and travelled  from  there  to  the
academy. The  family  law bar, family courts,  and  administrators of social
agencies  woke  up  to  the  urgency  of  the  social  problems  they  were
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entrusted with and organized  to promote family law as a profession in full
engagement  with  other  professions  handling  urgent  social  problems.  In
1965  two  casebooks  specifically  devoted  to  the family - one  of them  to
family  law - burst on the scene and put  a final  end to  domestic relations
as  a  viable  curricular  or  professional  idea.  One  of  these,  Cases and
Materials in  Family Law  by  Caleb  Foote,  Robert  J.  Levy  and  Frank
Sander,  implemented  the  Columbia  family  law  committee's  innovative
vision  with  amazing  fidelity.  Social  policy  and  interdisciplinary
professionalism  now required  that  the law  governing  families,  no matter
where  in the  legal  order CLT had parked it, needed to be included.  I tell
the story of the last great assault of the social era in Part IV.
And finally,  Section  V focuses  on rise  of feminism as  the  carrier of a
concon  consciousness  profoundly  hostile  to  the  formulations  of  the
professionalizers.  A  massive  conference  dedicated  to work  out feminist
approaches  to  every course in  the legal curriculum  held at NYU  in  1972
and Judith Areen's  Cases and Materials  on Family Law first published in
1978,  are  my  examples  of the  emergence  of  equality,  identity  politics,
constitutionalization,  the  culture  wars  - the  neoformalist  strand  of  the
concon  era - combined paradoxically  with  a general  sense  that making
legal  decisions  was  a  never-resolved  process  of  managing  conflicting
considerations.  Once again, a massive assault on FLE - widely designated
the  feminist  critique of the private/public  distinction but turning  at many
points on a critique of the family/market distinction - rolled onto the legal
field  and  substantially  transformed  both  the boundaries  and  the contents
of family  law.  But  as  feminist  law  reform  institutionalized  itself, FLE
reemerged  in  new  terms:  the  family  became  a  distinctly  feminized
conceptual  and  social  space,  and  feminist  presuppositions  began  to  do
what  the  market/family  distinction  had  long  done,  to  obscure  the
distributive consequences  of legal interventions.
The Conclusion points to a contemporary return to marriage-as-status  in
the  wake  of  the  same-sex  marriage  debates  and  asks  what  a  fully
distributive analysis of the field would look like today.
I. FROM THE CLASSICAL TO THE SOCIAL: DIVIDING  DOMESTIC
RELATIONS  FROM THE LAW OF WORK,  1870-1940
Classical  legal thought  was  a genuinely  classicizing  effort:  perhaps  its
most central characteristic  was the yearning to secure a vision of law as a
system.  The  status/contract,  family/market,  family  law/contract  law
distinction was one of the crucial  architectural  structures of this emerging
195 2011]
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system.  It drove the treatise writers,  and later the casebook composers,  to
divide  Blackstone's  now-ridiculed  "private oeconomical  relations""  -
husband  and  wife,  parent  and  child,  master  and  servant,  guardian  and
ward - so  that the  domestic relations  were  housed separately  from those
involving  the  state  and  the  market.  The  most  important  of these  shifts
required that master  and servant  be constructed  as radically distinct from
the  paradigmatic  status  relationships,  marriage  and  parentage.  This  took
work. I tell the story of that work in this  Section.
In the  first  American  Domestic  Relations  treatise,  published  in  1870,
James  Schouler  imagined the core of his topic  as "the  law of the family"
and  distinguished  it  sharply  from  the  law  of  the  market  in  decisively
Savignian terms:
To  an unusual  extent,  therefore,  is  the  law  of family  above  and
independent  of the  individual.  Society  provides  the home;  public
policy fashions  the  system:  and  it remains  for each  one  of us  to
place himself under rules which are, and must be, arbitrary.
So  is the law of family universal in its adaptation. It deals directly
with the individual.  Its provisions  are for man and woman;  not for
corporations  or business firms.12
Given  that  fundamental  distinction,  Schouler  worried  that  a  treatise  on
domestic  relations might  not be the  right place  in  the emerging  classical
system for the law governing servants not working "in families":
Apprentices  are,  without  much  violation  of  principle,  included
under this head;  they are generally bound out during minority  and
brought up in  families.  Clerks  are  not so  readily  confined  within
the circle of domestic relations  as  formerly;  and the  same  is to be
said  of  factors,  bailiffs,  and  stewards.  The  employds  of  a
corporation  are  frequently  designated  as  servants;  so  are  laborers
generally.  But it cannot be denied that master and servant is rather
a repulsive title, and fast losing favor in this republican country;  . .
. and that  in sounding  its legal depths  one often  loses  sight of his
landmarks,  and  finds himself  drifting  out  into  the  more  general
subject of principal and agent.'"
11.  1 WILLIAM  BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE  LAWS OF  ENGLAND  410  (photo.  reprint
1979) (1765).
12.  JAMES  SCHOULER,  A  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  EMBRACING
HUSBAND  AND  WIFE,  PARENT  AND  CHILD,  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD,  INFANCY,  AND  MASTER  AND
SERVANT  7, 9 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.  1870) [hereinafter  SCHOULER,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st
ed.)].
13.  Id. at 7-8.
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For  Blackstone,  the  term  "domestic"  had  unproblematically  included
master  and servant  and corporations;  for Schouler, it increasingly  carried
its modem sense, limited to the relations inhabiting the home.
I have  credited  Schouler  with  introducing  the  novel  legal  idea  that a
treatise  should draw its boundaries  not around a conceptual but around a
social space:  the  "circle  of domestic  relations"  that  he  imagines  is  the
ideologically  "separate  sphere"  of  the  home.  But  his  report  of
contemporary  developments  is acutely  anachronistic,  suggesting  that  his
powers  of  social  observation  were  severely  limited  by  his  classicizing
attitude. Robert Steinfeld has conclusively  shown that American judges in
the  free  states  had declared apprenticeship  unfree  and legally  invalid by
the  1850's, and that the terms master and servant had become repulsive, at
least  to  northern  servants,  in  the  wake  not  of the  civil  war but  of the
American Revolution. 14  Schouler has the glimmer of an idea that a  legal
category  should  track  a  social  one,  but  the  driving  impulse  behind  his
desire  to neaten  up the boundaries between husband  and wife  and parent
and child on one hand and master and  servant on the other is  the classical
yearning  for  system.  The  "principle"  he  follows  is  the  Savignian
family/contract  distinction.
Just  about the  time  Schouler was  fretting  over  the categorical  mistake
built  into  the  "domestic  relations,"  the  Scottish  author  of  his  chief
source-Lord  Patrick  Fraser's  1846  treatise  A  Treatise of the Law  of
Scotland,  as  Applicable  to  the  Personal and  Domestic  Relations,
Comprising Husband and Wife,  Parent and Child, Guardian and Ward
Master and Servant and Master and Apprentice'"-was having the same
worry. Scottish treatises  were at this time crucial  sources for architects  of
the  classical  legal  order  in  America,  in  part  because  they  provided  an
English-language  vehicle  for  civil-law  influence  so  deeply  desired  by
American jurists,  and partly because  the Union  of Scotland and England
produced  a  lot of law that  Americans,  trying to figure  out how to run a
federal  system,  could  ransack  for  legal  concepts  and  rules.  Indeed,  the
very status/contract distinction  that was driving master and  servant out of
the  domestic  relations  came  directly  from  Scottish  sources.
16  Twenty
14.  ROBERT J.  STEINFELD,  THE  INVENTION  OF  FREE LABOR:  THE  EMPLOYMENT  RELATION  IN
ENGLISH AND  AMERICAN  LAW AND  CULTURE,  1350-1870,  126-27,  178 (1991).
15.  PATRICK  FRASER,  A  TREATISE  OF  THE  LAW  OF  SCOTLAND,  AS  APPLICABLE  TO  THE
PERSONAL  AND  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS,  COMPRISING  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE,  PARENT  AND  CHILD,
GUARDIAN  AND  WARD  MASTER AND  SERVANT  AND  MASTER  AND  APPRENTICE  (Ist  ed.,  Edinburgh,
T. & T. Clark  1846).
16.  See Halley, What is Family Law?: Part  I, supra note 1, at 20-33.
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years after publishing his Treatise on domestic relations, Fraser perceived
that parent and child  and guardian  and ward were  similar enough to each
other  and  distinct enough  from  their usual company  that they warranted
separate  classification;  in  1866,  he  published  a  treatise  devoted  just  to
them."  And  in  1872 he published a treatise  devoted solely to master and
servant  and  master  and  apprentice,"  including  these  disparaging
comments  on his  own  1846  Domestic Relations treatise:  "[t]he  subjects
embraced in that work had no necessary connection with each other, and I
have  therefore  thought  that  the  practical  utility  of the  several  treatises
would be  increased,  were they now, on the occasion of a  second edition,
published  separately."l 9  Following  the  logic,  then,  of  a  family/market
distinction, that  left him  with  a simpler  topic  on  the  domestic  relations
side:  in  1882 he published  a Treatise on Husband and Wife According to
the Law of  Scotland. 20
This  swift and  decisive  division  of master  and  servant  from  husband
and  wife  and  parent  and  child,  is  decisively  not what  we  see  in  the
American  domestic  relations  treatises.  Schouler  led  the  way,
acknowledging  the  new-found  incoherence  of  Blackstone's  "private
oeconomical  relations,"  disparaging  the  inclusion  of master  and servant
with  the  "law  of  family[,]" 2'  but  going  ahead  anyway  to  establish
Domestic  Relations  as  a  taxonomically  impure  field.  Following
Schouler's  lead, the domain was beset by taxonomic vagaries, keeping an
increasingly  archaic fealty  to  Blackstone's topics and  wandering  down a
dead end of the "law of persons"; we  will study  these developments  in a
moment.  The  last  edition  of Domestic Relations that  Schouler authored
himself appeared  in  1905,  and it remained  loyal to its original,  admittedly
misshapen taxonomy. It was not until  1921  - after the enormous  shock to
legal  culture  administered  by  World  War  I  and  after  the  sociological
jurisprudes  had  launched  their  attack  on classical  legal  thought - that  a
17.  PATRICK FRASER,  A  TREATISE ON  THE LAW OF  SCOTLAND RELATIVE  TO PARENT AND  CHILD
AND  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD  (Hugh  Cowan  ed.,  2d  ed.,  Edinburgh,  T.  &  T.  Clark  1866).
Notwithstanding  the  information  on  the  title  page,  this  book  is  a substantial novelty,  not merely  a
second edition of Fraser's Domestic Relations.
18.  Only  the  second  edition  is  available  to  me:  PATRICK  FRASER,  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF
SCOTLAND  RELATIVE TO MASTER AND  SERVANT,  AND  MASTER  AND  APPRENTICE (2d ed.,  Edinburgh,
T.  &  T.  Clark  1872)  [hereinafter  FRASER,  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  SCOTLAND  RELATIVE  TO
MASTER AND  SERVANT].
19.  Id. at  v.
20.  PATRICK FRASER,  A  TREATISE ON  THE LAW  OF  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE (Boston,  Little, Brown
& Co. 1882).
21.  SCHOULER,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS (1st  ed.), supra note  12, at 9.
198 [Vol.  23:189
10
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss2/1Halley
new  editor,  Arthur  W.  Blakemore,  took  over  Schouler's  Domestic
Relations treatise  and  finally  dropped  master  and  servant.  This  new,
realist  handbook  concentrated  entirely  on  the  "law  of  family."
22
Blakemore  specifically  cited  the  transformations  wrought  by  "the Great
War" as his motive for completely  overhauling the contents of Schouler's
treatise.
23  Blakemore's  book belongs  not in this  Section  but in the next,
with  the  ferment  in  law  brought  on  by  the  anticlassical  sociological
jurisprudes.  For the Americans,  the  classical  impulse  to  divest domestic
relations  of master  and  servant was  a driving  force,  but the  sheer inertia
enjoyed  by  Blackstone's  legal  relations  baffled  the  classicals  who
attempted  the excision. It wasn't until the era of the social was well under
way  that  Americans  managed  a  division  that  had  been  so  easy  for  the
Scottish classicist Fraser.
Meanwhile,  the  rise  of  industrialization  and  the  emergence  of labor
conflict  received two distinct responses  in the classical  treatises. First, as
John Nockleby  shows, the classical treatises of contract, property  and tort
classified the relations of master and servant as fully governed by the  law
of contract  (even if they had to borrow rules from the  domestic relations
to  frame  union  activity  as  wrongful  conduct).24  And  even  during  the
heyday  of classical  legal thought, the  law of master  and  servant  evolved
rapidly  in  response  to  a  pressing  need  amongst  practicing  lawyers  for
books  dealing  with the rise of labor conflict.  As early  as  1840 we  find a
Scottish  treatise  devoted  solely  to  master  and  servant  and  master  and
apprentice.
25  In 1852-the same year that Joel  Prentiss Bishop introduced
marriage-as-status-not-contract  into  the  nascent  classical  order  in  his
treatise  on Marriage  and Divorce
26  - Charles Manley  Smith published A
22.  JAMES  SCHOULER  &  ARTHUR  W.  BLAKEMORE,  A  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE,  SEPARATION  AND  DOMESTIC RELATIONS,  at vii,  1, 3,  4 (6th ed.  1921).  Schouler had died in
1920. Historical  News, 25 AM.  HIST. REV.  756 (1920).  We see  here a practice of consigning valuable
treatise brands  to subsequent editors when the original  authors had stopped work on  them because of
death, old age,  illness, the press  of other responsibilities,  and the  like. Our  first instance  of this was
the extremely long vitality of Chancellor  Kent's Commentaries  on American Law. See  the last edition
of Kent's  Commentaries,  JAMES  KENT,  COMMENTARIES  ON  AMERICAN  LAW  (John  M.  Gould  ed.,
14th ed.,  Boston, Little, Brown & Co.  1896),  discussed in Halley,  What is Family Law?: Part  l, supra
note  1, at  88-89.  In this case - a treatise  handed off from a classicizer to a realist - the  pentimento is
dramatic. See also infra note 35, for similar example.
23.  SCHOULER  & BLAKEMORE, supra note 22, at Preface to the 6th ed.
24.  See  John  Nockleby,  Tortious Interference with  Contractual Relations  in  the  Nineteenth
Century: The Transformation  ofProperty,  Contract,  and Tort, 93 HARv.  L. REV.  1510 (1980).
25.  THOMAS  BAIRD  OF  PERTH,  A  TREATISE  ON THE  LAW  OF  SCOTLAND  RELATIVE  TO  MASTER
AND  SERVANT  AND  MASTER AND  APPRENTICE  (Edinburgh, Thomas Clark  1840).
26.  JOEL  PRENTISS  BISHOP,  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE  LAW  OF  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE,  AND
EVIDENCE  IN MATRIMONIAL  SUITS  105  (1st  ed.,  Boston,  Little,  Brown,  & Co.  1852)].  For  a
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Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant, including therein Masters and
Workmen  in Every Description of Trade and Occupation. This book was
published  in  London  and  in  Philadelphia;  the  English  edition  went
through  seven  editions  and  the  American  edition  two.
27  Additional
American  treatises concentrating  solely on master and servant appeared in
1877 and 1886.28  W.F. Baily's treatise devoted to the master's liability for
injuries to servants, first  published in  1897, was substantially  overhauled
in  1912,  going  from  two  volumes  to  three  in  the  process;
29  and  C.B.
Labatt expanded  his  treatise  on master and  servant  from two  volumes  in
1904 to eight in  1913.30
What to  call  this new field?  Schouler had been quite unsure.  He  noted
that,  "[i]n  these  days,  we  dislike  to  call  any  man  master.""  And  the
problem  was  not  just  nomenclatural;  it  was  taxonomic.  What,  he
wondered,  was  the  right  general  term  for  apprentices,  clerks,  bailiffs,
stewards,  and  employds  of  a  corporation?3 2  Were  they  "laborers
generally"?3 3  Or  perhaps  the  correct  general  title  was  "principal  and
agent"? 34  When  Fraser's  treatise  Master and Servant, and Master and
Apprentice reappeared  in  1882,  edited  by  William  Campbell,  it bore  a
more  modem  title,  adding  the  terms  "employer  and  workman,"  but
retaining the obsolete relation of master and apprentice.
discussion, see Halley,  What is Family Law?: Part  I, supra  note 1, at 33-48.
27.  CHARLES  MANLEY  SMITH,  A TREATISE  ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND  SERVANT,  INCLUDING
THEREIN  MASTERS  AND  WORKMEN  IN EVERY  DESCRIPTION  OF  TRADE  AND  OCCUPATION,  WITH  AN
APPENDIX  OF  STATUTES  (London,  S.  Sweet  1852;  Philadelphia,  T.  & J.W.  Johnson  1852).  London
printings  were  issued  in  1860,  1870,  1885,  1902,  1906,  and  1922;  the  second  American  edition
appeared  in  1866.
28.  H.G.  WOOD,  A  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  MASTER  AND  SERVANT.  COVERING  THE
RELATION,  DUTIES  AND  LIABILITIES  OF  EMPLOYERS  AND  EMPLOYEES  (Albany,  N.Y.,  John  D.
Parsons, Jr.  1886) [hereinafter WOOD,  MASTER AND  SERVANT  (1st ed.)]; H.G.  WOOD, A TREATISE ON
THE  LAW  OF  MASTER  AND  SERVANT.  COVERING  THE  RELATION,  DUTIES  AND  LIABILITIES  OF
EMPLOYERS  AND  EMPLOYEES  (Albany, N.Y., John D.  Parsons, Jr.  1877).
29.  W.F. BAILEY,  THE LAW OF  THE MASTER'S  LIABILITY  FOR  INJURIES TO  SERVANT  (St.  Paul,
Minn.,  West  Pub'g Co.  1894);  W.F.  BAILEY,  A  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  PERSONAL  INJURIES:
INCLUDING  EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY,  MASTER  AND  SERVANT  AND  THE WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION
ACT  (2d ed.  1912).
30.  C.B.  LABATT,  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE  LAW  OF  MASTER  AND  SERVANT:  INCLUDING  THE
MODERN  LAWS ON  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION,  ARBITRATION,  EMPLOYERS'  LIABILITY,  ETC.,  ETC.
(Rochester,  N.Y., The Lawyers  Cooperative Pub'g Co.  1913); C.B.  LABATT,  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE
LAW OF MASTER AND  SERVANT  (1904).
31.  SCHOULER,  DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed.), supra note  12, at 7.
32.  Id. at 7-8.
33.  Id.
34.  Id.
35.  PATRICK  FRASER,  TREATISE  ON  MASTER  AND  SERVANT,  EMPLOYER  AND  WORKMAN,  AND
MASTER  AND  APPRENTICE,  ACCORDING  TO  THE  LAW  OF  SCOTLAND  (William  Campbell  ed.,
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A  major  impediment  to  efforts  to  find  a  handy  title  for  the  modem
version  of master and servant was the emergence  of large bodies of social
legislation  and administrative  law  governing  relations  in the  workplace.
These  explicitly  contradicted  the  classical  ideology  that  master  and
servant was destined to contract,  and thus to the will theory. Fraser noted
the  rise  of statute  law,  bewailed  the  confusion  created  by  overlapping
legislation, and offered his  treatise as  an attempt  to produce  consistency:
"The Factory  Acts, the main object of which  is to protect  the interests  of
women  and  children,  amount  to  no  less  than  fourteen  in  number,
presenting  a  mass  of almost  inextricable  confusion  . . . which  must  be
puzzling  in deed  to  the young  persons  and  females  whose  interests  they
were  intended  to  guard."36  Baily's  and  Labatt's  revised  titles
acknowledged  the predominance of legislation over common  law and the
rise of social conflict in the field:  Bailey offered A Treatise on the Law of
Personal Injuries: Including Employer's Liability, Master and Servant
and  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  while  Labatt's  advertised
Commentaries on the Law of Master and Servant: Including the Modern
Laws  on  Workmen's  Compensation, Arbitration, Employers'  Liability,
etc.,  etc.  Even  a  cursory  survey  of  this  bookshelf  shows  the  rising
complexity of the field as  statutory and  administrative innovations  rose to
meet  the  social  crisis  attending  the  transformation  of the  common  law
master  into  the  capitalist  and  the  servant  into  organized  labor.  Kennedy
points  out, "After a  brief flirtation with the judge . . ., the hero  figures of
the  social  current  became,  in  principal,  the  legislators  who  drafted  the
multiplicity of special laws that constituted the new order, along with  the
administrator who produced  and enforced the detailed regulations that put
legislative regimes  into effect."37  We see that shift in Baily's and Labatt's
structural  overhaul of master and  servant. They  opened the  floodgates of
the social and reconstructed the ancient topic by an open-eyed recognition
of social  legislation.  Domestic  relations,  meanwhile,  sailed  placidly  on,
adding  chapters  about  Married  Women's  Property  Acts but  manifesting
Edinburgh,  T.  & T. Clark  1882).  By  the time  this volume  appeared, Fraser was  a  vigorous  65 years
old  and  a  Lord  of  Session.  OXFORD  DICTIONARY  OF  NATIONAL  BIOGRAPHY  ONLINE,
http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezp-prodl.hul.harvard.edu/view/articlel10119?docPos=2  (last  visited
Aug. 3, 2011).  Presumably he delegated the editorial role to Campbell because he was fully occupied
by his judicial duties.
36.  FRASER,  TREATISE  ON THE LAW OF  SCOTLAND  RELATIVE  TO MASTER  AND  SERVANT,  supra
note 18,  at vi.
37.  Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 4, at 43.
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no felt need to reframe or rename the field because of them.38
What  was  the  fate  of  Schouler's  idea  that  the  field  might  best  be
designated  the  law  of "laborers  generally"?  It  seems  plausible  that this
term, focusing  entirely on one  side of the relation, was understood by the
inventors of the field to be too partisan.  Several entrants proposed instead
to follow the old "relations"  format, by replacing master and servant with
employer  and  employee.  One  of these,  decidedly  not a product  of the
academic  legal  elite, offered itself not as  a legalists'  learned book but as a
handbook for the masses:
In  offering  this work  to  the  public  the author has  endeavored  to
give information which is often an object of earnest inquiry among
the  masses of the people;  but the  real  motives  that prompted  the
undertaking is to clear away the distrust in courts, and to point out
why so many decisions were against labor in the past, and to direct
the attention of the masses to bring the  law to bear on all matters
concerning them as the solution of the present evils....
...  Should the  work tend to  direct the thoughts  of the  industrial
and commercial world to apply the law, instead of force, to govern
their relations, thereby lessening the present overhanging evils, the
author  will consider  it of the highest personal  compensation,  and
to  the  end of bettering  the  condition  of the  toiling  masses  with
whom  he  has  ever  been  identified  the  book  is  respectfully
submitted.40
J.H. Murphy's  politics  were  typical  of social progressives.  He  deplored
the  Pullman  strikes  as  injurious  to capital,  workers  and consumers  alike
and implored  all sides to put strikes behind them. In a chapter titled "The
38.  Shouler thought  the  Married  Women's  Property  Acts  established an  unfair bias  in  favor  of
wives,  SCHOULER,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st ed.),  supra note  12, at  17-20,  and refered  to them only
when  necessary  in the  text,  e.g.,  id. at  247-48.  Blakemore,  revising  Schouler's  Domestic Relations
treatise in  1921,  was  perhaps even more disgusted by  the changes  these Acts  introduced,  SCHOULER
& BLAKEMORE, supra note 22,  at 309-10,  but felt obliged  to give them a chapter of their own, id. at
307-32 (Chapter XVI,  Married  Women's Acts).
39.  See  J.H.  MURPHY,  APPLY  THE  LAW:  A  TREATISE  ON  THE  APPLICATION  OF  LAW  AS  THE
MEANS  OF  SETTLING  DISPUTES  BETWEEN  EMPLOYER  AND  EMPLOYED,  AND  OTHER  MATTERS  OF
DAILY  IMPORTANCE  TO  THE  MASSES  7-8  (Terre  Haute,  Ind.,  Moore  &  Langain  1891);  WOOD,
MASTER AND  SERVANT  (1st  ed.), supra note 28, at Title  Page; see also IRVING  BROWNE,  ELEMENTS
OF THE  LAW  OF  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS AND  OF  EMPLOYER AND  EMPLOYED  (2d ed.,  Boston, Boston
Book  Co.  1909);  IRVING  BROWNE,  ELEMENTS  OF  THE  LAW  OF  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  AND  OF
EMPLOYER  AND  EMPLOYED (Boston, Soule  & Bugbee  1883)  (a student trot compressing  Schouler and
Wood).
40.  MURPHY,  supra  note 39, at 7-8. Murphy included  a short chapter on  marriage. Id.  at 133-37.
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Remedy,"  he proposed  the establishment  of labor  courts  devoted  to  the
neutral  and  fair  administration  of the  law.41  As  Kennedy  indicates,  the
social  occupied  a  large  political  range  between  communism  and  pure
laissez faire; across  the  spectrum  it  was  an  ideology  of  social  and
industrial  harmony,  not  of confrontation  and  class  war.4 2  Murphy  fits
right in, on the left end of the spectrum.
Murphy's preferred name for the field, employer and employee, did not
take  hold,  perhaps  because  it  gave  a  scent  of  his  progressive
egalitarianism.  (Our current course  Employment  Law  has  origins  not in
the rise  of the  social but in the Post-World-War  II era, the age of rights.)
The  nomenclatural  question  was  not  settled  until  1922,  the  year  after
Schouler's Domestic  Relations treatise appeared under new editorship and
for the  first time bereft of master and  servant.  The  social reformers'  new
name for the field was Labor Law, announced by Francis Bowes Sayre in
his  1922  work, A  Selection of Cases and Other Authorities on Labor
Law.
43  Inside the covers we find another transformation:  Sayres displaced
contract and  gave pride of place to combination.44  A  thoroughly modem
topic  had been  born,  and  a new  form  of the  status/contract  distinction:
domestic relations law/labor law.
The  divorce  of master  and  servant  from  domestic  relations  was  swift
but  one-sided:  the  former  declared  independence  long  before  the  latter
took  note  of the  rift  between  them.  As  Maine  had  predicted,  contract
progressed  and status lagged.  The  remainder of this section  describes  the
long,  shambling  wanderings  that  carried  Blackstone's  "private
oeconomical  relations"  into modernity,  that is,  to take  shape  as domestic
relations housing only husband and wife and parent and child.
Almost  incredibly,  Tapping  Reeve's  Law of Baron and Femme was
republished  in  1846,  1862,  and  1867,  long  after  Reeve's  own  death  in
1823.45  In  1888,  a  new editor renamed  it The Law of Husband and Wife
41.  Id. at 152-57.
42.  Kennedy, Three Globalizations,  supra  note 4, at 39, 42, 44.
43.  FRANCES  BOWES  SAYRE,  A  SELECTION OF CASES AND  OTHER AUTHORITIES  ON  LABOR  LAW
(1922).
44.  Id. at passim.
45.  TAPPING REEVE,  THE LAW  OF BARON AND  FEMME,  OF  PARENT AND  CHILD, GUARDIAN  AND
WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT,  AND OF THE POWERS  OF A COURT  OF CHANCERY,  WITH AN  ESSAY ON
THE  TERMS  HEIR, HEIRS  AND HEIRS  OF  THE  BODY (Amasa  J. Parker &  Charles  Baldwin  eds.,  3d ed.
[sic],  Albany,  N.Y.,  William  Gould  1867);  TAPPING  REEVE,  THE  LAW OF  BARON AND  FEMME,  OF
PARENT  AND  CHILD,  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD,  MASTER  AND  SERVANT,  AND  OF  THE  POWERS  OF  A
COURT  OF CHANCERY, WITH  AN  ESSAY ON THE  TERMS  HEIR, HEIRS  AND HEIRS OF  THE BODY (Amasa
J. Parker & Charles Baldwin  eds.,  3d ed.,  Albany,  N.Y.,  William  Gould  1862); TAPPING REEVE,  THE
LAW  OF  BARON  AND  FEMME,  OF  PARENT  AND  CHILD,  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD,  MASTER  AND
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and  deleted Reeve's  "Essay  on  the  Terms  Heir, Heirs  and  Heirs  of the
Body,"  but held  on tight  to an  admittedly  inadequate  section  on  master
and  servant:  "[T]he  growth  of modern  industrialism,  and  of  the  vast
combinations  of  capital  and  labor  necessary  to  carry  on  the  complex
activity  of the  commercial  life  of today,  have  led  to  a  corresponding
development and extension of the legal  principles governing the relations
of Master  and  Servant.  All  these  causes  have  led  to  the  comparative
disuse of Judge  REEVE'S  work, though  it  is  still  cited  with  respect by
courts, and used by older practioners."46  Meanwhile,  Schouler's Domestic
Relations went through at least  five editions under his  own  pen between
1870 and  1905,  always with  master and servant  on board.  47  Other books
followed suit.
48
Bolder  protests  against  the  inclusion  of master  and  servant  followed,
though without effectively  ousting  the  topic.  In  1896  Walter  C.  Tiffany
offered a Handbook  on the Law ofPersons and Domestic Relations which
included  the  following  topics:  Husband  and  Wife;  Parent  and  Child;
Guardian and  Ward;  Infants, Persons Non Compotes  Mentis,  and Aliens;
and  Master  and  Servant.49  (I  will  turn  to  this  addition  of  "persons"
SERVANT,  AND  OF  THE  POWERS  OF A COURT  OF CHANCERY,  WITH  AN  ESSAY  ON  THE  TERMS  HEIR,
HEIRS  AND  HEIRS  OF  THE  BODY  (Lucius  E.  Chittenden  ed.,  2d  ed.,  Burlington,  V.T.,  Chauncey
Goodrich  1846;  N.Y.,  Banks,  Gould  &  Co.  1846).  For  the  date  of Reeve's  death,  see  Rev.  Dr.
Beecher, Hon. Tapping Reeve.  From a Funeral  Sermon,  VT. CHRON.,  Mar. 9,  1827,  at 48  col.  E;
Tapping  Reeve,  AM.  NATIONAL  BIOGRAPHY  ONLINE,  http://www.anb.org/articles/l1/ll-
00724.html?a= l&f-%22tapping%20reeve%22&d=10&ss=0&q=1  (last visited Aug. 3,  2011).
46.  TAPPING REEVE & JAMES W. EATON,  JR.,  THE LAW OF HUSBAND  AND  WIFE,  OF PARENT AND
CHILD, GUARDIAN  AND  WARD,  MASTER  AND  SERVANT  iii  (4th ed.  [sic],  William Gould,  Jr.,  &  Co.
1888). This is actually the fifth edition.
47.  Schouler's treatise went  through  five editions  in  his lifetime. Throughout  he  maintained his
original categorical  scheme and reprinted his objections to it. See, for instance,  JAMES SCHOULER,  A
TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  EMBRACING  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE,  PARENT
AND  CHILD,  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD,  INFANCY,  AND  MASTER  AND  SERVANT  3-21  (2d  ed.,  Boston,
Little, Brown & Co.  1874),  which moves  the First Edition's introduction virtually verbatim  to a new
introductory chapter, and  JAMES SCHOULER,  A TREATISE  ON THE  LAW  OF THE  DOMESTIC RELATIONS
EMBRACING  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE,  PARENT  AND  CHILD,  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD,  INFANCY,  AND
MASTER AND  SERVANT  8-14  (3d  ed., Boston,  Little,  Brown &  Co.  1882),  which moves much  of the
categorical  discussion  to  footnotes,  with  modifications,  such  as  the  observation  that  'domestic
relations'  is now the well-sanctioned  title of that law which embraces  the topics specified  by us at the
outset[.]"
48.  MARSHALL  DAVIS  EWELL  &  JAMES W.  LA  MURE,  A  MANUAL  OF  THE  LAW  OF  DOMESTIC
RELATIONS  (Detroit,  Collector  Pub'g  Co.  1896)  (with  successive  editions);  WILLIS  E.  MYERS,
SYLLABUS  OF  THE  HON.  HENRY  D.  HARLAN'S  LECTURES  ON  THE  LAW  OF  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS
(Baltimore,  King  Brothers  1898);  JAMES  PAIGE,  ILLUSTRATIVE  CASES  IN  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS:
WITH  ANALYSIS  AND  CITATIONS  (Philadelphia,  T.  & J.W.  Jonson  1893).  All  three  of  these items
retained guardian and ward and master and servant.
49.  WALTER  C. TIFFANY,  HANDBOOK  ON  THE  LAW  OF  PERSONS  AND  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS,  at
iii (St.  Paul, Minn., West Pub'g Co.  1896) [hereinafter TIFFANY,  HANDBOOK].
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shortly.)  Tiffany  didn't like the inclusion of master and servant one  little
bit. Like Schouler, he thought that the proper topic was domestic relations
simpliciter,  and introduced Master  and Servant with an express  statement
that its classification with the domestic relations was an error:
The  relation  of master  and  servant  has  from  a  very  early period
been classed with that  of husband  and wife, parent and  child, and
guardian  and  ward,  as  one  of  the  domestic  relations  . . .. This
classification  is  accurate  enough  when  applied  to  slaves,
apprentices,  and  domestic  servants,  but  it  is  not  accurate  when
applied to other servants, like clerks in stores and offices, laborers,
employ6s  of railroad  companies,  and  many  other  employds  who
are subject to the law governing the relation of master and servant.
Accuracy  in classification, however, must, in this as in many other
cases,  yield  to  usage,  and  the  law  applicable  to  all  kinds  of
servants will be considered.o
The second  and third editions  of Tiffany's Law of Persons and  Domestic
Relations appeared  in  1909  and  1921;  the  second  credited  Roger  W.
Cooley  as  an  editor, while  the third declared  him a co-author."  Tiffany
and Cooley continued to object to their continued inclusion of master and
servant. Meanwhile,  possibly under the  influence  of Cooley  increasingly
shouldering  the  burden  alone,  the  treatise  added  an  almost  laughably
inadequate  section  on statutory  regulation.  I reproduce  it in full because
that is the only way to convey how little responsibility domestic relations
took  for the immense  social,  political  and  legal struggle  which  by  then
had become manifest in the freestanding  master and servant treatises:
STATUTORY REGULATION.
256.  The  state,  by  virtue  of the  police  power,  may  make  such
regulations  controlling  the relation  of master and  servant  as  may
be  necessary  to  preserve  the  public  health,  safety,  or  general
welfare.
In many states statutes have been enacted regulating the relation of
master  and  servant  in  matters  pertaining  to  the  employment  of
children and women, and the hours of labor, and intended to insure
the  public  welfare  and  health  and  safety  of  employds.  Such
50.  Id. at 451-52.
51.  WALTER  C.  TIFFANY  &  ROGER  W.  COOLEY,  THE  LAW  OF  PERSONS  AND  DOMESTIC
RELATIONS  (2d  ed.,  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  West  Pub'g  Co.  1909)  [hereinafter  TIFFANY  &  COOLEY,
DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (2d ed.)];  WALTER C.  TIFFANY  & ROGER W.  COOLEY, THE LAW  OF PERSONS
AND  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (3d ed.,  St. Paul,  Minn,  West Pub'g Co.  1912)  [hereinafter  TIFFANY  &
COOLEY, DOMESTIC RELATIONS  (3d ed.)].
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statutes are generally held to be valid exercises of the police power
of  the  state,  and  unless  open  to  some  special  objection  are
constitutional.5 2
One year after this pathetically depoliticized  and entirely useless summary
appeared,  Labatt produced  his eight-volume  guide  to master and  servant.
It is impossible  to imagine any early twentieth  century practitioner turning
to  a  treatise  on  domestic  relations  for  guidance  on  how  to  handle  a
working hours dispute or a labor injunction.  Master  and servant  lived  on
as a  "domestic  relation,"  but  under the  cloud of a  complete  and  express
loss of faith.
Meanwhile,  the  idea that marriage  is  status,  transformed  into  the  idea
that the wife occupies a status, that she was a deviant kind of legal person,
led  several  publishing  houses  and  treatise  writers  to  add  "the  law  of
persons" to their domestic relations offerings. The  American  idea  that
certain  people  are  persons  arose  not  from  the  Roman  law  concept  of
persones, but  from the home-grown  insight that certain  individuals  were
incapable of contract and needed special legal treatment.
53  If contract was
the  queen  of  all  law,  those  who  could  not  participate  in  it  were
problematic  and needed  special  treatment.  Theophilus  Parsons'  1853  list
of the  "disabled  persons" 5 4  included  a very  colorful  cast  of characters:
infants; married women; bankrupts  and insolvents; persons  of insufficient
mind  to  contract  (which  in turn  included  non compotes mentis,  seamen,
and persons under duress);  aliens;  slaves;  and outlaws,  persons  attainted,
and persons  excommunicated.
5  (At  no  time  did  American  legal  minds
entertain  the  French  legal  idea  of "personal  status  law.")  The  idea  of
classifying  the  domestic  relations  with  the  law  of  (defective)  persons
produced  a  small  shelf  of  treatises  entitled  Persons  and Domestic
Relations (or  vice  versa)  between  1897  and  1927,  and  then  died  out,
leaving  the  field  to  Domestic  Relations  simpliciter.  This  was  never  a
robust legal  idea;  and  there are  indications  that pressure  from publishers
rather than the working out of a legal logic lies behind this weak trend.
We  have  already  seen  Tiffany protesting  his  own  inclusion of master
52.  TIFFANY  &  COOLEY,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (2d  ed.),  supra  note  51,  at  478  (citations
omitted).  The  third  edition  added  equally  cursory  acknowledgment  that federal  statutes  and  state
Workmen's  Compensation  Acts existed. TIFFANY & COOLEY,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (3d ed.), supra
note 51,  at 573-74.
53.  See Halley, What is Family Law?: Part I, supra note 1, at  17.
54.  1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS,  THE LAW  OF CONTRACTS 242 (photo. reprint  1980) (Boston,  Little,
Brown & Co.  1853)  [hereinafter PARSONS,  THE LAW OF CONTRACTS].
55.  Id. at xix-xxii.
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and servant  in his  1896  Handbook on the Law of Persons and Domestic
Relations. Nor  did he like  including the  Infants, Persons Non  Compotes
Mentis and Aliens, his thinned out list of the classical persons.
His  Preface  states  his  own  preference  for  a book  limited to  Husband
and Wife, Parent and Child, Infants, and Guardian and Ward, indicating in
the passive  voice that  "it has been thought  advisable"  to  add  Master and
Servant, the insane and aliens. He thanked another writer, to whom he did
not  grant  the  dignity  of  co-authorship,  for  writing  these  unwelcome
additions.56  Tiffany  thus  offered  a  vastly  contracted  enumeration  of
disabled  persons from the one contemplated  by the classics; did so under
protest;  and  even refused to  write or even credit the author of the pages
setting forth their law.
This  is  the  first  book  in  our  survey  published  by  West,  and  it
exemplifies  the rise  of the  law-book (soon to be  the casebook)  series. A
new player, the publisher  seeking  to present the  full  array  of marketable
books,  is on the  stage.  It seems  likely that pressure  from West was  what
overrode  Tiffany's  legal  science,  and  that  his  term  "usage"  means
something close to the expectations  of the law-book consumer, probably a
practitioner, teacher or student, rather than a judge. This is our first direct
indication  of  a  force  that  doubtless  pervades  our  story  without  rising
explicitly  to the  surface:  the yearning  for system that  so preoccupied  the
classics was giving way to pragmatic  decisions attuned to selling books to
consumers  in law practice and in legal education.
One  detects  more  enthusiasm  for  linking  domestic  relations  with  the
law  of  persons  in  Edwin  Woodruff,  who  housed  under  this  rubric
Marriage,  Divorce  and  Separation;  Parent  and  Child;  Insanity;
Drunkenness;  and  Aliens.  But  contraction  of  the  defective  persons
continued when  Woodruff's  second and  final  editions, published  in  1905
and  1920,  drastically  curtailed  the  space  given over  to  them,  suggesting
that  he  (or his  readers  or publisher, or  some  combination  of them)  was
losing  faith  in  the  idea  that  a  law  of persons  existed  and  needed to  be
known. 
5  More  air was let  out of the balloon  by Albert  M.  Kales,  who
published  Cases on Persons and Domestic Relations in  1911  as  part  of
56.  TIFFANY,  HANDBOOK,  supra  note 49, at iii.
57.  EDWIN H.  WOODRUFF,  A  SELECTION OF CASES  ON  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  AND  THE  LAW  OF
PERSONS  iii-xiv (N.Y.,  Baker, Voorhis  & Co. 1897).
58.  EDWIN  H.  WOODRUFF,  A  SELECTION  OF CASES ON  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  AND  THE  LAW  OF
PERSONS  v-xi  (2d ed.,  New York, Baker, Voorhis  & Co.  1905); EDWIN  H.  WOODRUFF, A SELECTION
OF CASES  ON  THE LAW  OF  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  AND  OF  PERSONS  v-x  (3d  ed.,  New  York, Baker,
Voorhis & Co. 1920).
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West  Publishing  Company's  new  American  Casebook  Series.59  Kales
acknowledged  two sources:  Woodruff and  Jeremiah  Smith's  1899  Cases
on Selected Topics in the Law ofPersons60 (an offering suggesting  further
debilitation of the impulse for system) and proceeded without comment to
eliminate  all  of Woodruff s  disabled  persons  from  the  text  itself.6'  He
presented  the  list  which  Smith  had  deemed  merely  "selected" 62  as
complete:  Parent and Child, Infants,  and Husband  and Wife. By  the time
William  Edward McCurdy  published  his  1927  casebook  on The Law  of
Persons and  Domestic Relations, the impulse to classify marriage with the
disabled persons was dead.  McCurdy divided his book into three topics,
making no excuse  for what he was leaving  out:  Marriage,  Separation  and
Divorce;  Husband  and  Wife,  Married  Women;  and  Parent  and  Child,
Guardian  and  Ward,  and  Infants.  Moreover,  though  McCurdy  included
Guardian  and  Ward in  the  title  of his Part III,  he  radically  demoted the
topic: it disappeared  from the Table of Contents without comment and, in
the  text,  he  referred  to  it  in  scattered  notes  and  almost  offhand
references."  In the second edition he finished the excision: Part III of the
casebook  was  re-titled  "Parent  and  Child.  Infants."6'  The  modern
domestic relations law-book had finally been born.
In 1927 McCurdy was in the vanguard;  Schouler's vision - now almost
50 years  old - of a legal  topic centered  on the social  space of the home
was  finally realized.  Still,  McCurdy retained  The Law of Persons in his
title  through  three  further  editions,  deleting  it  only  in  his  last  1964
edition. 6  The casebook  was in print  for about 40 years, a very  long run.
59.  ALBERT  M.  KALES,  CASES  ON  PERSONS  AND  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  SELECTED  FROM  THE
DECISIONS  OF  ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  COURTS  xii-xvi (St.  Paul,  Minn.,  West  Pub'g  Co.  1911)
[hereinafter KALES,  PERSONS AND  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS].
60.  JEREMIAH  SMITH,  CASES  ON SELECTED  TOPICS  IN  THE LAW  OF PERSONS  (Cambridge,  Mass.,
Harvard  Law Review Pub'g  Assoc. 1899) [hereinafter  SMITH, LAW OF PERSONS].
61.  KALES,  PERSONS  AND  DOMESTIC RELATIONS, supra  note 59, at xii.
62.  SMITH, LAW OF  PERSONS, supra note 60, at v-ix.
63.  WILLIAM  EDWARD MCCURDY,  CASES ON  THE LAW OF  PERSONS  AND  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS
(1927)  [hereinafter MCCURDY,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st  ed.)]. For the  table of contents,  see  id. at
1x-x.
64.  The  index refers  to cases  and notes  on child custody, id. at 877-881,  the infant's  property, id.
at 894-99, 907-09  n.3, and to extremely abbreviated  footnote references about  infants'  contracts, id. at
1050  n.1,  on tort  actions  for  the  seduction of a child, id. at  1186  n.2,  and on  the  child's  tort action
against  a guardian  for injuries to his person,  id. at  1203  n.3.  For the  index entry, see  id. at  1216-17.
Guardian and ward had ceased being a topic and was reborn as fragmentary scraps of law within other
topics.
65.  WILLIAM  EDWARD  MCCURDY,  CASES ON  THE LAW OF  PERSONS  AND  DOMESTIC RELATIONS
xii (2d ed.  1933)  [hereinafter MCCURDY,  DOMESTIC RELATIONS  (2d ed.)]
66.  WILLIAM  EDWARD  MCCURDY, CASES  ON THE LAW OF  PERSONS  AND  DOMESTIC RELATIONS
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As  we will  see, by  1964  his whole approach,  from  title to contents,  had
become reactionary.
Thus  the  idea  of  a  law-book  housing  the  Blackstonian  "private
oeconomical  relations"  died  out  very  slowly  indeed. 7  When  it  did,
McCurdy's  casebook  became  modal.  But  compared  with  what  had
happened  to master and servant,  it represented very little change, achieved
very late. Domestic relations had become a temporally "slow"  field.
The rise of master and servant as a separate  topic, and its swift embrace
of social  legislation,  implied  a  complete rejection  of the  classical  legal
idea  that  the  work  relation  was  governed  by  contract  law,  and  that
contract  law was  preeminently  the home of the will theory,  the exclusive
domain of the  will of the parties.  This happened  quickly  in the  law-of-
work  treatises  - though  not  of course  so  quickly  in  the  classicizing
treatises  on  contract,  tort  and  property  and  very  slowly  indeed  at  the
Supreme  Court. And  we  see  a corresponding  loss  of faith  in  contract's
complementary  opposite,  status,  as  the  domestic  relations  treatises  and
casebooks  wanly attempted and gradually  failed to yoke a law  of persons
to the domestic relations.
What  we  are  seeing  here  is  the  reconstruction  of  the  classical
status/contract  distinction  in  the  new  parole  of  the  social.  What  made
domestic  relations  law  exceptional  was,  at first,  its  crisp preservation  of
the  will of the state  against  the will of the  parties,68  but an increasingly
distinct feature  of the field was becoming its tendency to lag. Master  and
servant modernized  rapidly; by the end of the  19 th century  it had assumed
its  social  form  and  was  lacking  only  its  social  name,  labor  law.
Meanwhile  domestic  relations  law  went  through  a  desultory,  almost
aimless series  of minor revisions. In this process, it became  acceptable  to
produce  domestic  relations  books  that  their  own  authors  denounced  as
wrong;  the  field  was  becoming  not  only  retardataire  but  demoralized.
Domestic relations  didn't  dock  as domestic  relations  law  in  the  revised
legal  order until  1927.  By  that time, the pervasive  understanding  of the
(3d  ed.  1939);  WILLIAM  EDWARD  MCCURDY,  CASES  ON  THE  LAW  OF  PERSONS  AND  DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (4th ed.  1952);  WILLIAM EDWARD  MCCURDY,  DOMESTIC RELATIONS  (1964).
67.  The  last treatise  that I can  find  using the  Blackstonian  list  in  its  title  is  WILLIAM  PINDER
EVERSLEY,  EVERSLEY'S  LAW  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS:  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE,  PARENT  AND
CHILD,  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD,  INFANTS,  MASTER  AND  SERVANT  (Alexander Cairnes  ed.,  5th ed.,
London,  Sweet  & Maxwell  1937).  Schouler's  posthumous  editor  had  by  that  time  abandoned  it,
classifying  instead  the  law  of ongoing marriages,  of parent  and child,  of infancy,  of guardian  and
ward, and of divorce and separation.  SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE,  supra note 22, at vii-xxx.
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legal  order  corresponded  with  "the  social."  Maine's  prediction  that
contract would progress and status would lag69  came true, though in terms
he could not possibly have predicted.
II. THE  RISE OF THE SOCIAL:  POUND
In the  early  years of the 20t'  century,  a massive  new brainwave  sped
through  the heads of American  legal  elites:  the rise  of the  idea that  law
derives not from abstract principles but from the human project of using it
to  address  social  needs.  Roscoe  Pound  was  in  the  vanguard  of  this
movement  and  established  himself quickly  as  one of its  most  vocal  and
prolific  proponents.70  In  1916,  the  same  year  that  he  became  Dean  of
Harvard Law School,"  Pound fired the opening salvo against the classical
contents  of Domestic  Relations  in an article  entitled "Individual  Interests
in the Domestic Relations."72  The article  states an ambitious new program
for sociological jurisprudence  about the domestic relations. The field was
finally going to be shaken up.
First,  note  that  Pound  paid  no  credit  to  the  idea  that  the  domestic
relations included master and servant. His article is a compact synthesis of
four  interests  that  constitute  the  field  and justify  legal  rules  in common
law, civil law, Roman law and the Married Women's Property Acts:
There  are four types of interest in the domestic relations which the
law  is  called  upon  to  secure.  These  are  (1)  interests  of parents,
demands  which  the  individual  may  make  growing  out  of  the
parental  relation;  (2)  interests  of  children,  demands  which  the
individual  may  make  growing  out  of  the  filial  relation;  (3)
interests of husbands,  demands which the individual  husband may
make  growing  out  of  the  marital  relation;  and  (4)  interests  of
wives, demands which the individual wife may make  growing out
of the marital relation.73
Delving down deeper, Pound counted up three legally recognized  interests
69.  HENRY  SUMNER  MAINE,  ANCIENT  LAW:  ITS  CONNECTION  WITH  THE  EARLY  HISTORY  OF
SOCIETY, AND  ITS RELATION TO MODERN  IDEAS  168-69  (Frederick Pollock ed.,  London, John Murray
1912)  (1861).  For a discussion,  see Halley,  What is Family Law?: Part  I, supra  note 1, at 71-74.
70.  Roscoe  Pound,  AM.  NAT'L  BIOGRAPHY  ONLINE,  http://www.anb.org.ezp-
prod l.hul.harvard.edu/articles/1  1/1  1-00699.html?a=1&n=roscoe%20pound&d=10&ss=O&q=1  (last
visited July 8, 2011).
71.  Id.
72.  Roscoe  Pound,  The Individual Interests in  the Domestic Relations, 14  MICH.  L.  REV.  177
(1916)  [hereinafter POUND,  INDIVIDUAL  INTERESTS].
73.  Id. at 181.
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in  the  parent  against  the  child;  three  interests  in  the  child  against  the
parent;  four interests  in the  husband with respect to  his  wife  against the
world; four interests in the husband  against the wife;  four interests  of the
wife with  respect to her husband against  the world;  and  two interests  in
the  wife  against  the  husband.74  For  each  of these,  Pound  assesses  the
strength of the interest,  identifies the rules that  serve  it, and  adjudges the
rules either adequate or still in need of improvement.
But  Pound's  title  is  misleading:  the  crux  of  his  argument  is  that
individual  interests  in  the  domestic  relations  must,  and  inexorably  do,
give  way to  social  interests.  The  very  first  lines  of the  article  state  this
credo:  "It  is  important  to distinguish  the  individual  interests  in domestic
relations  from  the  social  interest  in  the  family  and  marriage  as  social
institutions.  This  social  interest  must  play  an  important  part  in
determining  what individual  interests  in  such  are to  be  secured,  how  far
they are to be secured and how they are to be secured.""  The article maps
out,  rule  by  rule,  the  many  ways  in  which  the  individual  interests  of
husband  and wife, of parent and child - protected  as rights but constantly
implying  correlative  duties  - were  required  to  give  way  not  only  to
countervailing  individual  interests  but,  increasingly,  to  social  interests.
Joseph's  Story's  idea  that  marriage  is  an  institution  of  society,  and
Schouler's that domestic relations as a topic should map the social home -
both of which  had pretty much lain  on the  table unused by  anyone until
now-were suddenly ready for an efflorescence.
Pound rationalized  all the specific  rights of husband against  wife, wife
against husband, parent  against  child, child against  parents  as  individual
interests which,  whenever  needed,  quietly  give  way  to  an  overarching
social interest both  in  the  family  and  in  its  dependent  members.  For
example,  modern  law  restricts  parental  right  in  order  to  enforce  the
parental  duty  to  care  for  children  in  their  neediness  and  to  secure  the
social interest in the child as a member of society:
Under more  primitive  social  conditions the  group  interests of the
family or kindred largely dictated the legal delimitation of parental
and  filial interests.  In modern times  the individual interests  of the
child  came  to  be  given  greater  weight.  Today  certain  social
interests  are chiefly  regarded.  These  are  on the one  hand  a social
interest  in the maintenance of the family as a social institution and
on  the  other  a  social  interest  in  the  protection  of  dependent
74.  Id. at  181-2,  185-6,  188,  190-93,  193,  195.
75.  Id. at  177.
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persons,  in securing to all individuals a moral and social life and in
the  rearing  and  training  of sound  and  well-bred  citizens  for  the
future.  The  parent's  claim  to  the  custody  of  the  child  and  to
control over its bringing up has come to be greatly limited in order
to secure these interests.76
Except  for  the  complacency.  with  which  Pound  predicted  that  social
interests  inexorably  put precisely the right limits  on individual  ones,  this
is  almost verbatim  the  prescription  for the  family  that  we  see  in  one  of
Pound's most admired German jurists, Rudolf von Ihering.n  What Pound
admired in Ihering was precisely the  ideas that law had purpose  - that  its
purpose was not the  exaltation of the individual and his will but the well-
being of society - that legal rules both did and should evolve  to constrain
individual  will  and  serve  social  welfare  - and  that  an  entirely  new
jurisprudence  was  needed to  capture  the  immense  transformation  in  law
studies  and  law  making  that  was  founded  on  these  ideas.  The  great
modernist revolution in American  legal thought of the opening decades of
the  twentieth  century,  advancing  sociological  jurisprudence  and  legal-
science-based  social-purpose  functionalism 7 9  against  the  deductive  style
and the formal classicism of classical legal thought, shook up the house of
Domestic Relations just as it was doing for all the abutting legal topics.
Still,  there  was  an  important  difference  between  Ihering  and  Pound.
Ihering  expressed  anxiety  that  not  nearly  enough  was  being  done  to
protect children  from malign parents:  the solution - public homes - would
require  a "mighty transformation"  that might take  "perhaps  thousands  of
years."so  Pound's "Domestic  Relations"  article  was far more  complacent,
almost  giving off a "whatever is, is right"'  vibe. For all that, in his early
years,  Pound rightly  assumed  the mantle  of the  Young  Turk leading  the
76.  Id. at 182.
77.  RUDOLF  VON  IHERING,  LAW AS  A  MEANS  TO AN  END (Isaac  Husik trans., Boston, The Boston
Book Co.  1913)  [hereinafter  IHERING,  LAW  AS  A MEANS].  This prescription  is particularly  evident in
Chapter  8, § 13,  "The  Pressure of the Law upon the  Individual."  Id. at 381-409.  Pound read German,
and  so could  have read  Ihering's Law as a Means to an End in any of the several  German-language
versions  published  before  1913.  The  first  of these  was  RUDOLPH  VON  JHERING,  DER  ZWECK  IM
RECHT (Leipzig,  Breitkoph & Hlrtel 1877-1883).
78.  Pound  was  on  the  Editorial  Committee  of the  Association  of American  Law  Schools  that
sponsored the  1913  English translation  of Law as a Means to an End.  IHERING,  LAW  AS  A MEANS,
supra note 77, at frontispiece. For Pound's high estimate of Ihering  and his reasons  for it, see  Roscoe
Pound, Mechanical  Jurisprudence,  8 COLUM.  L.  REV.  605, 610 (1908);  and Roscoe Pound, The Scope
and Purpose  ofSociological  Jurisprudence  II, 25 HARV.  L. REV.  140,  140-47 (1911).
79.  Nicola, supra note 10, at 793-95.
80.  IHERING,  LAW AS A  MEANS,  supra  note 77, at 385.
81.  "One  truth  is clear,  'Whatever  IS,  is RIGHT."' Alexander  Pope, An Essay on Man, 1.294,  in
THE POEMS OF ALEXANDER  POPE 501,  515 (John Butt ed.,  1973).
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charge  against the  Old  Guards of conceptual jurisprudence,  he  displayed
at  the  same  time  the  profound  political  conservatism  which  was  to
transform  him in later  years  into  a political  reactionary  and  to  set up his
investment  in his conflict with the legal realists.
The next year,  1917,  Pound situated his vision of the domestic relations
in an all-out attack on individualism  as a principle  for legal development.
In Part II of "The End of Law as Developed  in Juristic Thought,"  he took
the  genealogy of individualism back to Immanuel Kant, traced  it through
Freidrich  Carl  von  Savigny  and  Henry  Sumner  Maine,  labeled  it
"individualism,"  and  denounced  its  march  across  the  late-nineteenth-
century  Anglo-American  legal field.  82  He concluded that  it "coincided  . .
. with  the dominance  of the idea of laissez  faire in economics"83  and was
pregnant with baleful ideological, social, and moral import:
Thus  the  conception  of  the  end  of  law  as  an  unshackling  of
individual  energy,  as  an  insuring  of the  maximum  of individual
free self-assertion, gave rise to a conception of the function of law
as a purely  negative  one  of removing  or  preventing  obstacles  to
such  individual  self-assertion,  not  a  positive  one  of  directly
furthering social progress.84
The  real  villain  of Pound's  story  was  less  Kant  than  Maine:  his
"teaching  was so completely  in accord with  . . . individualism  . . . that it
soon got entire possession of the field."8 5  And where Maine  went wrong,
his  initial  first mistaken  step,  was to adopt  as his  model the  Roman  law
seen "from the standpoint of Savigny.""  This body of social thought, and
all  its moral  and legal  ideas,  were  alien to the common law.  Cut out the
foreign  growth  and  the  healthy,  indigenously social emphasis  of Anglo-
American  law  - indeed,  its  healthy  feudal  emphasis  on  reciprocal
relations saturated with social duty - could flourish in modem form.
This  legal  purification required  the  excision of the  "Romanist  system"
in order to eradicate  its central "conception  of a legal  transaction"  giving
effect  to  the  "will  of the  actor[.]",
8   Pound  objected  to  the  preeminent
82.  Roscoe  Pound,  The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 30  HARV.  L.  REv.  201,
203-10 (1917)  [hereinafter  Pound, The End ofLaw]. Pound traced the spread of individualist thinking
from  the  English utilitarians  (e.g., Bentham),  id. at  206-08,  to historical jurists  (e.g.,  Maine),  id. at
209-11,  to the positivists (e.g., Spencer), id. at 222-23, to the social-individualists (e.g., Lasalle), id.  at
224.
83.  Id. at 203.
84.  Id.
85.  Id. at 210.
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place  given in  the Romanist  system to the  law of obligations,  elided into
the  law  of contract.88  "In  our law,  by  contrast,  the  central  idea  is  rather
relation.""  The antagonism  between  Romanist law and  the common  law
spans the legal field from one end to the other:
The  Romanist  speaks  of the contract  of societas. He  develops  all
his  doctrines from the will of the parties who engaged  in the legal
transaction  of forming  the partnership.  We  speak,  instead, of the
partnership relation and of the powers and rights  and duties which
the law attaches  to that relation. Again, the  Romanist speaks of a
letting  and  hiring  of  land  and  of  the  consequences  which  are
willed  by  entering  into  that  contract.  We  speak  of  the  law  of
landlord  and  tenant  and  of  the  warranties  which  that  relation
implies,  the duties  it involves,  and  the  incidents  attached thereto.
The  Romanist  speaks  of a locatio operarum, a letting of services
and of the effects which the parties have willed thereby. We speak
of the relation of master and servant and of the duty to furnish safe
appliances  and the assumption of risk which are imposed upon the
respective parties thereto.  . .. The  double titles of our digests, such
as  principal  and  surety,  or  vendor  and  purchaser,  where  the
Romanist would use the one word, suretyship or sale, tell the same
story.90
And Pound understood that Family Law was a Romanist  idea alien to the
common law:  "The Romanist  speaks of family  law. We speak of the law
of domestic relations."91
This  is  the  first  instance  in  my  genealogy  when  any  American jurist
gives  a reason why  the Americans never  picked up the German law term
family law for their own law. To be sure, they had been willing to use it to
designate the primitive,  exotic practices of dubiously  civilized others. Not
long after Schouler published his Domestic Relations treatise, Family Law
first appeared  as  a legal  topic  in English,  and all the early  uses  virtually
scream "primitive  law - foreign  law - the law of colonies - the law of the
East."  Thus we find a chapter on "Anglo-Saxon  Family Law";  The Family
Law of the  Chinese; a chapter  on Family  Law in An  Outline of Chinese
Civil Law; A  Treatise on  the Basic Hindu Law including  a chapter  on
Family Law; and a provisional  treaty setting forth the Personal  Status and
Family Law Jurisdiction  of American Nationals in Persia  and of Persian
88.  Id. at  211  n.34.
89.  Id.  at  212.
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Nationals in the United States of  America. 92  But never Anglo-American
family  law.  Before Pound's  intervention, this  setting-aside  can easily  be
explained by the fact that domestic  relations had been the preferred term
of practitioners  since at least the  1830's: there was an agreed-upon  term in
place for what we had in America.
But Pound's  reasons  ran  far  deeper.  He  wrote  in  the  midst of World
War  I;  in  1917,  the  year  Pound published  "The  End of Law,"  America
entered that  bloody conflict  against Germany  and  its  allies.  And  he was
simply  exploding  with  the  energy  of the  social,  deeply  hostile  to  the
ideological  orientation  of the  classical  era.  His  anti-Germanism,  anti-
individualism  and  anti-classicism  merged;  together  they  expressed,  for
him, a civilizational conflict.
Wait a minute, you might object: when the  Savignian Romanist speaks
of  family  law,  he  affirms  a  legal  domain  in  which  "regulation,
paternalism,  community  and  informality"93  are  both  venerated  and
preserved!  Why  not  welcome  that  element  of the  Savignian  idea,  and
leave  the  rest?  But  Pound  got  the  deconstructive  point  of  Savigny's
system:  family law sacralized community, reciprocity, paternalism,  and so
on by segregating them from contract. Family law  exceptionalism  (FLE)
was not a saving remnant from but a warrant  for the will theory. Adopting
the  Romanist  idea  of  family  law,  he  warned,  would  bring  the  paired,
opposite,  equally Romanist  idea of contract  in its wake.  As indeed  it had
done - though  it was now  housed under Pound's favored term Domestic
Relations.94
For  Pound,  then,  the  domestic  relations  were  not  exceptional.  They
92.  ROBERT  THOMAS  BRYAN,  AN  OUTLINE OF  CHINESE CIVIL  LAW  (Shanghai,  The Commercial
Press  1925);  KASHI  PRASAD  JAYASWAL,  MANU  AND  YAAAVAKJYA:  A  COMPARISON  AND
CONTRAST:  A  TREATISE ON  THE BASIC HINDU LAW  (Calcutta, Butterworth  1930); J.L. LAUGHLIN  ET
AL.,  ESSAYS  IN  ANGLO-SAXON  LAW  (Boston,  Little,  Brown  &  Co.  1876);  PAUL  GEORGE  VON
MOLLENDORFF,  THE  FAMILY  LAW  OF  THE  CHINESE  (Shanghai,  Kelley  &  Walsh  1896);  and
PERSONAL  STATUS  AND  FAMILY  LAW  JURISDICTION  OF  AMERICAN  NATIONALS  IN PERSIA  AND  OF
PERSIAN  NATIONALS  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  PROVISIONAL  AGREEMENT  OF  THE
UNITED  STATES OF  AMERICAN  [SIC]  AND  PERSON,  EFFECTED  BY  EXCHANGE  OF NOTES  SIGNED JULY
11,  1928  (Washington,  D.C.,  U.S.  Gov't  Print Office  1931).  The  Savignian  idea  that family  law  is
distinctively  national law,  unlike  contract  law  which  is  (or  ought  to  be)  universal,  thus  came  to
American law libraries through  legal anthropology about primitive law  and through handbooks on the
residual  law  of  colonized  people.  Pound  doesn't  allude  to  this  development,  but  it  may  have
contributed  to the  general  loyalty  to  Domestic  Relations  as the  title for  the  field  which  forms  the
default position from which my story in this Part begins.
93.  DUNCAN  KENNEDY,  THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT  185 (1975).
94.  Pound took note of this terminological  shift:  "If  it be said that this is a relatively recent phrase
in our books,  it may  be  pointed out that  the  title  'baron  and feme'  goes  a  long  way back,  and, as
contrasted with "law of persons,"  has the true common  law ring."  Pound, The End ofLaw, supra note
82, at 213 n.39.
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were  no  different  from the  relations  of landlord  and  tenant,  master  and
servant,  mortgagor  and  mortgagee;  no  different  from  the  duty  (the
relation) that  is the basis of tort  liability,  from fiduciary  duties,  from the
infusion of common law with equity.95  To be sure, the underlying relation
is  different  in  each  case,  but  it's relation  all  the  way  down.  Of all  the
figures  in our  genealogy,  Pound is  surely closest  to Theophilus  Parsons:
they  share the focus  on relation  and are antagonistic  to the market/family
division  of the world  that begins,  in  our story, with  Story.
96  To  be  sure,
Pound  objected  to  Parsons'  emphasis  on  contract,
97  not  noticing,
apparently,  that Parsons  actually  thought that  implied contracts - not the
will of the parties - "form  the web and woof of actual  life."98  As we will
see, this refusal  of FLE was immediately  and enthusiastically  taken up by
the first program for legal realist reform of the law school curriculum.
But before  we  turn  the page  forward,  one  more  important point about
Pound. He was an unabashed neofeudalist. 99 The great continental affinity
of the common  law was not with  Romanist law  but with German law -
German law as Pound supposed it to exist before the early modem revival
of Roman  law.  Maine  had  overlooked  an immense  resource of primitive
law  that did not need to be  superseded  by  contract and  that lay  at hand,
ready to help proponents of the social in their efforts to order modern  life.
Compare,  for  instance,  the  Roman patria potestas, the  power of the
head of the household, with the corresponding  Germanic institution of the
mundium. The  Roman  institution  is  quite one-sided. The paterfamilias  is
legally supreme within the household. He has rights. But whatever duties
he  may  owe  are  owed  without  the  household,  not  within. On  the  other
hand the  Germanic  institution  is conceived  of as  a relation of protection
and  subjection. But the subjection is  not because  of a right of the  house-
father. It is  a subjection because of the relation and for the purposes of the
protection which  the relation  involves.  Also the right of the house-father
grows  out of the  right of the relation  and  is a  right against the  world  to
exercise his duty of protection.ico
It  all  sounds  very  retro  now,  because  we  now  assume  that
modernization  means  equality,  and  that  a  man's  defense  of  male
95.  Id. at 213-16.
96.  See Halley,  What is Family Law?: Part  I, supra note 1, at  12-20.
97.  Pound, The End ofLaw, supra  note 82, at 218, n.56.
98.  PARSONS, THE  LAW OF CONTRACTS,  supra  note 54, at 4.
99.  See also Roscoe Pound, The New Feudal  System,  19  KY. L.J. I (1930).
100.  Pound, The End ofLaw, supra note 82, at 217  (citation omitted).
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superiority  is  almost  per se  in  bad  faith.  But  that  set  of ideas  didn't
become  canonical  in  family law until the last chapter  of our story, in  the
rise of identity politics as  a  central organizing  discourse  in the field,  and
of the equality of the spouses  as a  central organizing  legal principle.  The
modernizing  impulse  that Pound  brought to the domestic  relations  came
with an intuition that it was no different from any other area of law:  it was
social, and so was the law of business.
III. INSTITUTIONALIZING  THE SOCIAL:  THE LEGAL REALISTS  AND  THE
CURRICULUM
The  stage  finally  shifts  from  Harvard  Law  School  to  Columbia  Law
School, where  the faculty undertook an immense curricular reform project
in  1926. Happily, the story of this undertaking  has been painstakingly  told
in an article  by Brainerd Currie,"o'  and  I will rely heavily  on his research
in the primary documents.
The  stimulus  for  change  came  when  new  courses  in  Industrial
Relations,  Illegal  Combinations,  and  legal  economics  were  offered  at
Columbia  in  1922-23.  The  first two of these will not surprise a reader of
Section I of this Part:  the rise of labor conflict was  our first  indication of
the rise of the social in classical-era treatises. According the Currie,  these
new  courses  grabbed  the  faculty's  attention  for  framing  their  topics
around  social situations  rather than doctrinal  categories,  for transgressing
the  boundaries  between  the  topics  of  the  established  curriculum  in
assembling  the  law  they taught,  and  for integrating  "nonlegal  materials"
in  order  to  make  the  leap  from  law  to  society.
102  The  third,  taught  by
Robert  Hale,  dared  law  to  become  as  scientific  as  economics.  Currie
observed  that  these  courses,  with  their  "challenge  to  the  accepted
taxonomy  of the  law  and  their  disturbing  impact  on  the  unity  and  the
proportions  of the  curriculum,  . . . [were]  directly  responsible  for  the
extensive  studies  [of  the  curriculum  as  a  whole]  which  the  faculty
undertook four years later."'
03
The result was a  full-scale  effort to reform  the  entire  curriculum.  This
101.  Brainerd  Currie,  The  Materials of Law Study,  Part III, Nonlegal Materials in  the Law
School:  Beginnings  of the  Modern Integration Movement,  8 J.  LEGAL  EDUC.  1 (1955)  [hereinafter
Currie,  Materials]. I have  also  relied  on  Annaline  Loubser, Nonlegal  Materials  in  Legal  Education
with Special  Reference to Family Law (unpublished seminar paper, Harvard  Law School) (May  1961)
(on file with Harvard Law Library).
102.  Currie, Materials,  supra  note  101,  at 3.
103.  Id.  at  3-4.
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campaign  involved a vast outpouring of faculty energy. The goals were to
make  each  course  fully  responsive  to  pressing  social  problems,  to
integrate  social  science  knowledge  so  that  lawyers  could join with  other
professions  generating  knowledge  of  society  in  the  expert  solution  of
those  problems,  and,  in  the  process,  and  withal  that,  nevertheless  to
reconstruct  a coherent curriculum  in which  students would  not encounter
duplicative  training.  Currie again:  "At some point early  in this  four-year
period, the  idea was  developed  that  the  solution  to the  problem  was  to
reorganize  the  entire course of study  along  functional  lines.  . . . [This]
accounts  for the paradox that inclusion of nonlegal  materials in the course
of study was actually advocated as a simplification device  . ...  As long as
the  law  school  clings  to  the  doctrinal  classifications  as  the  basis  of
instruction,  duplication is inevitable;  but  duplication can be eliminated  if
functional  classifications  are consistently  substituted for them throughout
the curriculum."l
04
The  ultimate  goal  was  to  shift  all  teaching  to  social-purpose
functionalism. As Dean Oliphant charged the faculty,
All  rules of law,  both  statutory  and  customary,  should be judged
by legislators  and courts by their effects upon the human  relations
which  they  regulate  or  promote,  and  should  be  approved  or
changed  accordingly.  It is not enough to  consider them merely  as
ideas; how, as such, they  came  about;  and how they fit into some
body of abstract doctrine.  In order to judge  rules of law  by  their
effect it is necessary:
1. To discover what  human relation  is  actually being  affected  by
the operation of a given rule of law and
To  marshal  the  contemporary  data  of the  other  social  sciences
concerning  that  human  relation  and  consciously  to  weigh  such
data in passing upon the rule in question.'o
Currie's  story  begins  with  the  rising  excitement  with  which the  faculty
divided into committees dedicated to this ambitious collective goal.
One  of these  committees  was  Family  and Familial  Property.1
06  Dean
Oliphant's charge to this group:
1. The  primary object  is to uncover those areas of the law now
104.  Id. at 8.
105.  Id. at 28-29  (quoting  Professor  Herman  Oliphant,  Memorandum  Concerning  a  Proposed
Study  of Familial  Law,  cited in Currie,  Materials, supra  note  101,  as  Document  No.  28,  at  125B
[hereinafter Oliphant Memorandum]).
106.  Currie, Materials,  supra note 101,  at 22.
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affecting  the  family  without  our  being  aware  of  the  fact  and
reclassify  this  material  in  a  way  more  significant  for  a  study  of
these  rules  as social  forces  actually  shaping human  relations  and
conduct.  Present classification  tends merely  to facilitate  the study
of these  rules  of law  as  concepts,  as  parts  of a  history of legal
thought or as parts of a body of abstract doctrine.
2. The  secondary  objective  is to disclose to students of law the
major bodies  of pertinent knowledge  as to the family  in the other
social sciences  and to consider methods of using such knowledge
in judging rules of law.  o7
The Columbia enterprise thus aimed for a quadruple transformation of the
field:  it  was  now  defined  by  the  family, not  marriage;  all  the  law  that
"affect[s]"  the  family  - not just  marriage  and  divorce,  and  not just  the
reciprocal  relations  of husband  and  wife,  parent  and  child - was to  be
included;  rules  of  law  were  not  given  but  were  to  be judged on  a
functional  paradigm  (the  purpose  of teaching was  to  identify the  social
function of legal rules and to discover the best rule for each function); and
the social function of legal rules was to be revealed through social science
"knowledge."
If any of this were achieved, the classical edifice would lie  in ruins  and
an  entirely  new,  entirely  different,  but  equally  coherent  structure  would
take  its  place.  For  all  its  antagonism  to  classical  legal  thought,  the
Columbia  curricular  reform  was  neoclassical  at  its  core.  What  would
emerge  would  be  a  new  system.  The  tolerance  for  curricular
fragmentation  which  is  now  so  high  as  to  be  unremarkable  was  then
completely unknown.
Three  documents  mark  the progress  that  the  Columbia  team  made  in
transforming  Domestic  Relations:  the  Committee's  report;  a  762-page
report  entitled  A  Research  in  Family  Law,  privately  published  by
Committee  members  Albert  C.  Jacobs  and  Robert  C.  Angell  as  the
culmination  of research pursued on a $25,000 grant  from the Rockefeller
Foundation,  which I will  call  the  Jacobs/Angell  Report;'  and the  first
casebook  resulting  from  this  work,  Jacobs's  1933  Cases and  Other
Materials on Domestic Relations.1 09  What  did  the  progression  from  the
first of these statements to the third do to fulfill Oliphant's charge?
107.  Id. at 29 (quoting  Oliphant  Memorandum, supra  note  105, at 125c).
108.  ALBERT C. JACOBS & ROBERT  C. ANGELL, A RESEARCH  IN  FAMILY  LAw 4 (1930).  The full
name of the granting foundation was  the Laura Spellman  Rockefeller  Memorial Foundation. Id.
109.  ALBERT  C.  JACOBS,  CASES  AND  OTHER  MATERIALS  ON  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1933)
[hereinafter JACOBS,  DOMESTIC RELATIONS  (1st ed.)].
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First,  Columbia  reformers  were  eager  to  replace  Domestic  Relations
with  the  Family  and  Family  Law.  Ironically,  when  Pound's  impulse  to
sociological jurisprudence  bore its first fruit, his nomenclatural  campaign
for Domestic Relations was simply swept aside;  his  idea that Family  Law
signified  Romanism  and  the  will  theory  had  dissolved  without  a  trace.
The  same  thing happened  at Yale, where  Dean Hutchins  boasted  that in
1928-29  the  faculty had  "abandoned  the  old course  in domestic relations
because it seemed a waste of time to give such poor instruction in so vital
a  subject."  Hutchins  reported  that  a  team  of four  faculty  members  was
working to "build up a new course"  - which Hutchins called "family  law"
- "that should have  some relation to what is going on in the world."'  o To
this  first  wave  of social  functionalist  reformers,  Family  Law  clearly
signified  the social family and the exciting transformation  of legal  studies
into  a  new  social  science,  while  Domestic  Relations  became  the
"technical  doctrine  of the  law"I1 "  and  threatened  to lay the  dead hand of
the  intellectual  past  on  their  lively  work.  Pound's  high-theory
neofeudalism  had  no  takers. 112  Like  Pound,  the  reformers  burned  to
"make it new."  But for them, Family Law was the new.
What could  these gentlemen  have meant by "family  law"? I offer two
sources for an etymology  here: the  account of the field which Jacobs  and
Angell  extracted  from  sociology  and  anthropology  of  the  family  and
which  Jacobs redacted  as  Chapter I of his  1933  casebook;  and the family
courts movement  which  had begun  simultaneously  with  the  rise  of the
social. They follow a track so identical, to a destination so identical, that it
is hard to credit  the idea  of their  complete autonomy.  Somehow,  I don't
know how, they were connected.
The Jacobs/Angell Report observed that the term family  is a conceptual
110.  School of Law,  Report of Robert Maynard Hutchins, Dean, in  YALE  UNIVERSITY,  THE
SCHOOL OF  LAW, REPORTS OF THE  DEAN  AND OF THE  LIBRARIAN,  JULY 1, 1928-JUNE  30, 1929, at 5, 6
(1929).
111.  Harlan F.Stone,  The Future of  Legal Education, 10  A.B.A.  J. 233,  234  (1924),  quoted in
Currie, Materials,  supra note  101,  at  11.
112.  The  Columbia  committee  quoted  with  approval  the  lament  of Ernest  W.  Burgess  in  his
introduction  to Ernest  R.  Mowrer's  book Family Disorganization:  "Our  ignorance  of the  life of the
present-day  family is none the less  colossal because of the vast  and increasing literature upon  sex and
marriage  and the family.  For much  of this literature  deals with family  life of other  societies  than our
own,  the best of it with  marriage and  the  family among  preliterate  peoples,  and  the remainder  of it
with the  large  patriarchal  family,  the type of familial organization  of the  ancient Israelites,  Romans
and  Greeks  . . . ." Currie,  Materials, supra note  101,  at 29  n. 113.  (quoting  Document  42  at  320,
quoting  Ernest  W.  Burgess,  Foreward,  in  ERNEST  R.  MOWRER,  FAMILY  DISORGANIZATION  vii
(1927)).  Apparently  even knowing  about the  past could get  in  the way of learning about the  present.
We  see here an early  symptom of the anti-intellectualism  that  would entrench itself in  law schools in
the name of sociological  investigation.
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abstraction embracing  social arrangements  that differ vastly over time and
across  society.  Though the contemporary  European and American family
classically  consists  of a husband  and  wife,  their  offspring,  and  perhaps
collaterals  and  ascendants  "associated  together,"  there  was  nothing
necessary  about the nuclear unit:
Professor Ernest W. Burgess has defined the family as "a unity of
interacting  persons with a conception of their roles in  it supported
by,  if not derived  from,  the  community."  This  definition  clearly
shows  the  generalized  character  of the  concept  with  which  we
were  to  deal.  . . . [P]erhaps  a  higher  degree  of specific  content
would be obtained  if we regarded the family in modem European
and American society  as consisting  of man and woman associated
together for a period of some, but varying, duration, together with
the  offspring of this union, and  in many  instances  collaterals  and
ascendants  of  one  or  both  of  the  major  characters.  It  would
continue  to  be  a  "family"  after  the  death  or  departure  of the
collaterals,  ascendants,  descendants  or  even  one  of the  major
characters,  if the remainder of the group continued to function as a
social  unit.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  so  far no  reference  has  been
made of the necessity  for a marriage ceremony  in the creation of a
"family".  It  is  possible  to  create  a  "family"  by  the  relationship
between man and woman where there  is no marriage. Even further
variations  may occur in the constituent units of the group.  Several
adult  children  may  set  up  a  household  and  live  together  for  an
indefinite  period of time;  a  man,  having  no family,  may  adopt a
child  or  children,  and  the  group  may  function  as  a family.  It  is
apparent  also  that  variations  may  occur  in  significant
environmental  factors. A "family"  connotes a very  different set of
relationships  in  a  remote  agricultural  community  of  the  middle
west,  in  an  industrial  community  as  Pittsburgh,  and  in  an
apartment house in New York City."'
The shift from  domestic relations  to family  law was thus a shift from  the
purely legal  forms of familial relation to the actual social  forms, however
diverse  and  however  innocent  of  legal  recognition.  Schouler's  idea  of
limiting  the  field  to  those relations  that  actually  inhabited  the  home  has
broken  through his  indifference  to  sociological  and historical  reality:  the
Columbia  reformers  were  ready  to  make  the  leap  from  the  law  in  the
books to the law in action.
13.  JACOBS  & ANGELL,  supra note  108,  at 9-10. Jacobs reproduces  most of this passage  in the
opening pages of his  1933 casebook. JACOBS, DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st ed.), supra note 109,  at 1-2.
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The  1933 Jacobs casebook went on to ask whether  the "blood  tie"  and
the "sex  tie"'  were essential elements of family. Jacobs was not sure:
Suppose X and Y, first cousins, set up a household with an aunt, Z;
would this constitute a  family? X, Y and Z, adult men not related,
set up a household;  does this constitute a family?"'
He  did not answer this very queer  question.  It thus appears that  "family"
is  a  social  rather  than  a  legal  concept,  highly  variable  in  practice,
characterized  by  cohabitation  and  perhaps  by  the  ties  of blood  and  sex.
We have broken completely with Schouler's husband and wife, parent and
child. As long as the Columbia reformers'  influence held sway,  Domestic
Relations  referred  to  the  law  governing  these  legally recognized family
relations;  if one  was to  study  the family and  its  law, one  must  go much
much further.
Jacobs  observed  that  the  feudal  family  so  beloved  of  Pound  is  a
historical anachronism:  the modem family  has undergone "shrinkage.""'
The "most important" function  that has departed  the household is "family
industry."" 7  The  rise  of the  market  for  labor  and  of modem  industrial
relations  has  contracted  the  family:  the  family  in  both  cases,  formerly
large,  now  small.  But  that  doesn't  mean  that  the  family  is  a  purely
affective  social  space:  "about the  only functions  left  are the bearing  and
early care of the young, affection between spouses  and as to children, and
as a property holding and disposing unit."'18  Even  if it is no  longer the
primary  site  of  productive  labor,  the  family  remains  important  as  a
distributional  social institution.
Finally,  Jacobs  posits that  the law of this  family  extends way  beyond
the  old  common  law  rules  of  husband  and  wife,  parent  and  child:
"Beginning  with  a  closely-knit  body  of common  law  dealing  with  the
family,  this  all  has been  changed  by  interpretation  and  statute  to  meet
existing  conditions."1 9  Family  law  was  finally  poised  to  undergo  the
change  that master  and  servant underwent  in the  late nineteenth  century:
catching  up  with  the  statutes  is  one  of the  things  it means to  develop  a
social  idea of law. Account must be taken of the "Married Women's Acts,
the Child Labor Laws, the Compulsory Education Laws, the freer divorce
I14.  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st  ed.), supra note  109, at 2.
115.  Id.  at  6.
116.  Id.
117.  Id.
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laws,  and  many  others." 20  Large  state-based  bureaucracies  - public
schools, agencies  overseeing the welfare of children - are family law too.
I think  it is almost certain that Jacobs and Angell  were  taking their cue
from  the  very recent  rise  of family courts. As  with  so  much  else  in  the
American  legal  world  of the  social  era,  we  can  trace  the  family  court
movement  back  to  Pound.  In  "The  Administration  of  Justice  in  the
Modem  City,"  published  in  1913,  he  argued  that  the  rise  of  city  life
required  a turn from individualist to collectivist consciousness  in law  and
that this had  procedural  implications:  the  time  was  nigh  for  a turn  from
adjudication  to  administration.  Pound himself  then  saw  that  the  social-
purpose-functionalist  vision  could  not  contain  the  complexities  facing
administration:  managing  the  modem  city  required  tools  "to  apply  and
enforce  law  in  a  community  where  furnishing  a  guide  to  the  individual
conscience  is not enough, where  it is  often of more importance  to enforce
rules vigorously but intelligently  than  to insure  that the rules  are the best
possible[.]"l21  As  we  will  see,  Pound  bequeathed  this  insight  to  his
mentee Karl N.  Llewellyn, and they were  to come to a painful parting of
the ways over it.
When  it  came  to  the  family,  Pound's  solidaristic  goal  was  "to
administer justice in relations of family  life, where conditions of crowded
urban  life  and  economic  pressure  threaten  the  security  of  the  social
institutions of marriage  and the  family."
22  As  Amy J. Cohen  concludes,
this  was  precisely  the  motive  that  animated  the  progressive  reformers
setting up family courts:
To supporters,  family courts  embodied the progressive  and utterly
public  assumption  of duties and  obligations  that were  previously
administered  through  the private  family group.  Through  informal
conciliatory  procedures,  the  state could  demand  that  the  family
behave  in solidaristic, virtuous, and altruistic ways. 123
Cohen  recounts how  domestic  relations  courts  emerged  in the  1910's
and  were  soon  renamed  family  courts  to  signify  the  consolidation  of a
whole  array  of legal  instruments  addressing  "'the  security  of the home':
for example,  "nonsupport or abandonment of wives or children, paternity,
divorce,  child  custody,  adoption,  guardianship,  neglect  and  abuse  of
120.  Id.
121.  Roscoe Pound,  The Administration of  Justice in the Modern City, 26  HARv.  L.  REv.  302,
310-11  (1913).
122.  Id. at 311.
123.  Amy J. Cohen, The Family, The Market, and ADR, 2011 J. DISP.  RESOL.  91,  102.
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children,  and  matters  formerly  handled  in juvenile  court."
1 2 4  The  name
change  endowed  the moniker  "family  law"  with rich meanings:  whereas
the law of domestic relations  remained the common  law rules of husband
and  wife  and  of  parent  and  child,  all  legal  domains  and  institutions
centering  on  the  social  home  or  one  of  its  wayward  members  were,
collectively,  the  law  of the  family, family  law. Administrative  law  and
criminal  law  were just as  important  to  the  work  of family  courts  as  the
law of husband and wife and of parent and child.
This reframing  family  law de-exceptionalized  it. Any body of law, any
element  of  the  emerging  social  bureaucracy,  any  social  policy  that
managed the lives of actual  families - married or unmarried, legitimate or
not - was  within  the purview  of this  new  family  law.  A  key point:  the
family  law  of  the  poor  would  now  come  in  for  serious,  sustained
attention. The distributive effects - the economic  consequences - of legal
rules and practices  affecting  families would come  into view. A genuinely
distributive  emphasis  could  emerge  in  the  field.  FLE  was  dead:  the
distributive  market  and the  distributive  family  could be articulated  over
that erased boundary.
The  Columbia  reformers  were  in  a  game  of  deep  catch-up  with  the
sociologists and the social reformers out there in the field. A huge body of
sociology on the  contemporary  family was emerging:  how to embrace  it?
Family  courts  already  existed:  what  was  their  law?  The  family  law
committee's  first task was to  send a questionnaire  circulated to the whole
faculty  "seeking  out every  phase  of the  law  which might bear upon  the
family[.]"
1 2 5  The  Columbia  reformers  thought that the  law of the  lived
family had been hacked  into a thousand pieces  and distributed  carelessly
throughout  the  law  curriculum;  the  Committee,  as  John  Milton  would
have  said,  "imitating  the  careful  search  that  Isis  made  for the  mangled
body of Osiris,  went up and  down gathering up limb by  limb still as they
could find them."l
26
To  Pound,  the  domestic  relations  were  homologous  with  all  the
relations  of  society;  the  solicitude,  duty,  and  dependency  that  various
124.  Id.  at  100  (quoting  REGINALD  HEBER  SMITH,  JUSTICE  AND  THE  POOR:  A  STUDY  OF  THE
PRESENT  DENIAL  OF  JUSTICE  TO  THE  POOR AND  OF  THE  AGENCIES  MAKING  MORE  EQUAL  THEIR
POSITION BEFORE THE LAW 73  (1924)).
125.  Currie, Materials,  supra note 101,  at 30.
126.  John  Milton,  Areopagitica; A  Speech  of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicenc  'd
Printing,  to the Parlament  of  England, in JOHN MILTON:  COMPLETE  POEMS  AND  MAJOR  PROSE  717,
742  (Merrit  Y.  Hughes  ed.,  1957).  Milton  likened  Isis's painful  search  to  the  slow  gathering  of
fragmented  truth that is the fate of humankind after the ascent of Christ.
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members of society  bore towards each  other seamlessly pervaded  life; no
market/family  distinction  was  welcome.  But that very distinction  seemed
fundamental  to  the  Columbia  team:  the  "[b]road  areas  of  life  most
markedly  affected  by,  and  affecting,  law  are  those:  (i)  of  business
relations, (ii)  familial  relations, and (iii)  communal  political relations."l 27
To  the  Columbia  reformers,  the  family  was  a  distinct  social  form,
fundamentally  different  from  the  social  forms  of business  relations  and
the political  system.  It was  one of the  three great  social  systems,  and it
needed  its own  place  in  the  law  curriculum.  That much  of the  classical
order,  they  retained.  But  they  thought  that  the  law  of  the  family  was
idiotically  distributed  throughout  the  curriculum;  when  the  work  of
gathering  it back in  was done,  the field would bestow  a new,  intensified
coherence  and distinctiveness on the law that was proper to the family.
This  shift  from  the  domestic  relations  to  the  social  family  radically
demoted  marriage  in  favor  of  any  social  arrangements  that,  in  fact,
constituted  family  life.  As  we have  seen,  in theory  at  least,  Jacobs  and
Angell were ready for almost anything society could throw at them.
Having deliberated at how to encompass  this vastly expanded topic, the
Jacobs/Angell  group  proposed  two  Outlines,  one  addressed  to  the
sociological  object of study  and  the other constituting  a plan for  a series
of actual courses - an express admission that the research agenda and the
teaching plan would have to diverge:
The Fact Situation Outline  The Curricular  Outline
I. Single Individuals with reference  to  I. Family Organization and
Possible Future Family Founding  Disorganization
II.  Non-Marriage  Families  II.  The Biological Relations of the
Family
III. At Marriage  III. Personality Delevoment [sic] and
Family Solidarity
IV. The Husband  and Wife in the  IV. The Economic Relations of the
Organized Family  Family
V. The Child in the Organized Family  V. The Family and Other Institutions"'5
VI. The Organized  Family as a Whole
VII. Family Disorganization'i 29
127.  JACOBS  &  ANGELL,  supra note  108,  at  4  (quoting  FACULTY  OF  LAW  OF  COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY,  SUMMARY  OF  STUDIES  IN LEGAL  EDUCATION  (1926))  (citation  omitted).  Jacobs  and
Angell note that they have disposed  of "familial"  in favor of "family."  Id. at 4 n.3.
128.  Id. at 21.
129.  Id. at 12.  Like Pound, Jacobs and Angell had no use for master and servant  as an element of
their reconstituted  field. They noted  that  they  had omitted  even  from the broad  research agenda  the
"domestic  servant  problem.  This  field  has  not  been  explored  by  the  staff  in  its  investigations,
important as are the problems arising therefrom." Id. at  12 n. 15.
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The Curricular Outline proposed not just five separate  subheadings, but
five  separate  courses. The first - the core  course - was  basically the  law
of marriage  and  divorce;  Jacobs  and Angell  admitted  that  it  was  "a non-
functional  course[.]" 3 0  (It,  in  turn,  became  the  template  for  the  first
casebook  to  emerge  from  the  Family  Law  effort  of  the  Columbia
curricular  reform, Jacobs's  1933  Cases and Other Materials on Domestic
Relations, on which more anon.) The second course was a real innovation:
it  housed  the  public  health,  population  management,  and  social  control
problems posed by human  sexuality  and reproduction.  This  was  a course
in what Michel Foucault would  later designate biopower. 131 The third was
a hodgepodge  of issues dealing  with the family  as  a  site for "training  its
members in future family life"; the planners hoped that it could ultimately
be  merged  into  the  core  course.  The  Economic  Relations  of the  Family
was also  a complete  novelty. And the fifth course, The  Family and Other
Institutions,  was  also  a  complete  innovation:  it  would  address  the
relationships  between  family  life  and  religious  institutions,  industry,
education, the state, and the community.132
We have  noted that the  Columbia reform  project respected  FLE  to the
extent that  it  deemed public  law,  the  law  of commerce  and  the  law  of
family to  be the three basic  domains  of law. But within Family Law, the
Committee  discarded  FLE  almost  completely.  In  Blackstone's
preclassical  division,  the  "private oeconomical  relations"  - including
master and servant, husband and wife, parent and child, and guardian and
ward, and corporations  - sat side by side;  they were all  private, and they
were  all  "oeconomical."  The  classicals,  pushing  their  contract/status,
market/family  distinction,  broke  up  this  smooth  unity.  The  word
"economic,"  which  originally  signified  only  the  management  of  the
household,  gradually  came  to  signify  only  nonfamilial  market  activity,
while the  term  "family"  lost  its reference  to  the  master/servant  relation
and came  to  signify only the  husband,  his wife  and  their  children.  This
shift was of course ideological:  marriage and the family continued  all the
while to serve  functions that  fit the modern  sense of "economic";  but the
effect  of FLE was  to make  these functions  invisible,  to  subject them  to
what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick would call "the  speech act of a silence."' 33
130.  Id.at2l.
131.  MICHEL  FOUCAULT,  THE HISTORY  OF SEXUALITY,  VOLUME  1, AN  INTRODUCTION  135-150
(Robert Hurley trans.,  1978).
132.  JACOBS & ANGELL, supra note  108,  at 27.
133.  EVE  KOSOFSKY  SEDGWICK,  EPISTEMOLOGY  OF THE CLOSET 3 (1990).
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Jacobs and Angell's  course  on "The Economic  Relations  of the Family"
would have gone a long way to erasing the contract/status,  market/family
distinction, to unpinning FLE, and to enabling a distributive assessment of
the law governing the family. Pound had begun the work of undoing FLE;
the Columbia reformers aspired to complete it.
The  courses  examining  the relationships  between the  lived  family  and
the  administrative  state  and  between  the  lived  family  and  governance
institutions  outside the  state  were  equally new,  and shattered  FLE  along
another line, that separating the private family from public institutions and
public law. The rise of Family Courts during the Progressive era would be
explicitly brought into the curriculum; with it would have come the law of
poor  families,  vast  tracts  of administrative  law,  and  serious  attention  to
the  social  uptake  of  legal  rules.  Here,  the  Columbia  reformers  far
outpaced  Pound,  making  a  full  embrace  of the  social  institutions  that
governed  family  life  an  intrinsic  part  of  the  field  and  committing
themselves  to  a  realist  assessment  that  significantly  departed  from
Pound's residual formalism.
So  that  was  the  agenda  as  of  1930.  A  lot  happened  in  legal  theory
before  1933,  when  Jacobs published  the  casebook  which  he  intended to
encapsulate the  Columbia program for family  law, and we need to take it
into account as it provided the polemical context  in which Jacobs labored.
In  late  1930  or early  1931,  Pound published his  attack on what  he saw
as  malign  developments  in  sociological  jurisprudence,  "The  Call  for  a
Realist  Jurisprudence."1 34  In  direct  and  polemical  response,  Llewellyn
promptly  published  his  manifesto,  "Some  Realism  about  Realism  -
Responding to  Dean Pound,"' 35  decisively  breaking with  his mentor  and
severing what  I will call  "real  realism"  from sociological  jurisprudence.
There  were  now two  forms of the  social in  American  legal thought,  one
for the jurisprudes  committed  to  social-purpose  functionalism;  the  other
committed  to  "realism"  and  ecstatically  open  to  complex  and  even
paradoxical  relationships between law and its social effects. The next year
Llewellyn published  a major  paper on  family  law  in  the  Columbia Law
Review, titled "Behind the Law of Divorce: Part I."l36  Llewellyn had been
134.  Roscoe Pound,  The Callfor  a Realist Jurisprudence,  44 HARV.  L. REV.  697 (1930-31).
135.  Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound,  44 HARV. L.
REV.  1222  (1931).  For  an  excellent  account  of the  intense  intergenerational  relationship  between
Pound  and  Llewellyn,  see  William  Fisher,  Karl Llewellyn,  in  DAVID  KENNEDY  &  WILLIAM  W.
FISHER III,  THE CANON OF AMERICAN  LEGAL THOUGHT  133,  133-38  (2006).
136.  K.N.  Llewellyn,  Behind the Law ofDivorce, 32  COLUM.  L. REv.  1281  (1932)  [hereinafter
Llewellyn, Behind the Law ofDivorce].
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a  member  of  the  Columbia  faculty  since  1924'13;  he  was  on  the
curriculum committees on Finance and Credit and on Methodology.'38  He
was  acutely  aware  of the  Columbia  family  law  project, 139  and  Jacobs
would have been  equally aware of the rift in legal theory between Pound,
suddenly  repositioned  as  the Old Guard,  and  Llewellyn,  one  of the new
Young  Turks.  While  composing  his  casebook  Jacobs  must  have  asked
himself constantly:  am I fulfilling Oliphant's  social-purpose  functionalist
charge  and  Pound's  mandate  for  domestic  relations  and  sociological
jurisprudence,  or am I tracking real  realism as Llewellyn  mapped  it?  As
we  have  already  seen,  he  hewed  strongly  in  the  real  realist  direction.
Llewellyn's  divorce  paper  was  thus  an  important  intervention  into  the
Columbia  scene;  Jacobs's  path  forward  had  to  be  around  or  through  it.
What novelties did it introduce?
Llewellyn's express  aim in "Behind the Law of Divorce"  was to figure
out what  the rise  in  the  number of jurisdictions  allowing  for ever-easier
divorce,  and  the  rise  in  the  incidence  of divorce,  might  produce  in  the
form of social effects. This was no abstract inquiry for Llewellyn:  in 1930
the  first of his  three marriages  had ended  in divorce; this was the first of
his  two  divorces.
140  It  was  not  a  matter  of  comparing  available  rules,
identifying  their unilateral  social  consequences,  and  selecting  the  good
rule/consequence  pairs:  both  law  and  society  were  inexorably  and
dynamically changing, and Llewellyn thought that his first job was simply
to produce an adequate description of where they were going:
The  paradoxes  are  familiar.  Society  moulds  and  makes  the
individual;  but individuals  are and  mould society.  Law is a going
whole we are born  into;  but law  is a changing something we help
remodel.  Law  decides  cases;  but  cases  make  law.  Law  deflects
society;  but  society  is  reflected  in  the  law.  How  can  such
propositions, patently  all  true, all  so commonplace that we do  not
think them through,  exist together? How and where do the gears of
the  seemingly  inconsistent  insights mesh? The problem  before  us
is description.  It  is to  see,  in action, to follow  in their interaction,
the  divergent  branches  of the  paradox;  to  see  them  in action  as a
137.  Karl  Nickerson  Llewellyn,  AMERICAN  NATIONAL  BIOGRAPHY  ONLINE,
http://www.anb.org.ezpprodl.hul.harvard.edularticles/1  1/1 100533.html?a-1&f=Karl%20Llewellyn&
g-m&n=Karl%20Llewellyn&ia=-at&ib-bib&d=10&ss=0&q=1  (last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
138.  Currie, Materials,  supra note 101,  at 22, 23 n.83.
139.  Llewellyn repeatedly pointed to the Jacobs/Angell  Report as  a contribution to real realism.
Llewellyn,  Behind the Law of Divorce, supra note  136,  at 1287  n.10,  1305  n.60; Llewellyn,  supra
note  135,  at  1245 n.59,  1262 n.1  [sic].
140.  Fisher,  supra note 135,  at 138.
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going whole.1 4'
The immense buoyancy of social life occupies  the first part of Llewellyn's
investigation.  He  denied  that  marriage  itself  is  a  primarily  legal
institution:  divorce  may  be  subject  to  a  judicial  monopoly,  but  social
forces and  social norms play  a  far greater  role in the  conduct  of ongoing
marriages than legal rules. 4 2 He identified four general social purposes of
marriage-sex;  group-perpetuation;  economic aspects;  and personal effects
- and  each  of them  he  subdivided  into  a  complex  mesh  of completely
inconsistent  functions.  Thus  Llewellyn  shouldered  aside  Pound's  neat
discrimination  of the  four legal  relations  which  family  law  protects,  and
completely  rejects the  clinical  abstraction  with which  Pound  subdivided
them into neatly mirroring interests in and against each other.
One  example will have to  suffice.  The  first function  of marriage  is the
"powerful  social  pressure"l
43  that  channels  sex  into  permanent  pair-
bonding:
The ordering of sex relations:  there is but one recognized road in.
And  whole-hog  or  none,  with  permanent  relationships.  A  world
divided  into  those  who  are  res sacrae, and  those  who  can  be
acquired-but  acquired  only  as  permanencies.  Limited
possibilities  of  acquisition:  one  man,  one  wife;  unambiguous
marking  of  the  res sacrae: a  plain  thirdfinger  band;  in  some
circles, a diamond still will serve.144
Immediately  Llewellyn  turned  to  the paradoxical  way  in  which the  rule
produces and shapes the social space in which it can be flouted:
This  does  not  . . . eliminate  extra-marital  sex.  Prostitutes,
happenstances,  girl-friends,  poachers,  are  still  present.  But  the
tabu-system  simplifies the  problem  . . .:  by  isolating  a  single
issue,  and  specializing  the  means  to  its  solution.  Instead  of all
the  services  of marriage  coming  up  for thought  at  once,  extra-
marital  sex desire can specialize on sex.1
45
This  is the kind of thought-maneuver that Pound would never have made:
the ideas that informality  sits adjacent to formality, that permission begins
when  prohibition runs  out, that "is"  can be so completely  the opposite  of
"ought,"  are key elements  of real realism that break up the smooth surface
141.  Llewellyn, Behind the Law ofDivorce, supra note  136, at  1283.
142.  Id. at 1282.
143.  Id. at 1298.
144.  Id. at 1297-98.
145.  Id. at  1298.
2011] 229
41
Halley: What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
of the  world  according  to  social-purpose  functionalism.  But  Llewellyn
didn't  stop even  with  this arresting  insight;  he  forged  on,  to  notice  that
people involved in extra-marital  sex often import some, but not all, of the
functions of marriage:
Even  such  specialization  meets  its  troubles.  There  is  the
illegitimate  child.  There  is  abortion  (but,  for  all  that  one  can
gather,  vastly less frequent  outside than  inside the tabued  walls).
There  may  be  much  admixture  of  the  permanency  and
comforting  that  goes  with  marriage.  But  property  matters  in
the  large  sense,  and  matters  of  inheritance,  typically  also  the
problems  attending  the  production  or  consumption  unit,  are
removed. 146
Law  has  come  into  the  account,  in  the  form  of the  property  rules  of
marriage,  specifically  inheritance.  And  it is the basic  idea of enforceable
exclusive  property  rights that  secures  the  importance  of legal  marriage.
Like  enforceable  exclusive  property  rights  in  land,  they  secure  "the
Peace":
Factual possession is,  for any man or group which lacks a private
army,  a  reflection,  a product, of the Peace.  So,  too,  of marriage.
Assault,  kidnapping,  raiding  for women,  poisoning  or  knifing  of
unwanted  mates (one's own or another's)  are not the order of the
day.  On these points there can be  no question of the value  of the
lawmen and their ways to marriage as a social institution.14 7
And  even  where  there  is  no  question  that  the  property  rules  within
marriage will be enforced, they can condition the interactions of husbands
and wives in ways that reinforce  social hierarchies.  Turning "to the extent
to  which  the  law  of  property  in  marriage  affects  the  behavior  of the
partners  in a joint household[,"  Llewellyn  anticipates Lewis Kornhauser
and Robert Mnookin's  key insight that husbands  and wives bargain  with
one another "in  the shadow of the law"l
48:
Not as greatly,  one may indeed suspect,  as group-ways and -norms
outside the law; the turning over of the unopened pay envelope has
as  little  to  do  with  legal  rules  as  the  despotic  purse-power  not
infrequent with him whose  every asset stands in  his wife's name.
Still,  in  such major policy  decisions  as mortgaging  or selling  the
146.  Id. (citation omitted).
147.  Id. at 1300 (citation omitted).
148.  Lewis  Kornhauser  & Robert Mnookin,  Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  The  Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 954 (1979).
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house,  as  in  current  allocation  of income  between  the  partners,
informal observation  shows the sense of legal power repeatedly  to
enter in, often to tip the balance. Feet do get put down, and it is the
law which provides the footing. 1'
I have radically pared down Llewellyn's description of the sex-channeling
function  of marriage.  Even  so,  I  hope  I have  conveyed  the  sense  of
scintillation that his  account produces,  as effect  and  counter-effect  jostle
one another aside in a scramble for attention.
Several  methodological  trends  are  visible  in Llewellyn's  intervention,
and they  all differentiate real  realism from the sociological jurisprudence
in which the Columbia reforms were first imagined. First, the social world
as envisioned by Llewellyn was so diverse and complex - the latitude that
each  marital  pair has to  deviate  from any  supposed norm so  great - that
Llewellyn refused to acknowledge the existence of "society":
[T]oo  much is thought  and written  as if we  had a pattern of ways
that  made  up  marriage.  To  generalize  existent  ways  into  such  a
pattern, or even into a fixed number of typical patterns,  is to  lose
sight  precisely  of  that  r6le  of  individual  action  which  we  are
seeking  to  explore.  . . . In  part,  our  solutions  border  on  fresh
creation  : a thousand individual compromises.  We - you  and I, he
and she,  Joneses and Smiths. And not "society."so
It is  at  the level of "you  and I, he  and she,  Joneses  and Smiths"  that the
consequences  of divorce  law  will  appear.  The  idea  that there  is  such a
thing  as  "marriage"  is just  wrong:  "Our  society  shows  not  a  marriage
institution, but a goodly number of such, overlapping, contradictory,  both
in  needs  and  in  effects.""'  And  if  the  goal  is  to  describe  them
functionally,  well, once  again  one  faces  a Sisyphean  labor:  "In marriage
the functions seem to have no end."'
Nor was the law/society dynamic rational;  instead,  it was riven through
with contradictions, paradoxes and surprises.
The  tentative  conclusion:  society,  law-in-action,  legal  doctrine,
all  of necessity  sown  with  contradiction  and  divergent  tensions;
the older  basic structure  and  ideology (touchingly  over-simplified
even  as  to  the  conditions  which  it  mirrored)  bedevilled  with  a
kaleidoscopic  miscellany  of new patchings-  and  of more ancient
149.  Llewellyn, Behind the Law ofDivorce, supra  note  136, at  1305 (citation omitted).
150.  Id. at 1285 (citation omitted).
151.  Id. at 1287.
152.  Id. at 1288.
231 2011]
43
Halley: What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
hold-overs  imbedded.  Barocque,  Rococo,  Empire,  even particles
of modernistic, bristling like cloves upon the ancient Gothic. '"
Even at the level of a single operative legal rule, paradox reigned, cutting
purpose  and effect off from one another and even pitting them against one
another.  Recognizing  common-law  marriage,  for  instance,  though
intended  "to  relieve  hard  cases  may  be  working  to  produce  more  hard
cases  than  it  relieves."l 5 4  Law  envisioned  as  functional  might  be  not
merely ineffective but perversely productive.
Llewellyn mocked the idea that social science  empiricism could rescue
legal  studies  from  complexity  and paradox.  He rebelled  outright against
Oliphant's  mandate  to bring  legal  science  into  line  with  social  science.
Though  a  voracious  consumer  of social  science,  Llewellyn  attacked  the
ideas  that  social  science  was  a  superior,  more  objective  form  of
knowledge  to  which  students  of  law  had  to  defer.  It was  not  even  an
interdisciplinary  partnership:  law was better. In  1930-31,  at  a Brookings
Institution  seminar  dedicated to  the  question "Whither  Social  Science?",
Llewellyn  participated  as  the  only  representative  of legal  studies.'  He
refused  to  kowtow  to  the  empiricists,  who  were  having  their  own  crisis
about  whether  society  could  be  systematically  known.  Instead,  he
delivered a patronizing lecture on all the ways in which social science was
failing to benefit  from the  insights of legal real  realism. And in "Behind
the  Law  of Divorce,"  he  repeatedly  complained  about  the  state  of the
empirical evidence:  "[t]he  figures we have" on the role of pair marriage in
preventing  what we  now call  sexually  transmitted  diseases,  for  instance,
"give  no  adequate  light on this.  We trust neither  their completeness  nor
their  accuracy  nor  their  typicality."'16   The  social  sciences  were
methodologically  adrift;  they could  be neither  a  model nor a  source.  He
declared himself jaded by his "[s]ample  drillings into the available data":
these  almost  never  interfered  with  the  plausibility  of  "personal
153.  Id. at 1287.
154.  Id. at 1301  n.52.
155.  Llewellyn,  Legal  Tradition  and  Social  Science  Method  - A  Realist's  Critique,  in
BROOKINGS  INSTITUTION,  COMMITEE  ON  TRAINING,  ESSAYS  ON  RESEARCH  IN  THE  SOCIAL
SCIENCES:  PAPERS  PRESENTED  IN  A  GENERAL  SEMINAR  CONDUCTED  BY  THE  COMMITTEE  ON
TRAINING  OF  THE BROOKINGS  INSTITUTION,  1930-3 1, at 89 (1931)  [hereinafter  BROOKINGS  ESSAYS].
The  Training  Committee  commenced  its  collection  of essays  by  the  seminar  participants  with  an
introduction entitled  "Whither  the  Social  Sciences?",  BROOKINGS  ESSAYS,  supra, at  3, and the first
essay included in  the anthology  expressed alarm  that social science might never attain  the legitimacy
enjoyed by physics. W.F.G.  Swann, "What is Science,"  in  BROOKINGS ESSAYS,  supra, at 11-23.
156.  Llewellyn, Behind the Law ofDivorce, supra note 136, at  1289  n.14.
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observation  and  prior  reading-i.e.,  . . . so-called  insight."'  By
enshrining  the producer of objective truth, Oliphant delegitmated the only
really  honest  course  of  serious  inquiry:  drilling  down,  working  hard,
sorting  out  with  perpetual  skepticism  what  might  be  going  on  in  the
world,  and  then  guessing.  Sometimes  social  science  would  prove  you
right;  extremely  rarely  it would  insist  on  a  change  of view.  But  even
"[t]hat  of course affords  no proof even of the  views checked up, still less
of the others. It does justify their submission."'s  In short, "Nothing in the
paper purports to have any guaranty more trustworthy than common sense
and  personal  observation."' 59  Oliphant's  idea  that  there  could  be  legal
science  asked legal  inquirers  to  set  themselves  up  as  emperors  with  no
clothes;  Llewellyn  preferred  to  go,  simply  or  complexly  depending  on
your appetite for epistemology,  bare. To him, that  was legal science, and
should be the measure of social science as well.
From  Llewellyn's  perspective  Pound's  image  of law  as  its judicially
enforced  rules  was  just  as  abstract  and  conceptual  as  anything  CLT
produced.  Instead,  real  realism  required  a vastly  expanded  definition  of
law itself:
What will in this paper hereafter  be meant by "law"  . . .. is in first
instance  and  especially  all  that  the  lawmen  do,  as  such.  And  in
second instance, what one may reasonably anticipate that they will
do.  And  in  third  instance,  the  rules  laid  down  for  their  doing.
Fourthly,  the  ideology  about  their  doing  prevalent  among  them
(following  precedent,  e.g.).  Lastly,  the  ideology  of  other  folk
about  the  law comes  into the discussion.  Where  necessary,  some
one  or more of the several phases will be  singled out for emphasis
or contrast with another. And the question now recurs, have any of
the phases any effects on other people, in regard to marriage?' 60
Real  realism  about  marriage  and  divorce  required  a  hard-nosed  and
skeptical inquiry into whether and how law - figured not only as the rules
laid down by judges, not only as predictions  about what the judges will in
probability  do,  but  as  what  all the  lawmen  might  do,  what  ideologies
about that drive them, and what ideologies about all of that motivate users
of the legal system - produces effects  in the real world.
For  all  that  the  Peace  seems  overall  better  than  the  state  of nature,
157.  Id. at 1281,  n.*.
158.  Id.
159.  Id.
160.  Id. at 1297.
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Llewellyn  repeatedly  insisted  that  "[c]osts  which  go  here  unnoted  are
bitterly  high."l
61  This  was  a  large  methodological  point,  and  it  again
divides sociological jurisprudence  from real realism.  Whereas for Pound,
conflicts  between  individual and  social interests  were  passively resolved
as  the more  functional  arrangement  silently  emerged,  for Llewellyn  the
legal  order was distributive, and it distributed not only benefits but costs:
"One thing is  clear:  the prices paid for values need computation,  as well
as  the  values  gained. And  the  phenomena  of modern  marriage  are  best
seen  by setting the two  against each other."
62  For example,  he observed
that
"Pair marriage forces a large fraction of the population  to celibacy,
and it  is they who are  the excluded who suffer by the arrangement.
This bears  chiefly  on women.  . . . Very little  serious  attention  is
paid  to  this  offset  to  the  advantages."  . . . [T]to  some  future
generation  our  condemnation  of  unmarried  women  to
childlessness  will  seem  as  wildly cruel  as  witchcraft  persecution
seems to our contemporaries.6 3
Reversing  this  distribution,  so  that  unmarried  women  could  enjoy
legitimate  procreation,  would  of course  redistribute:  new  benefits  with
new costs, new costs with new benefits.
Llewellyn  flatly  denied  one  of  the  key  premises  of the  Columbia
curricular reform effort,  a premise which I have described as neoclassical:
that a new system just as orderly as the classical legal order could be built
by cleanly distinguishing  the social  functions of law and segregating them
into  their  proper  topics  and  ultimately  their  proper  courses.  This  idea
vastly  underestimated  the  complexity  envisioned  by  real  realist
functionalist thinking:
Such are the functions of the social institution, in our civilization.
Little about the set-up is inevitable.  . .. In no point is the institution
adequate  in performance,  nor is it always the major factor  in such
performance  as  obtains.  Any  one  of the  functions  could  be,  at
some time or place has been, is now in part, served powerfully  in
161.  Id. at 1295.
162.  Id. at  1294 n.35.
163.  Id.  Llewellyn  quoted  from  WILLIAM  GRAHAM  SUMNER,  FOLKWAYS:  A  STUDY  OF  THE
SOCIOLOGICAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  USAGES,  MANNERS,  CUSTOMS,  MORES  AND  MORALS  373  (1907).
Sumner was  a  prolific sociologist  and  economist  and  a key figure  in the  conservative  flank of the
American  social;  he  died  in  1910.  William  Graham Sumner,  AMERICAN  NATIONAL  BIOGRAPHY
ONLINE, http://www.anb.org.ezpprodl.hul.harvard.edu/articles/14/1400611  .html?a=1&g-m&n=willia
m%20graham%20sumner&ia=-at&ib=-bib&d=O&ss=0&q=1  (last visited July 13, 2011).
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other  ways. Few indeed  are  the cases  in which  marriage  alone  is
halfway  adequate  to  any of them.  Compare,  e.g.,  the  part played
today by written records,  specialization  of labor, the  schools,  and
breaking men into jobs, in carrying  forward the  existing culture of
the  western  world,  nation,  community,  and  industry.  But  would
one  for  that  deny  vitality  to  the  work,  in  any  of these  phases,
which marriage does?l"
This  is  a somewhat  complex  taxonomic  point.  Not only  does  marriage
largely  fail  to  fulfill  its  proper  functions;  other  institutions  and  social
forces are necessary to the production of its intended effects, and many of
its functions can be served by other elements of the social and legal order.
Elements  of  the  legal  order  that  seem  quite  off-sides  of marriage  and
divorce - administration, education, and labor markets - couldn't produce
their effects without marriage.
Llewellyn  has  completely  unravelled  the  neoclassical  premise  of the
Columbia reformers'  functional  vision. With  it, he has again  erased FLE.
The  idea  that  marriage  is  meaningfully  described  as  status-not-contract
struck  him  as  empty  lexical  twiddling:  he  alluded  to  the  idea  as  a
somewhat  ridiculous judicial  rationalization  in  the  opening  of his  essay
and  never returned  to  it.165  He  devoted  far  more  attention  to debunking
the  family/market  distinction. The  ideology of the market  and of marital
monogamy  was not so  much a complex  of mistaken  social purposes  as a
confusing mesh of hopelessly contradictory  rationalizations:
Here  one  can  add  the  ofcourseness  of the  glorification  of the
Captain of Industry who has the skill to manage great quantities of
things  and  people  "to  the common good."  And whose  powers  we
should not bring to  fruition if we  did not give  him-or  leave  him-
"incentive  to  provide  for his  offspring."  Meantime,  we  seek  to
keep him from unfolding, by limiting the pressure of responsibility
and pride to the offspring of a single woman; we do what we can,
too,  to  keep  his unique  talents  from  chances  of perpetuation  by
combination  with  any  chromosomes  save those  of the woman  he
happens  to  have  married.  The  interesting  thing  is  that  the  two
approaches  are  both,  for  our  dominant  ideology,  obvious.  And
164.  Llewellyn, Behind the Law ofDivorce, supra note  136,  at 1295-96  (citation omitted).
165.  "So the  law-books  tell  us of marriage  as a  'contract'  (by which is  meant  in first  instance a
contracting) and marriage  as a  'status';  indeed  in the  latter aspect jurisdictional  difficulties  have  led
courts into  talking of marriage  as a  'res.'  Yet though they  talk of legal  doctrine,  lawyers  like  other
folk find the  social reality coloring discussion and thought  at every point." Id. at  1282.  With no more
ceremony than that, Llewellyn tosses  aside the distinction that had helped give  shape to the classical
legal order. See Halley, What is Family Law?: Part I,  supra note  1, at 33-48.
2011] 235
47
Halley: What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
both  may,  of  course,  be  wise,  though  seemingly  inconsistent;
society  is  not mathematics.  But the  rationalizations  current  seem
to need considerable  re-working.166
Here  is  a  highly  counterintuitive  passage:  it  has,  to  me  anyway,  the
earmarks  of  a  chiasmatic  critique.  Our  ideology  produces  the
"ofcourseness"  of  the  ideas  that  the  Captain  of  Industry  must  be
untrammeled at work so that he  can provide  for his offspring, but that he
must  be  channeled  by  marriage  into producing  offspring  with  one  and
only one woman.  This  is a scrim of rationalizations;  tear  it away  and the
justifications for laissez  faire and for marriage  as status fall away, and we
are  radically  free  to  alter  the  rules  on either  side  of the  now-dissolved
family/market  divide.  Or  again:  among  the  economic  functions  of
marriage,  Llewellyn  noted  that  it  provides  a  career  for  infants  and
children,  along  with  "some  support,  too,  for  her  who  does  the  caring,
which  make[s]  her support  in decent measure  independent  of continuing
sex  charm.  Old age  insurance,  of a  sort. The  wife  who  is used up  is  not
simply  to  be  fired  - even  under  most  ruthless  individualistic
capitalism."' 67  Llewellyn  seamlessly  assimilates  the  husband's  common
law duty of support to  social insurance:  if we  can have  the one,  why not
the  other? The  question  is simply unintelligible  if one  maintains any grip
on  FLE; it seems inevitable if one lets it go.
The  Columbia  curricular  reform  project  became  a  crossroads  forcing
social  purpose functionalism  and  real realism  into real-time  conflict. As
we  have  seen,  Jacobs  and  Angell's  new  courses  promised  to  give
curricular  form  to  a  fundamental  restructuring  of  domestic  relations.  I
think it's safe to say that they pushed the field strongly  in the direction  of
real realism. For instance, the turn to administration: Pound's  1913 insight
that  social  purpose  functionalism  would  be  outrun  by  administration
would  later  come  to haunt  him  in  the  form of the  real  realists and  their
insistence  that  legal  method  accommodate  the  complexity  of  the
law/society  dynamic.  The  scope,  procedures  and  institutional  attitude  of
the  family  courts  invented  by  the  social  progressives  could  not  be
described in the vocabulary  of Pound's social purpose functionalism:  you
would need real realism even to notice them.
But  this  impulse  also  caused  the  committee  considerable  anguish,  as
they  did  not  yet  see  how  the  family-related  elements  of  the  law  of
166.  Llewellyn, Behind the Law ofDivorce,  supra note  136, at  1298 n.38.
167.  Id. at 1290 (citation omitted).
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Property  or of Trusts  and Estates  could  migrate  to  Family Law  without
causing  gaps  and/or  duplication  that  would  tear  the  new  curriculum  to
pieces.  And the  turn to  empirical  sociology opened  a floodgate  to  social
information  so  voluminous  that  Pound's  and  Oliphant's  complacent
social-purpose functionalism broke to pieces:  the shock of the real. As the
Committee  and its  members  reeled,  and  though  the  Committee  devoted
huge efforts to taming this ambitious  agenda so that it could be fitted into
teachable materials, the template  of the old Domestic Relations reasserted
itself, holding this  time  large  fragments  of the social.  FLE reemerged  -
not  in  its  classical  form,  but  in  the  new  parole  of  sociological
jurisprudence.  The  remainder  of my account  is  the  story of the continual
reassertion of FLE in ever-new,  ever-old terms.
From the beginning  the  Columbia researchers  realized that the  state of
sociological  knowledge  about  the  family  was  a  problem.  Currie  quoted
this passage from a working document in the Committee's files:
[T]he  approach  to  familial  law  is  at  least  two  or  three  decades
behind the present state of wisdom as to business law, and  . ..  the
painful  efforts  of the  pioneers  in  that  field during  the  last  thirty
years must be duplicated in the field of familial law before a report
on this topic  can approximate  the definiteness  and excellence  now
obtainable in the fields of business organization and marketing.
168
Jacobs  and  Angell  reported  that  their  working  group,  after  a  year  of
struggle  with  the  project,  was  "in  entire  accord"'1 6   with  the  dismal
prediction of the original Columbia committee:
It  is  probable  that  the  . . . [functional,  sociological]  approach
would  be  practicable  if  the  seminar  were  being  held  in  1947
instead  of 1927,  but it  is  the judgment of the  committee that  the
present  state  of knowledge  as  to  familial  organization  and  the
interaction  of law  therewith  is  so  imperfect  that  an  organization
upon  this  approach  would  involve  the  pyramiding  of guesses  to
such an extent as to be highly undesirable.1
70
Note that while,  for Maine, the  law of status progressed  by not changing
while  the  law  of  contract  sped  forward  to  modernity;  and  while  for
Schouler and Tiffany  the contents of domestic relations could not keep up
with  the demands of an emerging classical  legal  order;  for the  Columbia
168.  Currie,  Materials,  supra note 101,  at 29-30 (quoting Document No. 42 at 320).
169.  JACOBS & ANGELL, supra note  108,  at 20.
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reformers  it was knowledge about the family  and  marriage  that lagged.
The sense of being "behind" seems  like a permanent part of the field now,
but clearly it has its own conditions of intelligibility.
The  first edition  of Jacobs's  casebook marks  the  challenges of putting
the  Committee's  recommendations  and  the  Jacobs/Angell  report  into
effect.  Jacobs  signaled  his  long-run  willingness  to  make  compromises
with Domestic  Relations early on. In  1930, he and Angell had referred to
Domestic  Relations  courses  as  the  "Old-Type  Courses""';  three  years
later he  titled his  own casebook Cases and Other Materials on Domestic
Relations. His introduction reassured the anxious teacher that "[w]herever
possible  an attempt  has been  made  to continue  the  main portions  of the
material  covered  in the  older  courses  on  Domestic  Relations."l 72  Old-
type, conceptualist,  dogmatic  teaching was entrenched  among teachers  of
Domestic Relations;  like Schouler and Tiffany before him, Jacobs felt the
pressure to produce a marketable  law-book.  The tolerances  of the buying
public - the law professors out there teaching the field;  students  exerting
their  immemorial  drag  on  pedagogy  - reasserted  themselves  as
conservative  constraints on the field.
The  actual  casebook  shows,  however,  that  at first Jacobs  tried hard  to
pour  new  wine  into  this  old  bottle.  The  basic  structure  is  familiar
(marriage,  relations  during  marriage,  divorce),  but  introductory  sections
and  long,  densely  type-set  footnotes  present  historical  and  sociological
materials  which  sometimes  press  the  case  material  up  towards  the  top
margin."'  To be  sure,  marriage  has  returned  to  its prideful place  as  the
central,  indeed,  only real legal topic.  Family Organization  does  not refer
to  single people  or unmarried  families but to the formation of a marriage
contract  and of a  marriagel74 ; not until  1965  did a casebook emerge that
broke the constraints limiting the field to legal marriage. More in line with
the original aspirations,  Jacobs's Part II, Relations  among Members of an
Organized  Family,  is  divided  into  Solidarity between  husband  and  wife,
between parent  and child;  and Economic Relations  of husband  and wife,
of parent and child."'  This carries  out, at least in part, a major innovation
of  the  Columbia  curriculum  committee  which  Jacobs  had  co-chaired.
Pound's  idea that one  must focus  on the relative  claims  of the social and
171.  Id. at 28.
172.  JACOBS, DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st ed.), supra  note  109, at vii.
173.  See, for instance, id. at 34-38.
174.  Id. at xiii.
175.  Id. at xiv.
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the  individual  interests  of  the  family  was  now  central  to the  way  the
ongoing marriage was taught. And Blackstone's oeconomical relations are
back, now  indicating  something  new:  domestic economics. Finally,  Part
III, Family  Disorganization,  includes not  only divorce  but  a  series  of de
facto dissolutions  wrought  by informal separation  (desertion,  separation),
and by other legal institutions (incarceration for insanity and for crime)."'
It's  a  remarkably  careful  selection  from  the  immense  array  of topics
Jacobs and Angell had proposed three years earlier; it is in many ways the
breath  of fresh  air  the  Columbia  curricular  reform  had  sought;  but  its
bones  are  those  of  a  Domestic  Relations  treatise  A la  Schouler  and
McCurdy.
Jacobs took direct aim at the idea that marriage was status-not-contract.
The  first  case  in  his chapter  on  "Marriage"  is the  1888  Supreme  Court
decision  that adopted  this idea  into the  constitutional  order, Maynard v.
Hill.'77  In  so doing it brought  into positive legal doctrine a key  structural
division of the classical  legal  order, introduced originally in  1852 by Joel
Prentiss  Bishop.'78  Here are  the basic  facts  underlying  Maynard v. Hill.
David  Maynard  left  his  wife  Lydia  in  Ohio  and  departed  for  Seattle.
There,  he  obtained  a  divorce  from  cronies  in  the  Oregon  Territory
legislature without notice  to her and apparently  without cause. After both
of them had died, her children asserted dower rights in land he had  owned
during  the  marriage,  thus  raising  the  question  whether  the  divorce  was
good.  They  argued  that the  divorce  violated  the  Contracts  Clause  of the
U.S.  Constitution,  which  stipulates  that  the  states  may  not  impair  the
obligation  of contracts. "  When  the  case  finally  made  it  to  the  U.S.
Supreme  Court,  it  thus  raised  the  question:  was  marriage  a  species  of
contract? Preclassical treatise writers and judges had said yes. Bishop had
said no; it was the opposite of contract. The Court now agreed:
[W]hile marriage  is often termed by  text writers and  in decisions
of courts  as  a  civil  contract,  generally  to  indicate  that  it must be
founded  upon  the  agreement  of the  parties,  and  does not  require
any religious ceremony for its solemnization,  it is something more
176.  Id at xv.
177.  Id. at  128-35  (excerpting Maynard  v.  Hill,  125  U.S.  190  (1888)).  For  a  discussion of the
place of this  case in  the emergence of the status/contract  distinction  in U.S.  law, see Halley,  What is
Family  Law?: A Genealogy, Part  I, supra  note  1, at 48-54.
178.  For a discussion,  see Halley,  What is Family Law?: A Genalogy, Part  1, supra note  1, at  33-
48.
179.  The Contracts  Clause stipulates  that "No state shall  ...  pass  any . . . law  . . . impairing the
Obligation of Contracts."  U.S. CONST.  art. 1,  § 10, cl.  1.
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than  a  mere  contract.  The  consent  of  the  parties  is  of  course
essential  to  its  existence,  but  when  the  contract  to  marry  is
executed  by  the  marriage,  a  relationship  between  the  parties  is
created  which  they  cannot  change.  Other  contracts  may  be
modified,  restricted,  or  enlarged,  or  entirely  released  upon  the
consent of the parties. The relation  once  formed,  the law  steps  in
and holds the parties to various  obligations  and  liabilities. It is an
institution,  in the maintenance  of which  in its public character the
public  is  deeply  interested,  for  it  is  the  foundation  of the  family
and  of society,  without  which  there would  be neither  civilization
nor progress. 10
Two  years  later  the  Court  would  put  the  cherry  on  top,  designating
marriage  "status.""'  The  construction  of status  and  contract  as mutually
constitutive  opposites  was a key structural  element  of the classical  legal
order,  ideologically  conforming  it  with  laissez faire and  the  separate
spheres. In Maynard v. Hill, the Supreme  Court made it official.
What  is this  case  doing  in Jacobs  casebook,  you might ask! The short
answer:  it is there to be mocked. He almost crowded the decision itself off
the  page  with  an  extended  footnote  detailing  the  major  epochs  in  the
history  of marriage  that  bear  no  correspondence  with  Supreme  Court's
imagery:  in  Roman  law  marriage  was  entirely  subject  to  the  private
prerogative  of the  patriarch;  in  early  Christian  doctrine  it  was  merely
tolerated  as  a regulatory  framework for  those too  weak  for the  spiritual
life;  Luther and the  Catholic  Church  then  fought  over  whether  it was  a
sacrament  or a creature  of "social  agencies";  the Puritan idea that  it was
purely  civil  was  transposed  to  the  United  States  via Massachusetts  Bay
Colony.182  He  follows  the  case  with  three excerpts  from  sociologists  of
marriage  who  denied  primacy  to  marriage:  "We  may  truly  say  that
marriage  is rooted in  the family rather  than the family  in marriage,"  said
Edward  Westermark.1 83  And this  from William  Grant Sumner,  the  same
sociologist  that  Llewellyn  quoted  in  "Behind  the  Law  of  Divorce"
lamenting the childless  fate of unmarried women:  "Although we speak of
marriage  as an institution,  it  is only an imperfect  one. It has no structure.
The family is the institution, and  it was antecedent  to marriage.  Marriage
has always been  an elastic and variable usage, as it now is."1 84  Jacobs has
180.  Maynard v. Hill,  125 U.S.  at 210-11.
181.  United States v. Grimley,  137 U.S.  147,  151  (1890).
182.  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC RELATIONS  (1st ed.), supra note  109,  at 128-30 n.1.
183.  Id. at  138 (quoting  EDWARD WESTERMARCK,  MARRIAGE  8 (1929)).
184.  Id. at  135 (quoting  SUMNER,  FOLKWAYS,  supra note  163,  at 348-49).
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revealed  the  status/contract  distinction  to be  an  artifact of legal  thought,
one  which  students  of society  outright rejected.  To teach  this part of the
Jacobs  casebook well,  one  would  have  to  have  an  appetite  for  casting
doubt on the grand dogmas of CLT.
Over the five editions of Jacobs's casebook,  the Columbia committee's
radical  intervention  in  the field not only lost  its edge; it eventually  came
to  occupy  the  "conservative"  position.  Jacobs's  subsequent  editions,
juxtaposed  with  book reviews  of his  efforts,  tell the  story  of his gradual
relinquishment of the Columbia reform agenda.
Right from the start, the book reviews make manifest an intense politics
over whether the pedagogy  of domestic  relations  should progress  or not,
and if so how far. They manifest three contesting positions  in the politics
of  curricular  reform:  the  ancien regime  both  accepting  and  resisting
change;  progressives  celebrating  it;  and  social  functionalist  hardliners
willing to punish one of their own for not going far enough.
The  old  guard  sounded  a  wistful,  defeated  note.  Chester  G.  Vernier
admitted he might be "confessing his age in doubting the wisdom of such
a radical  departure from the style of the older and simpler casebooks"  and
graciously  cited  his  own casebook  and statutory handbook  (thus quietly
impeaching  his  own  objectivity).  He  worried  that  the  sheer  volume  of
materials in Jacobs's casebook  would swamp  the teacher's  creativity and
overwhelm  the  student's  capacity."'  But  Vernier  seemed  to  feel  that
complaints were too late, that a new day was  dawning, and that the future
belonged to the new  generation:  "The  day of the  simple casebook seems
to be gone.  The 'new deal'  in this field calls for cases  and materials."'
8 6
The  progressives  celebrated  a break  with  the  past  in  legal  pedagogy.
One  reviewer  exulted:  "A  revolution  is  precipitated  by  Jacobs  in  the
organization  and  approach  to  the  subject  of Domestic  Relations.  . . . In
every  sense  this  is  a  modern  case  book  for  modern  needs."'
8 7  Roy
Moreland  compared  McCurdy's  Cases  on  Domestic  Relations,  his
example  of the  "orthodox"  path,  with  Jacobs,  "an  unusual  and  at times
amazing  casebook.  The  emphasis  is  sociological rather  than  legal.  Much
non-legal  material  has been  included. All  the  social  sciences  are kept  in
185.  Chester  G.  Vernier,  Book  Review,  47  HARV.  L.  REv.  732,  732-33  (1934)  [hereinafter
Vernier,  Book  Review]  (reviewing  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st  ed.),  supra  note  109).
Vernier's  star  footnote  drew  attention  to his  CASES  ON  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE  (1912)  and  his
AMERICAN FAMILY  LAWS (Vol.  I, 1931; Vol. II, 1932).
186.  Vernier,  Book  Review, supra note  185,  at 732.  Note  Vernier's  association  of the  Jacobs
casebook with the structural  reforms being wrought by progressives  in public  law.
187.  Book Note,  11  CHI-KENTL.  REV. 319, 319 (1932-33).
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mind all the time.  . . . The reviewer has  chosen Mr. Jacobs'  casebook  for
use this year. It is interesting to experiment. And sometimes progress lies
in  that  direction."' 8 '  The  line  between  orthodoxy and  progress  has  been
redrawn, and McCurdy's  brief day as the vanguard was over.
Meanwhile,  those  who  sought  a rigorous  and  thorough  integration  of
legal  studies  with  sociology  went  into  print  scolding,  even  spanking,
Jacobs  for making  a compromise  favoring the  status quo. One was none
other than Robert  Cooley  Angell,  who  indicated  that he  had,  four  years
past, worked with Jacobs  on the Columbia curricular project  and admitted
he  was  biased  both  for  and  against  his  former  partner's  book.'89  The
review  itself can  hardly be  described  as  favorable.  Jacobs,  he  observed,
faced a dilemma between the conflicting demands brought by "run-of-the-
mine"  law  students  who  were  not  used  to  the  challenge  of
interdisciplinary  materials,  and  those  brought  by  real  social  scientists
whose  work  could  be  effectively  taught  to  law  students  only  in  an
advanced  seminar. 1 90  Regrettably,  Jacobs  opted  to  "steer  a  middle
course."l 9 1  But  there  was  a more  adventurous  third way  which  Jacobs
should  have  taken:  "My  criticism,  then,  comes  to  this:  the  materials
dealing  with  life  situations  might  have  taken  more  the  form  of  a
framework  for the legal materials  instead of being juxtaposed, as  it were,
on  the  same  level." 92  The  Domestic  Relations  armature  had  stifled
Jacobs's book in its cradle.
To  Donald  Slesinger,  the  Jacobs  casebook  was  not  merely
disappointing  but  positively  rearguard.  It  was  built  on  a  "specious
sociological  framework."1 93  1 quote  at  length  from  Shlesinger's  review
because  it will,  I hope,  give my readers  - no matter whom they identify
with  in  this  fracas  - the  opportunity  to  feel  some  of  the  rage,
defensiveness,  shame and sheer confusion that so often besiege  the parties
to an interdisciplinary romance  gone sour:
[T]here  is  not  the  much  needed  fresh  attack  on  family  law  and
188.  Roy  Moreland,  Book  Review,  22  KY.  L.J.  460,  460  (1934)  (reviewing  MCCURDY,
DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st  ed.),  supra note 63,  and JACOBS,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st  ed.), supra
note  109).
189.  Robert  Cooley Angell,  Book Review,  33  COLUM.  L.  REv.  1086,  1086  (1933)  (reviewing
JACOBS, DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st ed.), supra  note  109).
190.  Id. at 1087-88.
191.  Id.
192.  Id. at 1088.
193.  Donald  Slesinger,  Book  Review,  I U.  CHI.  L.  REv.  659,  659  (1934)  (reviewing  JACOBS,
DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st ed.),  supra  note  109).
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family relations. He  apparently  tried to build on the revered older
courses.  A  genuine  contribution  will not  be  made until  someone
starts  his  compilation  not by  asking  "what can be  added  to what
we  have  to  make  it  a  little bit  more";  but  "what  background  is
essential  for  a  practicing  lawyer  or  research  worker  in  this
important field?"
The  non-legal material,  mainly sociological,  is  uneven, and badly
co-ordinated  with  the  cases.  Much  of  what  is  presented  is
common-sense  and  historical  interpretation  with  relatively  few
concrete  data .....  [The introductory  non-legal materials]  give[]
the  legal  student  an  entirely  erroneous  idea  of the  way  a  social
science  expert in family relations attacks his problem. [Instead, the
presentation  of  sociological  conclusions]  is  likely  to  make  the
tough  minded  legal  student  a  little  contemptuous  of the  tender
minded  sociologist. That Mr.  Jacobs  shows  some of this entirely
unjustifiable  contempt is  evident from the type of social questions
he asks  at the conclusion of various sections.  . . .. The sociologist
called  to  mind  by  these  question  is  a  genial  judge  in  a  study
mulling  over  the  opinions  of earlier  social  scientists,  or  figuring
out answers  on a purely common  sense basis.  The law  student  is
given  no  hint  of  the  arduous  process  of  rational  analysis,  the
search for relevant  data,  and the complicated statistical techniques
that enter into the solution of any of the . ..  problems.194
The  early  unity of the  Columbia vision  had  clearly  broken  up  by  now.
Domestic Relations represented the old, the formalist, the conceptual - in
short,  the  classical;  Family  Law  represented  the  new,  the  social,  the
functionalist  and  the  realist.  But  could  Family  Law  so  depicted  be
achieved?
According to Currie, who surveyed the Columbia reform effort not only
in family law but in "Business Units,"'95 property, crime and criminology,
marketing,  finance  and  credit,  labor,  risk  and  risk-bearing,  and
"miscellaneous  matters,"l96  some  fields  were  relatively  successful  in
integrating  social  science  "knowledge";  others  less  so;  and  still  others,
notably  "risk  and risk-bearing,"  self-destructed  as the reformers  realized
that  social  science  and  law  classified  their  topics  in  incommensurate
ways.  And  though  Currie  credited  the  explosion  of  social-purpose
functionalism with  an outburst of new thought  about law,  he determined
194.  Id. at 659-60.
195.  Currie, Materials,  supra note 101,  at 23-28.
196.  Id. at 38-64.
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in the end that the Columbia curricular  reform could not be counted  as  a
success. We have  already seen in our small  sliver of the story some of the
problems  which  Currie  detected  in  the  overall  enterprise.  His  account
makes  for depressing  reading:  repeatedly  the faculty  discovered  reasons
why the curriculum  could not be a taxonomic expression  of legal science;
the curriculum that resulted was far more  fragmentary and incoherent  than
what had  preceded  it;  tensions  arose  between  the  lawyers  and the  social
scientists,  and  between  professional  education  and  social-science
research;  interdisciplinary  turf wars  broke  out.  As  participants  began  to
feel  that  the  enterprise  was  foundering,  personal  conflicts  set in,  taking
pot-shots  at social science became imaginable, and money ran out.
197
In  1939,  Jacobs  produced  a  second  edition  of his  Cases and Other
Materials  on Domestic Relations that responded to the critics in detail, not
only  in  matters  of format,  but  in  structure  and  content.19 8  Gone  is  the
original  first chapter quoting at length from the Jacobs/Angell Report and
collecting  sociological  approaches  to  the  family.  Gone  are  the  lengthy
footnotes  with  social  science  detail.  Sections  begin  with  cases  and  end
with  notes  summarizing  statutes  and  more  cases.199  The  Questions  to
which  Slesinger  had  taken  such  strong  objection:  deleted.  The  effort  to
link  domestic  relations  law  with  social  science  knowledge  was  now
compressed into a "Select Bibliography on Domestic Relations,"  a revised
version  of the  list that  headed  up the  first edition.200  This  time  it didn't
even make it into the Table of Contents. 201  As before, Jacobs  divided this
bibliography  into  "Non-Legal  Material"  and  "Legal  Material"  and
introduced  it  with  a  proviso  warning  that  the  following  pages  present
"[o]nly  a  few  of the  leading  books":  "For  an  exhaustive  collection  of
material on the family, see Jacobs and Angell, A Research in Family Law
(1930)[.]"202  As before  he concluded  the headnote, "Further citations will
be  given  in the notes throughout the  book," 203  but now those notes were
almost  all  missing.  In  the  first  edition  this  booklist  was  a  genuine
197.  Id.at64-71.
198.  ALBERT  C.  JACOBS,  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  ON  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (2d  ed.,  Chicago,
Foundation  Press  1939) [herinafter JACOBS,  DOMESTIC RELATIONS  (2d ed.)].
199.  See, e.g., id. at 15-47.
200.  Id.  at xix-xxiii.  For the original version,  see  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st ed.), supra
note  109,  at xvii-xx.
201.  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (2d. ed.), supra note  198, at xv-xvii.
202.  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st  ed.),  supra note  109,  at  xvii;  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (2d ed.), supra note 198,  at xix.
203.  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st  ed.),  supra  note  109,  at  xvii;  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (2d ed.), supra note  198, at xix.
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apparatus  for the many quotations  from the works listed that appeared  in
the  footnotes  and  notes;  in  the  second  edition  it substitutes  for them.  A
telling  detail:  in revising  the  list, Jacobs vastly  upgraded  his estimate  of
Vernier's American Family Laws. In  1933 it was "a  very useful reference
work":  in  1939 it was "[t]he  most useful work of its kind in existence[,]"
"[e]xtremely  valuable[.]"2 0 4  Whereas  the first edition included a "Note on
Domestic Relations or Family Courts" which  argued for "the desired  goal
of  bringing  all  family  adjustment  problems  together  in  one  court  of
exclusive jurisdiction[,]"  the  second  edition omits  it  and is  silent  on the
Family Court movement.
205  To sum up: whereas Jacobs's first edition had
been an attempt to fit the Jacobs/Angell agenda into the casebook  format,
the second  edition abandoned  that effort. Looking  back, one  notices  that
the road has  forked,  and that one  is now on another  path,  a path leading
back to the classical  field of domestic relations.
It  wasn't just  Jacobs's  lack  of  a  fighting  faith  in  the  Jacobs/Angell
vision,  the  conservatism  of  teachers  ordering  casebooks  and  students'
demands  for  digestible  syllabi  that  were  at  work  here.  Once  again
novelties  in  the world of adjudication  heralded  a  substantive  ideological
shift. At the same time that Angell was returning domestic relations law to
its classical parking  place,  FLE was  dividing  the  legal sensibility  of the
family  courts  from  that  of  commercial  arbitration:  the  status/contract
distinction was reemerging  as  a key determinant. Cohen tells how  family
courts  adopted  antiadversarial  and  informal  procedures:  one  proponent
indicated that the family court "should be  looked upon as  a social agency
rather  than  as  an  agency  to  enforce  criminal  law  or  decide  technical
controversies  between  litigants."206  Surprisingly,  this  informality  was
understood  by  its  creators  to  be  for-the-family-not-the-market.  Though
Pound had originally  envisioned administration  spanning  the market  and
the  family,207  once  again  expressing  his  hostility  to  FLE,  by  the  time
family courts emerged, they reasserted the family/market  dichotomy:
One  of the judges who  sits in  the  Domestic  Relations  Court has
said that if the letter of the law were followed, it would be a purely
financial  court.  . . . Fortunately  the judges  do not hold too rigidly
204.  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st  ed.),  supra note  109,  at  xx;  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC
RELATIONS  (2d ed.), supra note  198, at xxiii.
205.  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st  ed.), supra note  109,  at 782-84;  JACOBS,  DOMESTIC
RELATIONS  (2d ed.), supra note  198, at 299-505.
206.  F.  R. Aumann, Domestic Relations Courts in Ohio, 15  J. AM.  JUDICATURE  SOC'Y 89,
92 (1931-32)  (quoted in Cohen, supra note  123,  at 101-2).
207.  Cohen, supra note  123, at 99.
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to the letter of the law and some very excellent social work is done
in  this  court,  and  plans  for  the  enlargement  of  its  powers  are
already underway.
208
Cohen brilliantly exposes the divergent logics that drove the emergence of
two  opposed precursors  of ADR during  the  social  era:  family courts  for
the  home and arbitration  for the  market;  solidarity  and  fluid mechanisms
of legal regulation  for the former;  individualism  and rule-bound  contract
for the latter.
209  She  shows that  the  new  form  taken  by status  - intense
micropoweristic  oversight  and  management,  through  multiple  layers  of
social  bureaucracy,  into  and  over  the  family  lives  of  the  poor,  the
mentally  ill,  children,  orphans,  juvenile  offenders  and  all  the  other
disabled  persons  - was  not  simply  progressive;  it  also  carried  a  strong
social  control  agenda. 210  Meanwhile,  aficionados  of laissez faire and
individualism  invented  commercial  arbitration  to  restore  freedom  of the
will  to the  man of commerce  and to  protect him from  the progressives'
efforts to regulate markets. FLE was back.
To  accommodate  it,  Jacobs  completely  revised  his  presentation  of
Maynard v. Hill. The case  is,  once  again,  the  first  up in  the  section  on
"The Nature of Marriage"  that commences the chapter on "Marriage."  But
Jacobs deleted both his long footnote about the varied history of marriage
and  all  the  sociological  excerpts  that  followed  the  case  in  the  first
edition.
2 11 He  then promoted  a classicizing  quotation  from  Vernier  from
the  footnotes  to  the  notes,  where  it  basks  in  the  sun  as  his  only
substantive, non-case-based commentary on this key case:
Marriage  clearly  differs  from  an  ordinary  contract  in  that  (1)  it
cannot  be  rescinded  or  its  fundamental  terms  changed  by
agreement;  (2)  it results in a  status; (3) it merges the legal identity
of the parties at common law; and (4) it is not a contract within the
Fourteenth  Amendment,  United  States  Constitution,  forbidding
legislation  impairing  the  obligation  of  contract;  (5)  the  tests  of
capacity differ from those applied to ordinary contracts.212
208.  Mary  E. Paddon,  The Inferior Criminal Courts of New  York City,  11  J. AM.  INST. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY  8,  14 (1920)  (quoted in Cohen, supra note  123,  at 102).
209.  Cohen, supra note  123,  at 100-09.
210.  Id. at 100-03.  For a rich account of the domestic relations court in Chicago, documenting the
claim  that  it  was  newly  "punitive,  coercive,  and  therapeutic,"  see  MICHAEL  WILLRICH,  CITY  OF
COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN  PROGRESSIVE  ERA CHICAGO  128 (2003).
211.  JACOBS, DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (2d ed.), supra note  198, at 59-63.
212.  Id. at 63  (quoting CHESTER  G. VERNIER,  AMERICAN  FAMILY  LAWS  OF  THE FORTY-EIGHT
STATES,  ALASKA,  THE DISTRICT  OF COLUMBIA  AND  HAWAII  (TO  JAN.  1,  1931),  vol.  1, at 51  (1931)).
This quotation  had appeared in JACOBS,  DOMESTIC RELATIONS  (1st ed.), supra note  109, at 132 n.2.
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Marriage  as  status-not-contract - almost exactly  as  Joel  Prentiss  Bishop
had mortared  it into the foundation of the CLT - was back.213  Currents of
curricular change  carried the law of the market down streams of influence
flowing  out  of  the  Columbia  curricular  reform  project  and  the  legal
sensibility of real realism;  domestic relations, like the cheese, stood alone.
In  preparing  this  genealogy  I have  often  wondered  why  a  socially-
oriented  field  named  family law  did not  emerge  in the  wake of the rise,
early  in  the  social  era,  of  family  courts  and  why,  despite  the  firm
consensus  that the  family  courts  had jurisdiction vastly broader  than the
law  of domestic  relations,  we  leave  end  this  chapter  of our  story  still
clinging  to "domestic  relations"  as CLT had  framed it. The answer  lies in
this  second  edition  of  Jacobs's  casebook.  It  effectively  cut  domestic
relations  off from  the  real,  and  in  doing  so  cut  it  off  from  the  legal
profession.  It would  not  be until  1950's  that  these  concessions  to  CLT
were,  once again, frontally contested.
Most  of the  reviews  of  Jacobs's  second  edition  are  placid  reading.
Robert R. Willard mocked the first round of reviews for complaining  that
the first edition "contained  too much non-legal material, too little, and not
the right  kind"  as  a  Papa  Bear,  Mama Bear,  Baby  Bear side  show,  and
praising  all Jacobs's changes,  sometimes  precisely because  they could be
ignored.2 14  For  Ernst  H.  Schopflocher,  the  early  reviews  were  too
conflictual  by  half:  the  conflict  between  cases  and cases and materials
was  just  a  matter  of  "one's  preference [.]",215  Laurence  M.  Jones
recommended  that teachers  adopt both  Vernier's American Family Laws
and Jacobs's Domestic Relations.
2 16  And T. Munford  Boyd poured scorn
on  "the  so-called  social  sciences";  according  to  him,  Jacobs's  second
edition had been so dramatically  watered  down the original plan that one
could teach  it whichever  side  of the  great divide  one  stood on, and  that
was a  good thing.21 7  The sense that  something big was  changing and that
the  Jacobs  casebook  represented  transformation  was  waning.  Instead,
Jacobs  mediated  the  conflicts  between  the  conservatives  and  the
213.  Halley,  What is Family  Law?: A Genalogy, Part  I, supra note 1, at 33-48.
214.  Robert  R. Willard,  Book Review,  27 CAL.  L. REv.  631,  632  (1938-39)  (reviewing  JACOBS,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS  (2d ed.), supra note 198).
215.  Ernst  H.  Schopflocher,  Book  Review, 40  COLUM.  L.  REv.  1126,  1126  (1940)  (reviewing
JACOBS,  DOMESTIC RELATIONS (2d ed.), supra note  198).
216.  Laurence  M.  Jones,  Book  Review,  34  ILL.  L.  REv.  377,  378  (1939)  (reviewing  JACOBS,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS  (2d ed.), supra note  198).
217.  T.  Munford Boyd, Book Review,  26 VA. L. REv.  238, 239,  240 (1939)  (reviewing  JACOBS,
DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (2d ed.), supra note  198).
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hardliners,  stilled  the  sense  that a  'revolution"  was underway,  and  was
rewarded by a grateful readership willing to do mediating  labor in its turn.
The Jacobs casebook  was fading into  the light of common day. And  then
World War II intervened, changing everything.
IV: THE FAMILY IN TROUBLE:  THE POSTWAR
STRUGGLE FOR FAMILY LAW
During the War, Pound looked with dismay  at the state of legal science.
Society  as  of  1943  was  in  an  "era[]  of transition,"  and  the  "absolute
validity"  and  "aithority"  of law  in general  was  in  crisis:  indeed  "all  the
institutions  of  social  control  today"  were  shaken,  and  "[n]othing  in  the
way of law reform will achieve all we seek."218 He now looked back with
nostalgia at the  very certainties of the classical  era which he himself had
helped to dismantle:
A  traditional  ideal  of the  end  of law  is  the  ultimate  measure  of
choice of starting points for legal  reasoning, of interpretation,  and
of  application  of  standards.  In  the  last  century  throughout  the
world jurists and  lawyers  accepted a received ideal to which  they
found  it  possible  to  come  from  any  of  many  different
philosophical starting points.  219
That ideal had been the will theory, the idea  of law as system, deduction,
and all the other  guiding principles  of the classical  era. As we have seen,
these had been the object of Pound's attack  in "The  Ends of Law." But it
turned out that  life without  them was  disorienting:  "Today that  ideal has
been largely  given up,  and nothing has yet arisen and  established itself to
take its place." 22 0  "Every branch of the law is disturbed[.]" 221
A particular crisis was shaking up what Pound was now willing to call
family  law.  The  inability  of the  states  to  agree  on  a  uniform  law  of
divorce, and  the increase  in forum  shopping  for divorce  and of collusive
divorce,  were  demoralizing  judges.  Sometimes  they  seemed  to  think  it
was  better  to  go  along  with  a  husband  and  wife  collusively  seeking  a
divorce  on fabricated  evidence  of fault than to  force  a victim of marital
cruelty  back  into  the  arms  of her  tormenter.  Meanwhile,  religious  and
other social institutions  that used to aid law  in maintaining social  control
218.  Roscoe  Pound, Foreword [to] a Symposium  in the  Law of Divorce,  28  IOWA L.  REv.  179,
181  (1943)  [hereinafter  Pound, Foreword].
219.  Id. at  180.
220.  Id.
221.  Id.
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were losing their grip on society. Overall, Pound saw in the rise of divorce
a  weakening  of marriage  as  a  social  institution.  This  whole  pattern  of
changes  was  producing  "outstanding  scandals  of our  administration  of
justice[.]"
222
Nor would it be easy to address this crisis. Legal thought  itself was in a
state of disorientation.  It was no longer a matter  of smoothly and  almost
inevitably  ascertaining  when  the  social  interest  should  prevail  over
individual ones, as Pound had thought in  1913.  The challenge  now was to
balance conflicting considerations:
The  task  of  the  legal  order,  the  task  of adjusting  relations  and
ordering  conduct,  involves  reconciling  or  balancing  conflicting
and  overlapping  desires  and  demands.  It  is  a  task  of  social
engineering....  But all balancing  of contradictories  is hard. Some
philosophers  of the time  give  the  matter up.  A  leader of current
juristic  thought tells us that the law  is  confronted by an  insoluble
contradiction;  an irreducible antinomy.  . . . We  are told that the[]
objectives  of the legal  order cannot be reduced  to one and  that all
we  do  is  to  issue  certain  threats  of  employing  the  force  of
politically organized  society  . . .. I am not willing to  give  up the
central problem of the science of law in this  fashion.  . . . [In torts
the  challenges]  arise from the difficulty of reaching an adjustment
between  the  social  interest  in  the  individual  life  and  the  social
interest in the general security. In divorce  law we have to reach an
even  more  difficult  balance  between  the  social  interest  in  the
individual  life  and  the  social  interest  in  the  security  of  social
institutions. 223
The  era  of conflicting  considerations  - of concon - had begun. Nor did
Pound think  it would produce  resolution  soon:  divorce  was a legislative
not  judicial  domain,  and  "It  is  no  one's  business  to  draft  divorce
legislation such as  is demanded by the conditions of the time. Probably no
one  is  competent to  do so without research  which it is no one's business
to carry  on."224  Pound's  1943  essay  can serve  here  as  the  last, dispirited
222.  Id.
223.  Id. at  182-83.  We do not need to look for the legal  devil  described in this paragraph:  he is  a
made-up  boogey. The  anti-real-realists  in the  legal  academy  - Pound included - had been  attacking
the real  realists for "nihilism"  since  the  1930s. For a bibliography, see  Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces:
A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REv.  1195,  1195-96,  1196 nn.1,  2, 3 (1989).  For an account
of the  charge  of nihilism  during  the era of the  social and  again during  the  concon  era,  see Duncan
Kennedy  & Marie  Claire  Belleau,  La Place de Rend Demogue dans la Ggnealogie de la Pense
Juridique Contemporaine, 56  REVUE  INTERDISCIPLINAIRE  D'ETUDES  JURIDIQUES  163,  198-211
(2006).
224.  Pound, Foreword,  supra note 218, at 188.
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whimper of the social-purpose  functionalism  that so profoundly animated
the  rise of the social. It  also indicates  that  complacency  about the family
was  over:  divorce was produced  by and was producing  a  series of social
crises that no one knew how to solve.
After World War  II, the campaign  for the  social family re-emerged, but
it  carried  a  new  idea,  situated  in  a  completely  transformed  intellectual
paradigm.  Nineteen-fifty-one  can  be  our  inaugural  date  for  the  new
project  in  the field. That year the Association of American  Law Schools
convened  a  Roundtable  on  Family  Law  at  its  annual  meeting,  held  in
Denver,  in  which the  new  battle  lines  were  drawn.225  The  same  forces
mustered  the next year at the AALS  Annual  Meeting in Chicago.226  Two
books, both published in  1952,  represented the new formation. Fowler V.
Harper's Problems of  the Family,
227  collecting materials he taught at Yale
Law  School  in  a  Family  Law  course,  took  its  position  as  the  new
vanguard;  the  conservative  position  fell  to Jacobs  himself, publishing  a
third  edition  of  his  Domestic Relations  with  a  new  co-editor,  Julius
Goebel, Jr.228
Recall  that  the  social-purpose  functionalists  had  seen  the  family  as  a
site  of social  integration  and  disintegration,  and  they sought  to promote
the  former  and  manage  the  latter  by  selecting  the  optimal  legal  rules;
recall  also  that  the  real  realist trend  in  the  Columbia  curricular  reform
project  envisioned  family  law  as  the  totality  of  legal  agencies  that
managed family disorganization. Both adopted the stance of the governor,
first  in the  form  of a judge,  then  in  the  form  of a  social  regulator.  By
contrast,  Harper's  family  was  the  social  setting  encountered  by  the
practitioner  exposed  on  a daily  basis  to  familial  calamity.  An  emerging
crisis, produced by rising divorce rates and a surge in "children of broken
families,"  lay  claim  to  professional  concern.229  Harper's  intended
audience  was  young lawyers  who would  stand shoulder-to-shoulder  with
psychiatrists, sociologists (soon to morph into social workers),  clergymen,
225.  Robert Kingsley,  Book Review,  5 J.  LEGAL EDUC.  400, 400 (1952-53)  (reviewing  FOWLER
V.  HARPER,  PROBLEMS  OF  THE FAMILY  (1952)  and  ALBERT  C.  JACOBS  AND  JULIUS  GOEBEL, JR.,
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1952)).
226.  The Journal of  Legal Education published two papers  which refer to the  Chicago panel  as
their origin. See Kingsley, supra note 225,  at 400;  Kenneth Redden, Domestic Relations - Stepchild  of
the Curriculum, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC.  82, 82 n.*  (1953-54).
227.  FOWLER V.  HARPER,  PROBLEMS OF  THE FAMILY  (1952).
228.  ALBERT  C.  JACOBS  &  JuLius  GOEBEL,  CASES  AND  OTHER  MATERIALS  ON  DOMESTIC
RELATIONS  (3d ed.  1952).
229.  HARPER, supra note 227, at iii.
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and  anthropologists  "in  order  to deal  with  the family  in trouble." 2 30  For
those  in  the  grip  of  this  sensibility,  the  cool  attitude  of Jacobs's  and
Goebel's Domestic Relations casebook  seemed utterly  out of touch with
reality - seemed, indeed, to be mere conceptualism. Paul Sayre excoriated
Jacobs  and Goebels for missing the sheer human grandeur of their topic:
[M]y main difficulty  is with something that no one else apparently
thinks important, and which certainly is no defect in this casebook
by  all  the  accepted standards.  I don't  think any  of them  describe
the  animal  so  you would  recognize  him  by their  description.  Do
they  think  Domestic  Relations  a  purely  verbalistic  and  logical
system  of  rules  put  together  under  (preferably)  Aristotelian
influence?  If  so,  I  disagree.  . . . I  think  family  relations  are
strikingly  a dynamic matter with  apparently  an endless  succession
of the  relations  of parent  and  child,  then  husband  and  wife,  and
then parent and child again, in a kind of earthly immortality.
Our students,  for  the most  part, will go  out and  deal with  actual
children  and  husbands  and  wives.  To  serve  them  usefully  they
must  dare  to touch  the  dignity of life  itself. Not to  give  students
some training in the amazingly complex  and enduring  qualities  of
their labors means incredible failure.231
The  sense  of urgency,  of crisis-the  moral  earnestness  and  indignation
that  Sayre  brings to  his  attack  on Jacobs  and  Goebels  - are  completely
new. To be sure, the social-purpose  functionalists  had confronted "family
disintegration"  as  a  major  social  problem,  but  it  was  one  that  experts
could  deal  with.  From  a  high  center,  they  would  determine  the  social
purposes, study their operation in  society, and  recommend  the right rule.
For  all  the  intellectual  excitement  and  ferment  of the  realist  revolt,  it
harbored  a  deep  cognitive  composure.  The  postwar  progressives
jettisoned  all of that. For them,  the  family in  crisis  demanded  emotional
attachment  with  real  people  having  real  problems.  And  it  produced  a
sense of not-knowing that was unsettled, hectic, emotionally hot.
There were dissenters,  moving  into new positions on  a new battlefield.
Side  by  side  with  Sayers's  review,  the  Journal of Legal  Education
published one by Robert Kingsley, who  objected strongly to the idea that
he  should  teach  on  the  "integrated"  method  represented  by  Harper's
casebook:
230.  Id.
231.  Paul  Sayre,  Book Review,  62  YALE  L.J.  307, 400  (1953)  (reviewing FOWLER V.  HARPER,
PROBLEMS  OF THE FAMILY  (1952)).
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At this  point I "beg off."  I am  a  lawyer  - not an  anthropologist,
nor a theologian, nor an economist nor an historian. What is more,
I am  a  law  teacher.  I have  spent  a  quarter  of a  century,  slowly
learning  a little  about how  to teach law to  law  students.  And the
very  heart and  core  of my pedagogy  is  that  I teach  how  to  use
knowledge and not merely knowledge  itself. The arts and skills of
the  teacher  whose  sole  task  is  to  transmit  information  to,  and  to
imbed  it in, the  minds  of a student  body are  not mine. By  this,  I
deprecate neither my skills nor those of the teacher of data. But we
are different. He cannot do my job well; I cannot do his!232
Kingsley concluded by identifying himself as a pedagogic "conservative";
he  could  assign  Jacobs's  and  Goebel's  third  edition  because  it was,  by
now, in contrast to Harper's Young-Turk  entry, a "reasonably traditional"
text.233
Both  sides  of  the  new  domestic-relations/family-law  divide  had
abandoned  legal science;  both  sides  saw their job as  training  lawyers  to
meet with practical problems in the  real world. The  conflict was  over the
relationship  of legal  professionals  to  the  other  professions  attending  in
families  in  crisis.  For Harper,  the  idea  was  "not  . . . that lawyers  must
become  psychiatrists,  sociologists,  and  anthropologists  in  order  to  deal
with  the family  in  trouble" but  that the  lawyer "does  need something  of
the clergyman  in him, and perhaps also something of the psychiatrist and
social scientist"  to  give  substance  to "his understanding  of the  source  of
much unhappiness."234  Fully half of his materials, he claimed, come from
anthropology,  sociology,  and  psychiatry;  he  didn't  offer  his  readers  a
legal case until page seventy-five.235  In order to review the book, the Yale
Law Journal  understood that it was necessary to solicit contributions from
a psychiatrist, a lawyer, a social worker, and a family-court judge. 2 36  This
was  the  new  progressive  project.  For  the  conservatives,  the  goal  was
equally professional  but narrower:  Jacobs and Goebel would  enable them
to teach  lawyers to be lawyers, that is, to understand the legal problems  of
their troubled clients and to use law to solve them.
232.  Kingsley, supra note 225, at 401.
233.  Id. at 401-02.
234.  HARPER, supra note 227, at iii.
235.  Id. at 1-75.
236.  Jules V.  Coleman,  Book Review,  62  YALE L.J.  305 (1953)  (reviewing FOWLER V. HARPER,
PROBLEMS  OF  THE  FAMILY  (1952));  Sayre, supra note 231; Harleigh  B.  Trecher, Review,  62 YALE
L.J.  309 (1953);  Anna  M.  Kross,  Review,  62  YALE  L.J.  311  (1953).  The  notes  indicate  that  these
contributors  were,  respectively, a professor of psychiatry,  a professor of law, the dean of a school  of
social work, and a family court judge. 62 YALE L. J. at 307 n.*, 309 n.*, 311  n.*, 312  n.*.
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The  neoclassical  fagade  of  the  legal  order  envisioned  by  the  social-
purpose  functionalists  had  broken  up.  They  wanted  legal  science  to  be
like  the  natural  and  social  sciences;  just  as  those  sciences  sought  to
discern  universal  law  in  their  proper  domains,  legal  science  would
identify  an  entire  universe  made up by  the  laws of social control.  Their
curriculum would transparently represent the universe known by this legal
science.  Observers  have  regretted  that  they  undertook  to  "revamp  the
entire  curriculum" 237 but  that  was  central  to their  idea  of a  respectable
knowledge  project,  and in adopting it they sought to replace  the classical
edifice  with  another  structure  equally  shapely  and  complete.  The  real
realists had  enthusiastically  accepted  fragmentation,  but they too wanted
to  explain  everything. Postwar,  we  detect  no  trace  of this  encyclopedic
ambition.  If Pound had  thought  that domestic  relations  were  of a piece
with all  social relations,  and if the Columbia social-purpose  functionalists
had thought  that  the  family was  a distinct social  entity that nevertheless
could be governed  through the use of the  same intellectual paradigm  that
would  work on  every  other  social activity,  the  postwar family  fell back
into the complete exceptionalism  which the classical order had crafted for
it.
Given the robust ascendancy  of the market in postwar American  social
life and  in the career  ambitions of law  students, advocates  of family  law
dedicated themselves  to it as  to a fighting faith.  In 1952  Kenneth Redden
recalled  with sorrow  and  indignation his  experience  as  a beginning  law
teacher at the University of Virginia:
As the bottom man  on the  totem pole I was  quite naturally  given
those courses which no one else wanted to teach. One of these was
family  law. Having  absolutely  no prior  experience  in the  field,  I
was  obviously  the  perfect  one  to  teach  it.  I could  approach  the
subject  with an  objective,  unbiased,  and  impartial  eye  in  all  the
unsullied freshness of youth.238
Redden  "soon discovered"  that family law was the "stepchild"  - even the
"ugly  duckling"  - of the  curriculum. 2 39  But this  was a dangerous  error:
"Although  lawyers  are  properly  concerned  with  prosperous  business
relations,  sound  financial  relations,  peaceful  international  relations,  or
conciliatory  labor relations, what good are they if we have a failure in our
237.  LAuRA  KALMAN,  LEGAL  REALISM  AT YALE  73  (1986);  see also Currie, Materials,  supra
note  101,  at 71.
238.  Redden, supra note 226, at 82.
239.  Id. at  82, 84.
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family  relations?" 24 0  (Echoes  of Pound  and  the  Columbia  reformers:  all
the  relations  constituted  an  ordered  society,  and  all  were  coequal  in
importance.)  Given  the  "alarming  rise  of juvenile  delinquency  and  the
tragic  disintegration  of the family  unit,"  the  stakes were  no smaller than
the "fall  or decline of every great civilization."
24 1 In  1960  Dean Griswold
of Harvard  Law  School  worried  in  his  annual  report  that  law  students'
enthusiasm for the  law  of the  market  was resulting  in  a curriculum  that
demoted and verged on ignoring civil and human rights, international law,
legal history, legal theory - and family law.2 4 2  Something had to be done.
The  push  for  a  revitalized  field,  when  it  did  come,  arose  not  in  the
academy  but  among  professional  lawyers.  In  the  late  1950's,  bar
associations  started  producing  sections  and  publications  dedicated  to
family law. The movement started in state bar associations,
243  and  swiftly
commandeered  the  energies  of the  American  Bar  Association.  In  1960,
the  ABA  started  publishing  The  Family  Lawyer,  a  bimonthly
newsletter; 24  and  proceedings  of  the  ABA  section  on  Family  Law
appeared  annually  from  1959  through  1963.245  The  urgency  and
excitement  conveyed  in  these early  publications  can perhaps be captured
in  some  characteristic  greetings  appearing  in  these  series.  The  second
issue  of  The  Family Lawyer confessed  that,  "[i]n  trying  to  include  all
accumulated  news  [since  the first issue two months before],  the type had
to  be  reduced  below the  bifocal  strength  of some  grandfathers'  glasses.
For  this  we  apologize.  By  trial  and  error,  we  hope  to  have  a  creditable
newsletter."
246  Section  Chairman  Sol Morton  Isaac  closed his  Foreword
to the Proceedings  published that same year with this salute:  "If you have
a  family - if  you  represent  a family  - if you judge  a family  - you  are
concerned  with  Family  Law."
247  Institution  building  was  an  urgent
240.  Id. at 82.
241.  Id.
242.  Erwin N.  Griswold,  Law School, in 58  OFFICIAL  REGISTER  OF  HARV.  UNIV.  405,  408-09
(1961)  (special  issue  containing  Report  of the  President of Harvard College  and  Reports of
Departments, 1959-1960).
243.  STATE BAR  OF  CAL.  COMM.  ON  CONTINUING  EDUC.  OF  THE BAR,  FAMILY  LAW  FOR CAL.
LAWYERS  (Univ.  of  Cal.  at  Berkeley  Extension  1956);  INDIANA  STATE  BAR  ASSOCIATION,  THE
EIGHTH  ANNUAL  ELEVENTH  DISTRICT  LEGAL  INSTITUTE  ANNUAL  MIDWINTER  MEETING  OF  THE
INDIANA  STATE  BAR  ASSOCIATION  ON  FAMILY  LAW  (John  D.  Cochran  &  Joseph  G.  Wood  eds.,
Indianapolis, Bobbs Merrill Co.  1957).
244.  1:1 THE FAMILY  LAWYER (April  1960).
245.  AMERICAN  BAR  ASSOCIATION,  SECTION  OF  FAMILY  LAW,  SUMMARY  OF  PROCEEDINGS
(Chicago, American Bar Center  1959, 1960,  1961,  1962,  1963).
246.  1:2  THE FAMILY LAWYER  I (June  1960).
247.  AMERICAN  BAR  ASSOCIATION,  SECTION  OF  FAMILY  LAW,  SUMMARY  OF  PROCEEDINGS  7
254 [Vol.  23:189
66
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss2/1Halley
priority.  The  June  1960  issue  of  The  Family Lawyer  is  packed  with
reports  on  state  bar  association  meetings,  tentative  schedules  for
upcoming  meetings,  resolves  to  start  law  clinics  and  raise  funds,  case
notes and offers  of bibliographical  assistance:  it  all  "adds  up  to the  fact
that a genuine  Research  Center must be  our  number  one  project."248  As
part  of the  general  ferment,  Duke  University  had  already established  an
Institute  on  Family  Law  and  circulated  a  verbatim  account  of  its
proceedings  in  typescript.249  The  American  Law  Institute  published  a
practice  guide  on  Family  Law,
250  and  a  whole  array  of Family  Law
journals  and  research  reports  appeared.
2 5 1  Family Law re-emerged,  this
time  from the professional  organizations.  It was Family Law  as opposed
to  Domestic  Relations,  a  stodgy  formalist  encrustation  of  the  law
curriculum.  It was  Family  Law  because  it was  about  real  families  and
their  real  problems.  It  took  about  five  more  years  before  it  pushed
Domestic Relations off the curricular stage.
This  transition  was  fraught  with  meaning  for  the  participants,  and
anyone who was politically alive in the  1960s will recognize  the urgency,
the fervor, the sense that the center might not hold, that the chaos of social
life  might  overwhelm  law  - the  sheer  contact  with  craziness  - that
attended the long-belated  birth of Family Law  as a  topic  in the  standard
law curriculum.  The  turning point from  domestic relations  to  family law
was  interpreted contemporaneously  in  an anguished book  review for  the
Harvard  Law Review by Robert F. Drinan,  S.J. He narrated the shift from
domestic  relations  to  family  law  as  a  shift  from  formalism  to  a
professionalized  social-realist  attitude  towards  family  crises  like  divorce
and adoption.252  We can see  the  shift  in the  very  titles of his  examples:
Homer  H.  Clark's  Cases and Problems on Domestic Relations, Joseph
Goldstein  and  Jay  Katz's  The Family and the  Law,  and  Caleb  Foote,
(Chicago, American Bar Center,  1960).
248.  1:2 THE FAMILY LAWYER  I (June 1960).
249.  PROCEEDINGS  OF THE INSTITUTE  OF FAMILY  LAW  APRIL 9,  10,  11,  1959, DUKE UNIVERSITY
(John S. Bradway ed.,  1959) (typescript).
250.  C. CLINTON  CLAD,  FAMILY  LAW (1958).
251.  In  addition to  THE FAMILY  LAWYER,  supra notes  244  &  246,  see,  for  instance,  ILLINOIS
STATE  BAR  ASSOCIATION  SECTION  ON  FAMILY  LAW,  FAMILY  LAW  BULLETIN  (Springfield,  Ill.,
1958);  JOURNAL  OF  FAMILY  LAW  (University  of Louisville  School  of  Law  1961);  A  REVIEW  OF
FAMILY  LAW  RESEARCH  AND  SOME  SUGGESTED  AREAS  OF  FUTURE ACTIVITY  (Chicago,  American
Bar Foundation  1961).
252.  Robert F.  Drinan, S.J., Book  Review,  79 HARV.  L. REv.  1727 (1966)  (reviewing  HOMER H.
CLARK,  CASES  AND  PROBLEMS  ON  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1965);  JOSEPH  GOLDSTEIN  AND  JAY
KATZ,  THE  FAMILY  AND  THE  LAW  (1965);  CALEB  FOOTE,  ROBERT  J.  LEVY,  AND  FRANK  E.  A.
SANDER,  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  ON FAMILY LAW (1965)).
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Robert J. Levy and  Frank E. A.  Sander's Cases and Materials on Family
Law.  253  This sequence  takes us from  domestic relations (Clark is the new
Jacobs and Goebels),  to the social and psychological  family confronted by
the law, to  family law as a new discipline or field in legal studies.
The urgency  of Father  Drinan's  review  arose  from his  sense  that  no-
fault  divorce  was  exposing  moral  and  spiritual  problems  for  which
"society"  and  "the  law"  had,  as  yet,  no  answers.  Signing  on  to  Justice
Brandeis's  bon  mot,  "A  lawyer  who  has  not  studied  economics  and
sociology  is  very  apt  to become  a public  enemy,"254  Drinan  ranked  the
three books by the extents to which they acknowledged the profundity of
family  problems  and  to  which  they  professionalized them.  Divorce,
custody,  difficult  adoptions,  the  path  of  unwed  motherhood:  a  client
presenting  these  legal  issues is  "seeking  the  aid of a lawyer  to  alter  the
profoundest  personal  relationships  of his  life."255  Clark's  tutelage  of the
lawyer as "technician dealing  almost exclusively with the legal aspects of
the  marriage  relation"  was  simply  not  up  to  the  task.256  The
interdisciplinary  materials  - from psychiatry  particularly  - presented  in
the Goldstein  and  Katz volume  were  more  adequate  at  least  in  showing
that  "the  legal  aspects  of  any  problem  related  to  marriage,  divorce,  or
custody  are  almost  nonessential  formalities  in  comparison  with  the
profound moral and  spiritual values which form the real basis of the legal
concept  of  the  union  of  husband  and  wife."
257  Their  materials  were
"bewildering,"  but  the  resulting  disorientation  was,  Drinan  thought,  an
important wake-up  call:  "The  ambivalence  and  sheer confusion"  that the
law  manifests  when  it  confronts  the  socially  and  psychologically  real
family  are  "portrayed  in  Goldstein-Katz  in  a  way  that  is  truly
shattering."258  In  1966 law professors liked to feel shattered.
But  clearly  Drinan  thought  that  Foote,  Levy,  and  Sander's  casebook
offered  the  only  way  out.  Their  casebook  aimed  for  a  professional
response  to the problem:  it was "unprofessional"  for lawyers to ignore the
"nonlegal  problems"  suffered  by  their  clients,  and it was  a  professional
253.  HOMER H. CLARK,  CASES  AND  PROBLEMS  ON  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1965);  CALEB FOOTE,
ROBERT  J.  LEVY  &  FRANK  E.  A.  SANDER,  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  ON  FAMILY  LAW  (1966)
[hereinafter  FOOTE,  LEVY  &  SANDER,  FAMILY  LAW];  and  JOSEPH  GOLDSTEIN  &  JAY  KATZ,  THE
FAMILY AND THE LAW  (1965)  [hereinafter GOLDTEIN  & KATZ,  THE FAMILY  AND  THE LAW].
254.  Drinan, supra note 252, at 1727.
255.  Id. at 1729.
256.  Id. at 1728.
257.  Id.
258.  Id. at 1729.
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obligation for them to have enough interdisciplinary  training to be  able to
refer  clients  to  "psychiatry,  social  work,  and  other  relevant  disciplines"
for help with those problems.259  With "expert nonlegal  assistance" clients
might even hope for "resolution" of those problems.260
Drinan  also praised  Foote/Levy/Sander  for throwing  a healthy  dose of
skepticism  on the  idea that  these problems  were a  new set  of formal  or
technical  challenges:  rather,  the  law  attempts  to  make  an  "uneasy
compromise  of irreconcilable  values[.]" 261 And when it can't, it faces the
inescapable,  dire  question,  "Which  of the  'irreconcilable  values'  should
the  law  endorse?" 2 6 2  Because  it  faced  that  question  "in  countless
disquieting ways"  the  Foote, Levy,  and  Sander volume  was,  in Drinan's
view,  "the  most  important  casebook  in  family  law  in  the  history  of
American legal education."
263
What  shifts in the  legal  ideology  of this  new domain  can we detect  in
Drinan's  review?  Like  all  advocates  for  family  law  and  detractors  of
domestic  relations  since  the  Columbia  reforms,  it was  antiformal.  Like
Harper,  it acknowledged  the  need  for parallel  professional  engagement;
like Harper, it focused attention on the sheer giddy  depth of family affect.
The novelty is the sense of social crisis, pitched in an awareness  that most
problems addressed  by family law  escape  its reach.  The  legal  obligations
of husband  to  wife,  the  grounds  for  divorce,  the  causes  of  action  for
breach  of marriage-related  duties:  these  were  quite  beside  the  point  for
lawyers  facing the social disruption and moral confusion of people whose
lives were being lived off their grid.
The  Foote/Levy/Sander  casebook  originated  in  1956,  in  a  National
Institutes of Mental Health  grant  to  support  training  for  law  students  in
the behavioral  sciences.2 64  It thus  expresses  in academic  form  the family
law bar ferment that arose as  the postwar generation  tried to get a grip on
its rapidly changing society. By  1960, Frank Sander was teaching "Family
Law"  to Harvard  Law  School  students.2 65  So far,  the project sounds  like
the  Columbia  family  law  project  rising  like  a  Phoenix.  But  with  a
difference:  in addition  to framing policy  questions in large  social-science
259.  Id.
260.  Id.
261.  Id. at 1730  (quoting FOOTE, LEVY & SANDER,  FAMILY LAW,  supra note 253, at 649).
262.  Id. at 1730.
263.  Id.
264.  FOOTE,  LEVY & SANDER,  FAMILY  LAW, supra note 253, at ix.
265.  FRANK  ERNEST ARNOLD  SANDER,  FAMILY  LAW (1960-61)  (mimeographed  course materials
available at Harvard Law Library, Hollis # 8438824).
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contexts,  Sander consistently  propelled students  into their coming role as
lawyers.  The  materials  add "Problems":  "Miss  Ida  Idlehour  has  come  to
you  with  the  following  problem";  "As  chairman  of  your  state's  law
revision  commission,  you  have  been  asked  to  consider  both  the
constitutionality  and  the  advisability,  in  public-policy  terms,  of  the
following  statute."266  And  he  included  a  special  section  devoted  to  the
counseling role, in which the Columbia focus on the collaboration of legal
science  with  social  science  morphs  into  an  emphasis  on  lawyers'
collaborations  with  psychiatrists,  social  workers,  medical  teams,  school
officials  and  the  full  panoply  of professionals  with  any  kind  of role  in
managing the lives of actual people in actual families.  He included a draft
article by Howard  R.  Sacks advising, "[m]any  lawyers  seem unaware  of
the  contribution  that  social  agencies,  marriage  counselors,  psychiatrists,
and  clinical psychologists  can make  in aiding  a client."2 67  Family law  is
now not  only about policy  analysis but also about the practice  of law by
actual  lawyers,  embedded  in a complex web of professionals  responsible
for addressing all the complex aspects of a family crisis.
The  next year  Sander  and  Caleb  Foote  produced  independent  course
materials,  Cases and Materials on Family Law. This  is  the prototype  of
the  1965 Foote/Levy/Sander  casebook, and a major innovation that strikes
the  eye  reading  both of them  is how  fully  they  incorporate  the  kinds  of
materials  which,  in  the  longue durde of the  Jacobs  casebook,  never  got
out of the footnotes and short notes. The published casebook includes two
actual  trial  records,  including  probation  officer's reports  and psychiatric
assessments  from independent psychiatrists  and state hospitals,  as well  as
transcripts of court proceedings,  giving students  a direct view of multiple
institutions  and  professional  roles  convening  to  determine  the  future
course  of seriously  troubled  parties.2 6 8  The editors  have  compiled  long
introductory  sections  summarizing  social  science  data  relevant  to  the
cases;  include  complete  statutes  so  that  students  can  be  asked  to  apply
them to the cases; and excerpt social science articles as main readings, not
notes.269  The first chapter of the  casebook, for instance,  devotes fifty-six
pages to policy analysis and thirty-one pages to lawyers'  problem-solving
266.  Id. at Assignment 1, 1, Assignment  3, 1.
267.  Id., n.p. (excerpting Howard R. Sacks, Talking with Clients,  at 9 (mimeographed article)).
268.  FOOTE,  LEVY & SANDER,  FAMILY  LAW, supra note 253,  at 417-40, 866-95.
269.  For  instance,  in  the  chapter  on  "The  Dysfunctional  Family,"  we  find  an  introduction
crammed with social detail,  id. at 394-400, a complete statute  on the "neglected  child", id. at 417-22,
and a long excerpt from the social  science literature, id. at 441-43 (quoting Eileen L. Younghusband,
The Dilemma of  the Juvenile Court, 33 SOC.  SERV.  REv. 10  (1959)).
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options.
270  These  sections,  which  represent  more  than half of the  entire
chapter,  forgo  cases  altogether.  The  speculativeness  that  the  Columbia
committee  feared  and  the  market  resistance  that  Jacobs  had to  contend
with  were  no  longer  impediments;  Foote,  Levy  and  Sander  confidently
offered a richly social casebook.
These formal  changes  dramatically  altered  the  substance  of the topic.
The first chapter, for instance, is not  about marriage or "the  family"  but
about "The  Problem of Illegitimacy." 2 71  This  full frontal recognition that
sex and procreation happen outside the legally legitimate place for them is
real realist;  we  first  saw it in  Llewellyn's "Behind the  Law  of Divorce."
The  focus  is  explicitly  distributive.  After  reviewing  cases  deciding
whether  illegitimate  children  could  inherit  (at  common  law, the  answer
was  no;  a bastard  is filius nullius), 272  the notes  turn to  the  possibility  of
providing  for  their  support  through  a  federally  funded  social  welfare
program.  There,  students  were  asked  whether  this  was  a  good  idea  on
policy  grounds,  and  how  Congress  could  best  trump  common  law
definitions  of "child." 2 73  The section  on support  for illegitimate children
assumes  that support  must  be  found:  who  should  shoulder this burden?
The  first  source  examined  is  the  mother's  filiation  or  paternity  action
against the alleged father, but we soon encounter the fact that "the bulk of
paternity proceedings  are forced to trial by the Welfare Department[."
274
The paternity  action is  at the nexus between  the family and the state:  it is
where the public welfare  system most visibly pushes  its responsibility  to
provide  subsistence back onto the family. Foote, Levy  and Sander offer a
swift but comprehensive treatment  of the law governing public assistance
and a description of the relationship between sources of private and public
support  for  illegitimate  children.
2 75  The  sections  on  inheritance  and
filiation thus transgress  the  private/public  distinction  in order to  make  it
clear  that  the  family  is  a  crucial  private  welfare  system.  The  casebook
comes directly to the distributive point: illegitimate  children need support
just as badly as legitimate ones do; who is going to provide it?
The  casebook  authors  showcase  Walter  Gellhom's  condemnation  of
trying paternity  actions as criminal litigation. Gellhom vividly claims that
270.  Id. at 77-159.
271.  Id. at 3-169
272.  Id. at 11-22.
273.  Id. at 23 (Problem 2).
274.  Id.  at 63  (quoting WALTER  GELLHORN,  CHILDREN AND  FAMILIES  IN THE COURTS  OF NEW
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adversarial procedure brings the worst out of everybody:
The wretched chronicles  that unfold before  the Court are likely to
thrill none  but the  depraved.  They rarely  bring joy  in the  telling
either to the complainant or to the defendant.  . . . [In cases]  forced
to trial  by the  Welfare Department  . . . the  mother is  a reluctant
participant, and in any event cases are not brought on for trial until
the evidence has been responsibly reviewed by  a highly competent
law officer of the City of New York. In "private" litigation, on the
contrary,  the defendant  may be  the victim  of a scheming  woman
who,  by  threatening  to  shout  her  accusations  in  a public  forum,
may exact a substantial  settlement regardless of the merits.276
Lawyers, judges, venal  mothers  and frightened putative fathers  all appear
in  a  world  minutely  managed  by  the  Welfare  Department's  social
workers.  (Note,  incidentally, the  absence of the victimized  single mother
and  the  deadbeat  dad  from  this  picture.  Feminism  will  introduce  them
onto  the  family  law  stage  in  the next  Section  of this  Part.)  Policy  errs
when  it compels professionals  to solve  the profound problems  of family
life  in  the  rigid,  adversarial  forms  of  criminal  court.  This  is  an
administrative problem  and  it  should  be  addressed  with  administrative
tools:
Hearings  in Family Court seem on the whole to be conducted in a
more helpful  spirit than are their counterparts  in  Special  Sessions.
. . . The  holding  of hearings  in  small  courtrooms  without  the
crowds  that  fill  the  seats  of  Special  Sessions,  conduces  to  a
natural, relaxed, and unsensational presentation of the facts.277
Foote,  Levy  and  Sander came  out  from behind  the  curtain  to refute  the
counterclaim  on behalf of Special  Sessions,  that women  will be deterred
from bringing fraudulent claims  by the publicity of criminal proceedings.
The  ability  to  expose  a  "man  of  substance  and  standing"  in  public
proceedings  puts a weapon  of "terror"  in a woman's hands: "It  may well
be  that the  threat of exposure  to a  public  airing  . . . may  be a means  of
furthering  fraudulent  claims,  rather  than  discouraging  them." 278  Like
Llewellyn,  Foote, Levy  and  Sander could see  the perverse  effects  of law
in  action;  but  unlike  him  they  expressed  a  calm  confidence  that
professional minds can manage them wisely.
As we  have seen,  Family Courts were  the first institutions  to invent the
276.  Id. at 62-63  (quoting GELLHORN, supra note 274,  at 180).
277.  Id.  at 63 (quoting GELLHORN,  supra note 274, at  183).
278.  Id. at 63 n.40.
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idea  of  modem  family  law  and  to  dissolve  FLE,  but  the  Columbia
reformers  failed  to  figure  out  how  to  incorporate  these  courts,
administrative  law  generally,  and  the  expanded category  of family  law.
The commitment of the domestic relations format to FLE was too strong,
and  Jacobs's  casebook  reverted  to  type.  Foote,  Levy  and  Sander  had
finally  figured  out how to  frame  family  law as  the  full range  of crucial
distributive  devices  which  had  long  been  sought  by  proponents  of the
social and by the real realist strand within it.
Foote,  Levy  and  Sander  completely  broke  the  Domestic  Relations
mold. They did know the Jacobs/Angell  Report  and relied on it, fittingly,
for doctrines  of marital property 2 79; but  they didn't  cite  it  for the  many
ways  they reproduce  its  field-design  innovations.  It  seems,  instead,  that
they  reinvented  many  of  the  Jacobs/Angell  Report's  strategies  for
incorporating  the  social  family.  There  is something  almost  structural  in
their  revival  of its  key  features.  Once  again  we  see  the  turn  to  law  in
society,  the  encounter  there  with the  role of administrative  agencies,  the
vastly  different  legal  systems  that  address  the  legal  life  of poor  and
"disorganized"  families from  those that attend to  the needs of the middle
and  upper  classes.  But  there  is  a  new  affective  tone.  Foote  and  Sander
have exposed us to the angst and horror that real family problems produce
not  only  in  the  people  who  suffer  them  but  in  the  professionals
responsible  for regulating  them. It's not about getting  the  right rule:  it's
about being a self-disciplined professional who can look at human misery
and modestly bring the meagre tools of law to bear, knowing that they can
address  but  cannot  cure  the  malaise.  The  costs  run  bitterly  high,  but
lawyers  must  participate  in  the  work  of social  distribution.  Their  only
salvation is professionalism.
After  1966,  family  law  rapidly  replaced  domestic  relations  as  the
favored title for the  field. Family  law is  well  established  now, but it is a
fairly recent invention.
V. EQUALITY,  IDENTITY POLITICS, CONSTITUTIONALIZATION  AND
CONFLICTING CONSIDERATIONS:  AREEN
By  the  early  1970's,  legal  feminists  had  appeared  on  the  scene,
agitating  for an overhaul  of the  law curriculum  with  the ultimate goal  of
changing  the law  and  transforming  society.  Modeling  themselves  on  the
black civil rights movement  of the  past and  setting the template  for gay-
279.  Id. at 319 n.33.
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identity  reformers  to  come,  they  saw  themselves  as  having  a  social
constituency.  They spoke  for a vibrant  social movement  and brought the
brainwaves of identity politics and multiculturalism to law school. When  I
started  teaching  Family  Law  in  1990,  this  insurgency  had  dramatically
changed family  law not only by redrawing its borders but by transforming
its contents. The feminists launched  an assault on FLE that was as cogent,
as  intense,  and  as  serious  as  the  one  waged  by  the  social-purpose
functionalists  and real realists; and like them, they successfully reoriented
the field. But as their efforts became  institutionalized, FLE re-emerged.
In  1972,  legal  feminists  staged  a  flagship  conference  on  The  Law
School Curriculum and the Legal Rights of Women.280  It was held at New
York University Law School and sponsored by the American Association
of Law Schools. Excitement was high:  Eleanor Holmes Norton's  keynote
address  indicated  that  attendance  was  so  much  more  robust  than
anticipated that,  even after the conference  was moved  to larger rooms, it
was  still  oversubscribed.  Once  again we  have all  the  signs of reforming
ferment, but this time it has a more grassroots and even insurgent origin, a
more indignant and even angry tone:
Special tribute  is  due  to  the vanguard  group who  pried  open the
consciousness  of the bar.  Who were  they?  . . . As  with  so  many
issues during the past  15 years, the vanguard  was students, in this
case  women  law  students.  Unpracticed  in  the law  and new  to  its
280.  AMERICAN  ASS'N OF  LAW  SCHOOLS,  A  SYMPOSIUM  ON  THE LAW  SCHOOL  CURRICULUM
AND  THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1972)  (conference  proceedings)  [hereinafter NYU  SYMPOSIUM].
This  is  a collection of mimeographed  teaching  plans for courses  in  the  law school  curriculum;  each
has  its own  pagination.  It is quite rare: only 22  copies  exist  in  American  libraries.  OCLC Accession
Number, 4510893,  in FirstSearch,  ONLINE  COMPUTER  LIBRARY  CENTER,  INC.  (last visited  July 21,
2011).
The contents  of the Harvard  Law  Library version of this  collection  are as  follows (in  the order  of
the  collection):  Remarks  of Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chairman, New  York  City  Commission on
Human Rights, at  "the Law  School  Curriculum and The Legal Rights of Women, " A  Symposium
Presented  by  The Association of  American Law Schools and New York  University School of Law on
Friday, October 20  and Saturday, October 21,  1972  [hereinafter  Norton,  Keynote];  Ruth  Bader
Ginsburg,  Towards Elimination of Sex-Based Discrimination: Constitutional Aspects  [hereinafter
Ginsburg, Sex-Based Discrimination];  Susan  C.  Ross, Cases and Materials on  Title  VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act for the AALS  Panel on Labor Law; Kenneth  M.  Davidson,  Women  in Unions: The
LMRA,  the LMRDA  and  Associated Problems: Cases and Materials; Davidson, Cases and Materials
on the Equal Pay Act of 1963;  Davidson, Cases and Materials on Executive Order 11246; Linda R.
Singer,  Women  in the Criminal Justice System  [hereinafter  Singer,  Women  in the Criminal Justice
System]; Barbara  Allen Babcock,  Outline of the Discussion about Rape To  be Presented  at the AALS
Symposium on the Law School Curriculum and the Legal Rights of Women; Herma Hill  Kay, Robert
J.  Levy,  Cynthia Lou  Attwood  & Kathryn  Gehrels,  Family Law  Materials [hereinafter  Kay  et  al.,
Family Law  Materials]; Anon.,  Social  Welfare Legislation; Babette  Barton,  Grace  Blumberg  &
Carlyn  McCaffrey,  Tax Law Materials; Leo  Kanowitz,  The Law School Curriculum and The Legal
Rights of Women: Property;  Judith T. Younger, Community Property, Women and Curriculum  [sic].
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rigors  and  concepts,  they forged  ahead  to uncover what  only  the
unbiased  eye  could  see:  that  the  law  was  riddled  with  sexist
distinctions;  that  the  law  encouraged  diminished  opportunity  for
girls  and  women;  that  the  law  ridiculed  and  punished  people
because they  are women and not men.281
An  immense  samizdat  collection  of teaching  materials  issued  from  the
conference.  It is a self-published collection of course outlines  and "cases
and materials,"  typed out and mimeographed  onto the recto  side of 8 x  11
paper.  It  resembles  nothing  in  this  genealogy  so  much  as  the
Jacobs/Angell  report,  but  that  was  the  communication  of  elite  insiders
with themselves; this is a how-to manual  for the troops. Jacobs and Angell
were  deputized  to  reform  the  law  school  curriculum  by  the  Dean;  the
NYU  conference  proceedings  addressed  themselves  to  a  loose  national
alliance  of individual teachers.  Course by course,  it put tools in the hands
of  readers  eager  to  transform  the  curriculum  by  changing  what  was
taught, starting now.
As  I  indicated  in  the  Introduction,  Duncan  Kennedy's  third
globalization  of  legal  thought  embraced  two  contradictory  trends.  It
maintained  the  social,  but  now  without  the  rationalist  assumption  that
social interests would eventually be correctly  subserved by the emergence
of legal rules that would optimally adjust them: they were now politicized
as conflicting social interests, and  the best that law could  do would be to
balance  them  in  the  least  bad  way  that  lawmakers  could  ascertain.
Conflicting  considerations  - concon.  But  the  third  globalization  also
revived  a  classical  idea  of  legal  right:  neoformalist  rights,  ideally
constitutionalized  and  enforced  by  judges,  would  vindicate  socially
oppressed  groups.  The  NYU  feminists  were  strongly  committed  to  the
latter  strand  of  concon  thinking.  Contributors  to  the  conference  were
sanguine that  the Equal  Rights  Amendment,  very recently  passed by  the
Senate,  would  be  ratified.  Law  was both the  problem  and  the  solution.
Ruth  Bader  Ginsburg contributed  the  first entry,  an  outline  of women's
historical  legal  inequality  and  an  argument  that  the  ERA  - not  the
Fourteenth  Amendment  or  legislation  - would  be  needed  to  produce
change.28 2  The  section  on  family  law,  composed  by  Herma  Hill  Kay,
Robert  Levy,  Cynthia  Lou  Attwood  and  Kathryn  Gehrels,  looks  to  the
same approach to emancipation: "These materials  are intended to focus  on
sex  discrimination,  with  special  emphasis  on  discrimination  against
281.  Norton, Keynote, in NYU  SYMPOSIUM,  supra  note 280, at 2.
282.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex-Based Discrimination,  in NYU  SYMPOSIUM,  supra note 280, at 2.
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women.  . . . It  is  submitted  that women  should support  an  approach  to
family law reform which seeks to  insure that traditional  family law policy
be replaced  by a policy  of advancing  the goal of equality  inherent  in the
Equal  Rights  Amendment  and  the  Woman's  Movement  generally." 283
Constitutional  equality  was  the  measure  of everything.  With  only  one
exception,28 4  all the other  teaching materials  in the collection hew to this
emphasis  on equal  rights. Four key  innovations  come  into our story  with
this  move:  1.  a  focus  on  rights,  2.  specifically  rights  to  equality,  3.
preferably  based  in  the  Constitution,  4.  to  be  realized  through
adjudication.  As  Kennedy  indicates  in  his  diagnosis  of  the  third
globalization, for concon consciousness, the judge is the hero.
The NYU  feminists took up  family  law  as  an existing  domain, tacitly
accepted  its  contours,  and  thus  carried  forward  its  existing  exceptional
location.  But  family  law  was  by  no  means  the  only  site  that  needed
substantial legal and social reconstruction. Instead, it was located amidst a
welter of legal  domains that needed  fixing. The  collection included  cases
and materials  and outlines on Title VII; Women in Unions (with Notes on
Additional  Strategies  for  Dissident  Minorities);  the  Equal  Pay  Act  of
1963;  Executive  Order  11246  (requiring  nondiscrimination  in
employment  by government  contractors);  Women  in the Criminal  Justice
System;  Rape;  Family  Law;  Social  Welfare  Legislation;  Tax  Law;
Property; and Community Property. 28 5  Family Law was a distinct domain;
no effort was  made to unpin its boundaries.  But every  course  in the legal
curriculum needed reform: family law was not special.
Unlike the early social-purpose  functionalist reformers at Columbia, the
NYU  feminists had no faith in the idea of a correct systematic architecture
for  law;  the  legal  system  could  be  dealt  with  in  its  existing  fragments.
Indeed,  the  complete  absence  of  an  impulse  to  put  the  distinct
contributions  into a correct or even a coherent order signals acquiescence
in  the fragmented  legal  curriculum  that had resulted  when  the  Columbia
reformers'  effort to produce a systematic  one flew to pieces.
For the early  feminist  reformers,  however, there  was a  structure  to  the
legal  order.  It  was  not  expressed  in  the  various  topics  of  the  law
curriculum;  rather  it  permeated  them  all.  It  was  male  domination  and
283.  Kay et al., Family Law Materials,  in NYU  SYMPOSIUM, supra note 280, at 2.
284.  Linda Singer's materials on Women  in the Criminal  Justice System argued  that the goal  for
feminists must  not be equality  of incarcerated  women with  incarcerated  men but the  depopulation of
the entire  prison system.  Linda Singer,  Women in the Criminal  Justice System, in NYU  SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 280, at 43-44.
285.  For a complete list of the NYU  Symposium contents, see supra  note  280.
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female  subordination.  Separate  spheres  ideology  and  the  market/family
distinction - typically  dubbed the private/public  distinction - constituted
the key  structural  feature  of the legal  system and  made law indispensable
to the maintenance  of male domination. Norton asked  the NYU  feminists
to "[t]hink  how far along the country would be if the bar began to take the
same professional responsibility  for equal rights, justice for the poor, and
criminal  justice  that  it  has  historically  taken  for  the  country's  tax  and
business  policy,  in  [sic]  behalf,  of  course,  of  its  most  prosperous
clients."286  And think they  did:  by the end of the  decade,  legal feminists
had  produced  a  sophisticated  structural  critique  of  the  private/public
distinction  and  its  role  in  constructing,  perpetuating  and  legitimating
women's inequality.
In  1982,  David Kairys published  a handbook  for  critical legal  studies,
then  in  its heyday.2 87  Kairys  included  two feminist  essays, both  of them
centrally  committed  to  unraveling  the  private/public  distinction  as  a
crucial  step  towards  women's  emancipation.288  Nadine  Taub  and
Elizabeth M. Schneider opened their essay with an attack on FLE:
The Anglo-American  legal tradition purports to value  equality, by
which it means,  at a minimum,  equal application  of the law to all
persons.  Nevertheless,  throughout  this country's  history,  women
have been denied the most basic rights of citizenship,  allowed only
limited  participation  in  the  marketplace,  and  otherwise  denied
access  to  power,  dignity  and  respect.  Women  have  instead been
largely  occupied  with  providing  the  personal  and  household
services necessary to sustain family life.289
Women were legally and socially excluded from the two "public"  spheres
- governance and the market; positive law actively kept them out.290  Thus
constrained to the private  sphere of the family, they were exposed there to
the  raw power of men:  privacy meant  an "[a]bsence  of [l]aw"  from the
domestic  sphere.291 Taub  and  Schneider  elaborated  Norton's  idea  that
men  had  provided  themselves  with  protections  in  the  marketplace  that
286.  Norton,  Keynote, supra note 280, at  1.
287.  DAVID KAIRYS,  THE POLITICS OF  LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (1982).
288.  The  two  feminist  essays  were  Nadine  Taub  & Elizabeth  M.  Schneider,  Perspectives on
Women 's Subordination and the Role of Law, in  KAIRYS,  THE POLITICS  OF  LAW  117  [hereinafter
Taub  &  Schneider,  Women's  Subordination]; and  Diane  Polan,  Toward a  Theory  of Law  and
Patriarchy,  in KAIRYS,  supra,  at 294.
289.  Taub & Schneider, Women's Subordination,  supra note 288, at 117.
290.  Id. at  118-20.
291.  Id. at  121.
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they  had denied to women  in the home. The very distinction between  the
law  of the  market  and  the  absence  of law  in  the  family  subordinated
women:
Despite  the  fundamental  similarity  of  conflicts  in  the  private
sphere to legally  cognizable disputes  in the public sphere, the law
generally  refuses  to interfere  in ongoing  family relationships.  For
example, the essence of the marital relationship as  a legal matter is
the  exchange of the  man's obligation  to support  the women  [sic]
for  her  household  and  sexual  services.  Yet  contract  law,  which
purports  to enforce  promissory  obligation between  individuals,  is
not  available during  the marriage to  enforce either  the underlying
support obligation or other agreements by the parties to a marriage
to  matters  not  involving  property.  A  woman  whose  husband
squanders  or gives  away assets  during  the  marriage  cannot  even
get  an  accounting.  And  while  premarital  property  arrangements
will  be  enforced  on  divorce,  courts'  enormous  discretion  in
awarding  support  and  distributing  property  makes  it  highly
unlikely  that  these  decisions  will  reflect  the  parties'  conduct
during  the  marriage  in  regard  to  either  the  underlying  support
obligation  or  other  agreements.  It  is  as  if  in  regulating  the
beginning  and  end of a business  partnership  the  law  disregarded
the  events  that  transpired  during  the  partnership  and  refused  to
enforce  any  agreements  between  the  partners  as  to  how  they
would behave.292
But it  was not  only contract and business  law that  was missing:  tort and
criminal  law  step  back  from  the  family  and  remit  women  to  male
domination  in  the  private  sphere  that  these  legal  evacuations  create.
Interspousal  immunity,  the marital rape exception,  courts'  refusal to hold
men  criminally  liable  for assaults  in  the  home  and  to  issue  injunctions
evicting  them not only left women  defenseless in the private sphere; they
sent  the  message  that  women,  their  safety  and  their work  in  the  home
were  meaningless.293  A  large  law  reform  agenda  was  implied  by  this
critique:  tort  law,  criminal  law,  business  associations  law,  and  the
remedies  available  in  equity were packed  with protective  legal rules that
men  depended  on  in  the  public  sphere;  women  should  enjoy  them  at
home. Eliminating FLE was an equality project.
Note  that  Taub  and  Schneider  have  flipped  the  status/contract
distinction framed  by  CLT. They saw the market  as public  and  saturated
292.  Id.  at  121.
293.  Id. at 122-24.
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with  duty,  and  marriage  as private  and  relegated  to  the  husband's  raw
social power. Their solution: make the family more like the market. But in
the  rise  of laissez faire and  separate  spheres  ideology  in  the  nineteenth
century,  American jurists had  framed  contract  as  the will  of the parties
and marriage  as the will of the state;  freedom of contract was paired with
its opposite, marital status.2 94  And as we have seen, this idea is extremely
resilient;  it seems  to  be  embedded  in  our  legal  consciousness  and  to  be
capable  of truly  spooky  returns  from  the  grave.  Sadly,  that  is precisely
what happened in the wake of the legal feminists'  assault on FLE. Indeed,
the feminists themselves facilitated it. Her is how.
As Frances  E. Olsen argued  in an article  published  in  1983,  Taub  and
Schneider  vastly  underestimated  the  complexity  of  the  market/family
distinction.  Vis-A-vis  the  state,  both  the  market  and  the  family  were
understood  to be private; and legal  ideology was equally committed to the
ideas  that  law  governed  both of them  and  that  law  had  to  leave  them
free.2 9 5  Though  these  ideas were  immensely  productive  in  shaping  law
and  society,  they  were,  Olsen  insisted,  at  root  ideological.296  Feminist
arguments that emancipation  could be sought by making  the family more
like  the  market  ran  the  risk  of  intensifying  rather  than  relieving  the
individualism  and  privacy of the  domestic  sphere;  the opposite  strategy,
pursued by cultural  feminists, of making the market more  like the family
might  extend protections  for  caring behavior  to the workplace  but might
also extend the reach of oppressive  gender stereotypes  from the family to
the  market,  entrenching  women  in  caring  roles.2 9 7  Olsen's  argument
brought the tools of critical legal  studies - with  its commitment to seeing
the contradictory  operation of legal rights which we can trace back, in this
genealogy,  to  Llewellyn - to bear  on the feminist attack  on FLE.  It  is a
brilliant  chiasmatic  critique  of  the  false  necessity  of  feminist  rights-
focused neoformalism.
The  idea that  legal  feminism needed  to take  the shape  of critical  work
within the CLS  movement  did not appeal to everyone,  however. Not only
did liberal  feminists like  Ginsberg  feel just fine  ignoring  CLS; the more
radical elements of legal feminism were undergoing a turn to the state and
an  embrace  of concon  rights  neoformalism  across  the board.  I will  offer
294.  Halley,  What is Family Law?: A Genealogy, Part  I, supra note 1, at 33-54, 86-95.
295.  Frances  E.  Olsen,  The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Law Reform,  96
HARV.  L. REv.  1497,  1497-1507  (1983).
296.  Id.  at  1508-28.
297.  Id.  at  1529-60.
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just two examples of this trend,  one from perhaps  the leading producer of
power feminism in legal  studies, Catherine  A.  MacKinnon, and  the other
from perhaps  the leading producer of cultural  feminism in  legal  studies,
Robin West.
In  1983,  MacKinnon  published  a critique of rape  law  that deployed  a
core  critical  maneuver,  one  we  have  seen  in  this  genealogy  when
Llewellyn noted that the concentration of legitimate sex in pair marriage,
where  it  becomes  tied  to  the  almost  infinite  nonsexual  functions  of
marriage,  liberated  "extra-marital sex"  to  "specialize  on  sex."298  In
Llewellyn's formulation, the formally recognized and legitimated element
of the legal  order implies  a hidden, illegitimate  element:  enforcement  of
the  legal rule  inevitably runs  out, and that makes  space for precisely the
human events  it aimed to make  impossible.  MacKinnon  ran this move  in
reverse,  starting  with  the  criminalization  of rape  and  then remembering
that  it would run out, implicitly legitimating all the rapes that fell outside
the  scope  of the  prohibition. Criminalization  was  too risky,  MacKinnon
thought  in  1983;  the "state  was male  in the feminist  sense";  and  only  a
thoroughgoing  critique  of  male  domination  in  all  its  lived,  legal  and
ideological  ramifications  could  make  law  emancipatory  for  women.2 99
But  by  1989,  when  MacKinnon  revised  these  very  passages  for
publication  in  book  form,  she  had  concluded  that  "Rape  with  legal
impunity  makes  women  second-class  citizens."
300   The  turn  to
neoformalist  rights thinking, to the state,  and away from real realism  and
CLS.
Meanwhile,  West  helpfully  recorded  the  social  dimension  of  this
division  of intellectual  forces,  describing  it  as the  "CLS-Fem  Split"  and
siding decisively on the Fem side in it. Within the CLS  Conference,  West
noted,  tenured male  law professors  enjoyed  a position  of relative  power
over untenured female feminist law professors, who suffered a position of
relative  powerlessness. 31  Their own  commitments  to what  West dubbed
"deconstruction"  (more  accurately,  perhaps,  denaturalization)  should by
then  have  led  the  tenured  male  law  professors  to  embrace  the
feminists'critique  of their own sexist  attitudes  and  practices, but a  recent
298.  Llewellyn, Behind the Law ofDivorce, supra note  136, at 1298.
299.  Catharine  A.  MacKinnon,  Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State:  Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence,  8 SIGNS 635, 644-45,  655-58  (1983).
300.  CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,  TOWARD  A FEMINIST THEORY  OF THE STATE  182  (1989).  For
a  discussion  of this  transition,  see  JANET  HALLEY,  SPLIT DECISIONS:  HOW  AND  WHY  TO  TAKE  A
BREAK  FROM FEMINISM 46-48 (2006).
301.  Robin West, Deconstructing  the CLS-Fem Split, 2 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 85, 85 (1986).
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article assessing  the erotic politics  of mentorship  in the CLS  Conference,
written by none other than Duncan Kennedy, 302  made it clear to West that
they  had  not  done  anything  of  the  kind.303  West  concluded  with  a
tripartite  recommendation.  The  tenured  male  professors  in  CLS  should
change  their ways through intense  self-criticism.  "Second,  unless they do
so,  CLS  is  not  a  congenial  atmosphere  for  feminist  work,  nor  is  it  a
healthy  environment  for women,  and  women  should  therefore  get  out."
And third - presupposing that the tenured male law professors would not
meet West's  first demand - feminist law professors  should relate  to CLS
not  as  members  but as  an external  audience  for their work.304  The  split
was  foreordained.  Cut  off from  its  critical  base,  radical  legal  feminism
loosened its grip on Olsen's critique of FLE; instead, they began to lay the
tracks  for its return.
Well before Taub and Schneider published their feminist attack on FLE,
Judith Areen's  1978  Cases and Materials on Family Law had worked out
its  implications for teachers  of family  law.30  This book enabled  feminist
law  professors  to  bring  the  NYU  Conference's  emphasis  on  women's
equality directly into the family law classroom.
Symptomatically,  Areen  had no  use  for several  important  innovations
from  the  1960s.  Foote,  Levy  and  Sanders'  emphasis  on professionalism
and  interprofessional  cooperation was gone;  the idea of focusing  sections
of the  casebook  on social problems  like  illegitimacy  had  dissolved  into
thin  air.  Nonlegal  materials  were  now  introduced  not  to  exemplify
professional  perspectives  of non-lawyer  experts  but  for the  truth  of the
matter asserted therein  or for the controversial positions  they staked. The
emphasis  on  expertise  and  professionalism  was  being  replaced  by  a
balancing consciousness  and neoformalist rights thinking.
Areen,  fully within  the new concon  zeitgeist, saw the  rise  of rights as
basic  to  her  topic,  and  saw  rights  as  in  tension,  always  in  needing  of
balancing, with family privacy:
[I]f there  is a  single  theme  that may  serve  to unify  the  materials
that follow, it is the tension between the doctrine of family privacy
and protection of the rights of individual  family members.  Critics
302.  Duncan  Kennedy, Psycho-Social  CLS: A Comment on the Cardozo Conference, 6 CARDOZO
L. REv.  1013  (1985).
303.  West, supra  note 301,  at 87-91.
304.  Id. at 91-92.
305.  JUDITH  AREEN,  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  ON  FAMILY  LAW  (1978)  [hereinafter  AREEN,
FAMILY LAW  (1st  ed.)].
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of the family privacy doctrine argue that it is unfair to the needs of
abused  wives  or  children.  But  at  the  same  time,  growing  fears
about the intrusiveness  or clumsiness of modern  government have
provided  new  support  for  the  policy  of leaving  families  alone.
Both views are, of course, right in some respects. The challenge to
the student or practitioner  of family law  is to adjust the tension in
a  way  that  maximizes  the  strengths  of family  life,  yet provides
protection for individuals endangered in a particular family.306
Areen's  second  edition,  published  in  1985,  translated  this  formulation
slightly.  The  anti-privacy  point  of view  was  no  longer that  of "critics"
who "argue"  but of experts who know - "As our knowledge  of the special
needs of working wives or the dangers of child abuse  grows ... "  - and
what they  know  is  that  the  field  must  become  more  responsive  to  the
needs of women  and  children.  For  all  the  concon  bottomlessness  of the
rights/privacy  conundrum,  Areen displays  here  as  well  a nonmilitant  but
insistent presumption  that men and fathers benefit  from family privacy  at
the expense of women and children, and that the role of rights is to correct
things for vulnerable family  members  by bringing  in their ally  the  state.
This is a quietly feminist book:  it enacts rather than pronounces feminism.
It presumes  rather  than  complains  that women  and  children  share  a  lot,
specifically problematic men.
Whereas  Drinan  had  expressed  surprise  and  anguish  over  the
uncertainty  that  flooded  into postwar  legal thought,  Areen  faced  it with
steely resolve.  The tensions  simply had to be resolved in the best way.  In
1985,  she  calmly,  competently  professed  herself  "uncertain  of  law's
ability to grapple with  [the]..  .complexities"  of family life.  308  The tone is
angst-free, agnostic. The problem was not that society was unraveling and
that  the  social  control  capacities  of  law  were  crumbling;  it  was  that
ideological  conflict and normative incommensurability  made it impossible
to  say  with certainty  what the social  or legal  problem  was. Had no-fault
divorce  introduced  social crisis,  as  Pound had feared and  as Foote, Levy
and  Sander  knew?  Areen  professed  uncertainty  about  whether  America
even  had no  fault  divorce.309  What  we  now  call  the  culture  wars  had
begun,  and  it  was  impossible  to  say,  without  taking  sides,  whether
Schouler's domestic sphere was still the normative core of family law:
306.  Id. at xix-xx.
307.  JuDITH AREEN,  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  ON FAMILY  LAW,  at xxi (2d ed.  1985)  [hereinafter
AREEN, FAMILY  LAW (2d ed.)].
308.  Id.  at xxii.
309.  Id.  at xxi.
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Identifying  the proper balance  between  individuals  and  family  is
complicated  by  the  fact  that  the  social  consensus  as  to  what
constitutes  acceptable  family  life  is  weaker  than  ever.  A  few
figures:
By  1980  almost  one of four  children  aged  seventeen  or under
did not live with both parents. This was true for  17.4 percent of
white children and 57.8 percent of black children.
More  than  20 percent  of the  children  in  the United  States  are
born  to  unmarried  parents.  Almost  50  percent  of  non-white
babies are born to unmarried parents.3"o
The  problem  of  unwed  motherhood  that  Foote,  Levy  and  Sander
presented  as  the  inaugural  issue  has  become  a  problem  of  racial
difference:  single,  unmarried  parenthood  was  predominantly  black
parenthood. It was  not a problem to be solved but a normative difference
to  be  deferred  to.  Fornication  and  illegitimacy  had  become  nonmarital
cohabitation  and  single parenthood;  they were  as  acceptable in minority
communities  as marital  cohabitation  and parenthood were  in white ones,
and  figuring  out how  to  run a  legal  order that  enabled  people  to  travel
both  paths  without  enduring  stigma  and  moral  derogation  was  the
challenge.  We  see  here  a  liberal-multicultural  commitment  to  crediting
racial minorities when they chose to opt out of the marriage system and to
finding a posture  of normative disengagement  in  the midst of ideological
conflict.  To  be  a  good  lawyer  was  to  be  a  good  multiculturalist.  But
throughout,  to  be  a  good  multiculturalist  was  also  to  be  a feminist:
whatever  the  racial/cultural  differences  at  stake,  women  and  children
would persistently  need protection against men. Deciding when to invade
family  privacy  to  deliver  that  protection  required  careful  balancing;  the
balances needed would differ along a racial gradient;  and the result would
be a family law open to diverse outcomes.
For all that  it commits  itself to  cool-headed  balancing,  Areen's  Cases
and Materials on Family Law also  registered  the  concon  shift  to  rights.
The constitution  pops up constantly. Part I, devoted  to "Husbands, Wives
and  Lovers,"  includes  separate  sections  on  the  "Constitutionality  of
Marriage  Restrictions,"  the  "Constitutional  Limits  on  Gender
Discrimination,"  and "The  Constitutional Right  to Privacy[.]"  311  Part II,
3 10.  Id.
311.  AREEN, FAMILY  LAW  (1st ed.), supra note 305, at 34-50, 99-116, 156-68.
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on "Children,  Parents  and  the  State,"  is shot through with  constitutional
law  and,  in  the  second  edition,  includes  a  separate  section  for
constitutional  "Encroachments  on  the  Doctrine  of  Family  Privacy.312
Entirely  without irony,  the  "Constitutional  Right to  Privacy"  as  between
husbands,  wives and  lovers  is a classified  as one  of the "Encroachments
on the Doctrine of Family Privacy":  rights  to contraception  and  abortion
are  the  public-law  rights  of  women  to  make  reproductive  decisions
without male interference.
3 13
Areen reshaped  the field to give effect to the  critique of FLE advanced
at the NYU  Conference  and later elaborated  by Taub  and Schnieder. Not
only  the  Constution but  new  developments  in  "Tort  and  Criminal  Law"
encroached upon family privacy.314  This section includes cases abolishing
the tort for criminal conversation;  rejecting  a jury verdict for alienation  of
a  wife's  affections  as  too high;  and  recognizing  a  new  tort  for  loss  of
consortium  on  behalf of a  spouse  whose  spouse  is  injured  by  a  third
party.3 1s The subsection  on "Intra-Family  Torts and Crimes"  is grounded
in  the  feminist  campaign  against  domestic  violence,  though  that  term
never  appears.  Areen's cases  tend to describe  the social problem here  as
"wife-beating";  she  renamed  it  "Spouse  Abuse."316  She  showcased  the
abolition  of interspousal tort  immunity  in  the  twenty-first  state  to  adopt
this reform and the rejection of a husband's equality challenge to a statute
specifically  criminalizing  a  husband's  assault  on  his  wife."  She
highlighted  a  broad-spectrum  class  action  seeking  declaratory  and
injunctive relief against multiple  state police departments for neglecting to
intervene  in  and  effectively  condoning  "wife-beating"  by  husbands."
She  surveyed restraining-order  and  peace-bond  statutes  and  found  them
wanting:  not only are these remedies so difficult to obtain as to be useless
312.  AREEN,  FAMILY  LAW (2d ed.), supra  note 307,  at 919-34.
313.  AREEN,  FAMILY  LAW (1st ed.), supra note 305,  at xii.
314.  Id. at 168-92.
315.  Excerpts from the following  occupy AREEN,  FAMILY LAW (1st  ed.), supra note 305,  at  168-
79:  Rodriguez  v. Bethlehem  Steel Co.,  12  Cal.  3d 382  (1974)  (recognizing loss of consortium claim
for  injuries  to a  spouse);  Fadgen  v.  Lenkner,  469  Pa.  272  (1976)  (abolishing  cause  of action  for
criminal  conversation);  Alaimo  v.  Schwanz,  56  Wis.  2d  198  (1972)  (reducing  jury  verdict  for
alienation  of affections  on  grounds  of  the  bad  marital  relations  between  plaintiff husband  and  his
errant wife). When Areen selected these cases, they were all new.
316.  AREEN, FAMILY  LAW (1st ed.), supra note 305, at  185.
317.  AREEN,  FAMILY  LAW  (1st  ed.),  supra note  305,  at  179-81  (excerpting  Windauer  v.
O'Connor,  12  Ariz. App. 442  (1970));  id  at  189-92 (excerpting  People v. Cameron,  53 Cal.  App. 3d
786  (1975)).
318.  Id. at  181-85  (excerpting Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.  2d 974 (1977)).
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but,  once  obtained,  they  provided  no  practical  protection.3 1 9  Inside  this
time  capsule  we  find  a  vivid portrait  of feminists'  desperate  search  for
legal tools to address what we now call domestic violence.
Areen's second edition showed a significant upgrade in the feminist tort
and criminal arsenal. Abolition of the tort action for criminal conversation
and  near-abolition  of alienation  of affections:  check.320  Recognition  of
loss  of consortium  claims  on  the  death  of a  spouse  and  abrogation  of
interspousal  tort  immunity:  check. 321  Modification  of  the  marital
testimonial  privilege  so  that  spouses  cannot  bar  their  spouses  from
testifying  against them:  check.322  Admissibility of expert testimony about
battered  women's  syndrome  when  women kill  their  assailants:  check.323
The  desperate  search  for  tools  against  domestic  violence  had  by  now
produced  statutes  providing  for powerful  injunctive  protection  orders  on
an exparte basis, and Areen  included a case rejecting a constitutional  due
process  challenge  to this expedited  procedure.3 24  The  section  concludes
with  the  United  States  Attorney  General's  1984  report  recommending
mandatory  arrest  in  cases  of family  violence.
325  The feminist  version  of
the  anti-FLE  agenda was beginning  to take hold  in legislation,  case  law,
and policy.
At the core of the Areen casebook is Rose v. Rose, a "case" presented  as
"materials."  Rose v. Rose was a bitter and protracted custody dispute; trial
court  testimony occupied  16 days.326  Areen gives us a redacted transcript
of  these  hearings,  following  it  with  the  trial  court's  first  placement
decision, the appellate court's decision affirming that decision, and (in the
319.  Id. at 185-89.
320.  The following  occupy  AREEN,  FAMILY LAW (2d ed.),  supra  note  307,  at 184-98:  Fadgen v.
Lenkner,  469  Pa. 272  (1976)  (abolishing the  cause  of action  for criminal  conversation);  Nelson v.
Jacobsen,  669  P.2d  1207  (Ut.  1983)  (narrowing  the  claim  for  alienation  of affections  to  instances
where the defendant's actions were the controlling cause of the alienated spouse's infidelity).
321.  The following occupy  AREEN, FAMILY  LAW (2d ed.), supra note 307, at  199-206: Rodriguez
v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,  12 Cal.  3d 382  (1974)  (recognizing  a loss of consortium claim  for injuries to
a spouse); Shook v. Crabb, 281  N.W.2d  616 (Iowa 1979) (abrogating interspousal immunity).
322.  Id. at 206-10  (excerpting Trammel  v. United States, 445 U.S.  40 (1980)).
323.  Id. at 212-19  (excerpting  State v. Kelly, 478  A.2d 364 (N.J.  1984)).
324.  Id. at 219-24  (excerpting  State ex rel. Williams  v.  Marsh, 626  S.W.2d  223  (Mo.  1982)  (en
banc)).
325.  Id. at  224-26  (excerpting  U.S.  ATTORNEY  GENERAL,  FINAL  REPORT,  TASK  FORCE  ON
FAMILY  VIOLENCE  (1984)).  Except  for  Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469  Pa.  272  (1976),  and  Rodriguez v.
Bethlehem Steel Co.,  12  Cal.  3d 382  (1974),  which had been included in the  first edition of Areen's
casebook,  all  the  entries  in  this  subsection  were  produced  between  the  dates  of Areen's  first  and
second editions:  they were new.
326.  Rose v. Rose:  ...  The  Trial Court Decides, in AREEN,  FAMILY  LAW  (1st  ed.), supra note
305,  at 561.
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second edition  only because  this last opinion  was  not issued until  1979)
the  trial  court's  later  modification  of the  initial  custody  award.  Taking
into account  the interim  order, which is not  separately  reproduced,  these
court  records  take  us  through  the  following  custody  voyage  for  baby
Jason:
Trial  Court's  interim  order:  custody  in  Steven  Rose,  the  father,
with minimal supervised visitation for Diane Rose, the mother;
32 7
Trial  Court's  final  order:  custody  in  Diane,  with  reasonable
visitation for Steve; 328
On appellate review:  affirmed
329;
Trial  court  ruling  on  Steve's  motion  for  modification  based  on
changed  circumstances:  custody  in  Steve,  with  reasonable
visitation for Diane.330
The legal  rule governing Rose v. Rose is that Mother of All  Standards,
the  best  interests  of  the  child  standard  (BIC).3 3   Right  after  the  trial
materials  in  Rose  v.  Rose,  Areen  presented  Ex parte Devine,  a  1981
decision  in  which  the  Alabama  Supreme  Court  held  that  the  so-called
tender  years  presumption  favoring  mothers  was  an  "unconstitutional
gender-based  classification,"  and  replaced  it with  BIC.332  When  Areen
added this case  to the second  edition,  it was  new: it was  issued after the
publication of her first edition. It was part of a sweeping feminist-inspired
law  reform  in  which  formal  equality  in  marriage  erased  the  rules  of
coverture  one  by  one. BIC  was  a bittersweet  victory  for  feminists,  who
celebrated  formal  equality  but  bemoaned  the  resulting  substantive
inequality  it perpetuated.  This shift to  a fully neutral principle meant that
fathers  like Steve Rose could lay claim to  custody of children  at the time
of  divorce  and  litigate  it  under  a  standard  so  open-ended  and
indeterminate  that  the  outcome  was,  technically  at  least,  completely
unpredictable.  Mothers  were  now  equal  before  the  law,  but  far  more
vulnerable to losing custody of their small children.
327.  AREEN, FAMILY  LAW (1st ed.), supra note 305, at 478, 519.
328.  Id. at 559-61.
329.  Rose v. Rose:  ...  The Appeals Court  Decides, in id. at 561-62.
330.  Rose v.  Rose Revisited:  The Court Changes Its Position:  June 6,  1979, in AREEN,  FAMILY
LAW (2d  ed.), supra  note 307, at 551-54.
331.  On  the  radical  indeterminacy  of BIC,  see  Robert  Mnookin,  Child-Custody Adjudication:
Judicial  Functions  in the Face  ofIndeterminacy,  39 L. &  CONTEMP.  PROBLEMS  226, 249-55  (1975).
332.  AREEN,  FAMILY  LAW  (2d  ed.), supra note  307,  at 425-32 (excerting  Ex Porte Devine,  398
So.2d 686, 695 (Ala. 1981)).
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I cannot possibly  reproduce  here the  poisonous atmosphere  evoked by
the  transcript, the  sense that  a  truly  insane  family  system  has broken  up
into  adversarial  units  represented  by  winner-take-all  counsel  intent  on
bringing  family  members'  psychological  disturbances,  malign  alliances,
prevarications  and  outright  lies into court.  The  two parents  were  backed
up by their own parents, whose testimony vastly ramified the viciousness
and  spite  on  display.  The  stories  presented  by  the  adversaries  are  so
diametrically  opposite  and  so  morally  charged  that  it  is  difficult not  to
take sides, but here  is an attempt  at an objective  statement of the dispute.
Diane's case  rested  on her claim  that  Steve,  in alliance  with  his mother,
had so intimately  and relentlessly  attacked  Diane's mothering that Diane
attempted  suicide, jumping  out of an  eighth  story window  and  suffering
severe  injuries. Otherwise she was an excellent mother to their son Jason.
Jason should not be deprived of his mother's custody because his father's
daily hectoring  and  her mother-in-law's  interference  had  made  it  almost
impossible  for  her  to  care  for  her  child;  now  that  the  couple  was
separated, Diane was the obvious caretaker parent and should get custody.
Steve's case rested on the claim that Diane's  suicide attempt was  merely
an episode in her chronic mental  instability, that she was still a candidate
for  suicide,  and  that her  suicidal  history  represented  her  willingness  to
outright  abandon  her  child  in  the  most  damaging  way  possible.  Her
absence  from Jason's life after the  suicide  attempt  and under the  interim
custody  order  had rendered  the  mother  a  virtual  stranger  to  her  son;  if
Jason was to have continuity of care Steve must retain custody.
The  transcript  begins  with  a  list  of  "Dramatis  Personae"  and  the
"Setting":  though it is  designated  "The  Trial,"  we are  invited to  read the
transcript as  a  play.  If it is  indeed  a play,  it  can  only be read  as tragedy.
Whereas  the  treatises  focused  on the  law  alone;  whereas  the  first Cases
and  Materials  casebooks  sought  to  bring  social  science  knowledge  to
lawyers attempting to solve social problems by the election of the optimal
legal rule; and whereas Foote, Levy and Sander sought to convene experts
in  a  last-ditch  effort  to  manage  and  ameliorate  the  suffering  of broken
families - Areen  seeks to expose us as directly as possible to a family  so
riven by internal  aggression  and desperate emotion  that one  can only  say
of the little child whose custody is under dispute:  "Poor Jason!"
By presenting Rose v. Rose as a theatrical drama, complete with judicial
opinions reversing  Jason's  placement  twice,  Areen  enlists  us  as anxious
beholders of a continually  unfolding  indeterminacy  in which  some or all
of the  courts  involved  seem just as  willfully  indifferent  to  Jason's well
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being as the parties allow themselves to be. And by presenting the judicial
opinions not with legal  citations but with journalistic headlines like "Rose
v.  Rose  The  Courts  Decide"  and  "Rose  v.  Rose  Revisited:  The  Court
Changes  its Position:  June  6,  1979,"  Areen  framed them  as incidents in  a
politically  and ideologically  controversial "famous  trial."  Rose v. Rose is
spectacle.
The transcript  makes  it much  easier to  take Diane's  side than  Steve's.
Steve Rose was  first called as an adverse witness by Diane's attorney, so
that we meet him as  he is being examined  as an adverse witness, denying
a  vast  range  of  factual  assertions  which,  if  true,  would  be  highly
damaging  to  his credibility  and  character.333  Areen  introduced him  in  a
miasma of suspicion.  Diane,  subsequently  examined  on  direct,  was  the
first witness  to  relate  the  couple's  courtship,  marriage,  and  parenthood,
and  the  suicide  attempt,  in  a  comprehensible  first-to-last  story;  and  of
course  that  story  is  highly  sympathetic  to  her  character  as  a  wife  and
mother.334  There  was  a feminist  way to  connect these dots.  Diane  was  a
victim of psychological  abuse by her husband and his mother; her suicide
was  an  act  of  desperation  produced  when  they  overwhelmed  her
psychological  defenses;  and  the  idea  that  she  might  be  deprived  of
custody in the child's best interests was a horrifying travesty  of the policy
purposes  of the  new  standard  and  a  ratification  of male  domination.  If
Diane had emotional  problems,  they were  attributable  to  Steve's  abusive
treatment  of her,  and  he  should  not  be  allowed  to  benefit  from  his
wrongdoing.  The  facts  that  Steve planned to  move far  away from  Diane
immediately  after the trial  in  order to  attend medical  school  and  that he
would  inevitably  devolve  the  care  of  Jason  first  to  his  mother  and
eventually to a  paid caretaker, while Diane was prepared to  care  for him
on  a  daily  basis,  would  disqualify  Steve  if the  supposedly  neutral  BIC
standard  weren't covertly  biased against women  and  their caretaker  role,
preserving men's dominance  in the family because of their privileged role
in market. Areen never told her readers  to interpret the case this way, but
it is eminently possible to do so.
Joseph  Goldstein appeared  as an  expert witness  for Steve.  He had co-
authored,  with  Anna  Freud  and  Albert  Solnit,  a daring  intervention  into
family  policy  entitled  Beyond the  Best Interests of the  Child, and  his
testimony applied that book's recommendations  to the question of Jason's
333.  AREEN, FAMILY  LAW (1st ed.), supra note 305, at 440-42, 446-55.
334.  Id. at 466-74.
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custody.  At  the  crux  of the  Goldstein/Freud/Solnit  approach  were  two
arguments:  that  each  child has  one  primary psychological  parent,
335  and
that  continuity  of  care  by  that  parent  is  the  primary  and  preeminent
determinant  of the  child's  healthy  psychological  development.336  Their
corollary  claims  were  that  custody  should  always  lie  with  the
psychological  parent,  and  that  the  custodial  parent  needed  the
untrammeled  authority  to prohibit  or permit the  child's contact  with the
noncustodial  parent.3 37  (Why  the  latter  rule?  Court  ordered  visitation
unwanted by the  primary custodian would  directly undermine  the child's
sense that he enjoyed the stable protection of at  least one parent.) Finally,
doctrine should recognize that courts could not realistically aim to provide
children whose custody came up for adjudication with  a solution that was
in their best interests; the legal test should reflect an achievable  goal, the
identification  and  enforcement  of  the  least  detrimental  available
alternative.338
Goldstein  admitted from the outset  that he had  not examined  Jason.339
Nevertheless  he  observed  that  Diane  had  been  relatively  absent  from
Jason's life dating from the suicide  attempt, concluded that  Steve was the
psychological parent  of the child, and recommended that the court should
vest exclusive  custody  in  Steve,  with the  authority  to deny  Diane  even
visitation.3 40  He was undaunted by the prospect that Steve would hire paid
caregivers;  Jason  would  see  that  Steve  was  constantly  there  even  as
babysitters came and went, and this would strengthen his sense of security
and  continuity.341  On  cross  examination  Goldstein  admitted  that  even  a
kidnapper  would  get  custody  under  his  analysis;  punishment  for  the
wrongdoing  that  initiated  such  a parent/child  relationship  was  for  other
legal  instruments,  not the  law  of custody.3 42  He  admitted  that  a father's
hostility to a mother's involvement in a child's life was bad for the child:
he started out describing it as "not particularly beneficial"  to the child but,
pressed  by  Diane's  attorney,  eventually  conceded  that "it  can  be  very
335.  JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN,  ANNA  FREUD  & ALBERT  J.  SOLNIT,  BEYOND  THE  BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 17-20 (1980).
336.  Id. at 31-49.
337.  Id. at 38.
338.  Id. at 53-64.
339.  AREEN, FAMILY  LAW (1st  ed.), supra note 305, at 513.
340.  Id. at 514-15.
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harmful  to  the  child[.]" 343  He  admitted  that  Steve's  plan  to  break  off
Jason's relationship with his grandmother would  disrupt the continuity of
Jason's care but, like the transition from daycare  to babysitter, would only
emphasize Steve's  abiding presence in his  life. 34  The facts that Diane had
had  custody  of  Jason  for  four  hours  twice  a  week  and  every  other
weekend ever since the interim custody order, and that the child exhibited
strong, affectionate  ties to his mother, led  Goldstein to conclude that  she
could become Jason's  psychological  parent  as  long  as  Steve's  primary
role  as  the  current  psychological  parent  were  maintained,  but  not
otherwise.3 4 5
The judges clearly  discarded Goldstein's  testimony. His idea that Jason
had  only  one  psychological  parent  found  no  takers  among  the judges
deciding and reviewing the case;  nor did the idea that visitation was in the
gift of the custodial parent. The  trial court rejected  Steve's version of the
facts,  accepted  Diane's,  granted  custody  to  Diane  because  Steve's
hectoring and arrogance supported the conclusion that Diane would be the
better caretaker  and because  she would not  delegate Jason's  care  to paid
caregivers  but  would  provide  it  herself. Steve would  get  visitation,  the
schedule  to  be  negotiated  between  the  parties.3 46  The  appeals  court
explicitly held that "both the husband and wife are psychological parents"
and affirmed the trial court's decision on de novo review.
347
When  the  trial court  modified  the award  four years  later, it found  that
Steve  had  mellowed  somewhat  and  remarried,  that  Diane  had become
very unstable emotionally  after moving out on her own, and that the child
was being harmed by being  "a pawn between two well meaning parents."
The new ruling:  primary custody to  Steve, and a crisp visitation schedule
determined  by  the  court.348  At  the  original  hearing  Goldstein  had  quite
gratuitously  testified that,  once  custody  was  allocated,  even  if in  legal
error, it should never be  modified. 3 4 9  At the  time he  offered  this  rule  of
decision,  it  favored  Steve;  by  the  time  Steve  sought  modification,  it
favored Diane. There is no trace of it in the modification order.
Thus the only ideas from the Goldstein/Freud/Solnit  kitbag that made it
into  the  judges'  BIC  thinking  were  that  children  have  psychological
343.  Id. at 519-20.
344.  Id. at 520-21.
345.  Id. at 519.
346.  Id. at 561.
347.  Id. at 562.
348.  AREEN,  FAMILY LAW (2d ed.), supra  note 307, at 551-54.
349.  AREEN,  FAMILY LAW  (1st ed.), supra note 305,  at 523.
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parents  and  need  continuity  of  care  by  them.  Otherwise  his  entire
approach was silently dismissed. If the judges had opined on the value  of
his testimony, they would have observed that his  rigid prescriptions  bore
no resemblance to the myriad and evolving conflicting considerations that
a  difficult  custody  decision  like  Jason's  presented.  He  comes  off as  a
formalist  clueless  about  the  custody+visitation  world  in  which  he  was
operating.
Seen  from  the  mostly  silent  but  steady  feminist  perspective  that
permeates  Areen's  casebook,  moreover,  Goldstein's  testimony  was  not
merely  out  of step  with judicial  expectations  and  legal  realities;  it was
positively malign. All  of his arguments could just as  easily have produced
a  recommendation  for  Diane's  custody  of  Jason;  from  the  casebook's
implicit  feminist  point of view,  Goldstein  was  a misogynist  in  expert's
clothing.  His  conclusions  were  arbitrarily tilted  to  bestow  custody to  a
vindictive,  arrogant, antagonistic  and  misogynist  father while  forcing  an
innocent and nurturing yet repeatedly  victimized mother to listen to expert
testimony that she was not even her own child's psychological  parent. No
wonder she became emotionally unstable.
We  have  already  met Goldstein  as the co-author,  with Jay  Katz, of the
breakthrough  1965  casebook  The Family and the Law. While  she  was a
student  at Yale Law School,  Areen had taken Family Law from Katz and
Anna  Freud  and  a  course  on  psychoanalysis  and  the  law  from
Goldstein.3 so  She was now producing a casebook in competition with her
former teachers'  heavily psychoanalytic  one.  Indeed, Areen  got the  very
idea of including trial materials along with  successive  trial and  appellate
court opinions, and of giving them journalistic  rather than legalistic titles,
directly  from Goldstein  and Katz's  casebook. 5 1  One  subtle point of the
Rose v. Rose centerpiece  to her Cases and Materials  on Family Law: there
was  a  new  kid  on  the  family  law  block,  a  feminist  one,  and  she  was
willing to  expose her  former teacher  as hopelessly  pass6 in  a family  law
350.  E-mails from Judith Areen to author (July 2011)  (on file with author).
351.  Goldstein  & Katz,  The  Family and the Law  begins  with Lesser v.  Lesser, a  separation,
divorce  and  custody  case  far more  protracted  and  if anything  even  more  toxic  than Rose  v. Rose.
GOLDSTEIN & KATZ,  THE FAMILY  AND  THE LAW, supra note 253,  at 13-59,  176-216, 261-64,  302-07,
518-57.  Areen and  her teachers  follow a  path  very  different that  hewn by Foote,  Levy and  Sander,
who included legal  file materials, but whose focus was not on  trials and family psychodrama. Instead,
they included juvenile court  administrative proceedings  ranging from lawyer's  memos to the  reports
of the various bureaucrats  involved. See text at note 253 above.  Who is the hero? We have gone from
the professor  (CLT),  to the  administrator  and policy maker  (the social),  to  the judge  (concon).  See
Kennedy,  Three Globalizations, supra note  4,  at  21  (designating the  "legal  agency"  imagined  to be
primary in the three globalizations).
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that was increasingly answerable  to feminist concerns.352
A  genealogical  point:  a  Diane  litigating  custody  today  on  the  facts
related  above  would  charge  Steve  with  spousal  or domestic  abuse  and
argue  that placement  with  him was  not in  the best  interests  of the  child
and perhaps even that he was unfit. The word "abuse"  appears nowhere in
the Rose v. Rose transcript because the DV element of the feminist family
law  campaign  had  not yet gained  sufficient  legal  and cultural traction  to
appear  in any  settings outside  the  fledgling  domestic  violence protection
order regime.  In 1985,  Areen's only  cases on domestic violence involved
the  question  whether  expert  testimony  on  battered-woman's  syndrome
was  admissible to support  a woman's  claim of self-defense  in the  killing
of her husband,"'  and  whether protection  orders issued ex parte violated
the  defendant's  due  process  rights.3 54  At  the time  Areen  included  them,
these cases were new: State v. Kelley was only one year old. This segment
of the casebook grew rapidly  in subsequent  editions.  By  the  time Areen
published  her third edition  in  1992,  she  could  add  cases  abrogating  the
marital  rape  exception  and  extending  municipal  liability  for  failure  to
enforce a protective order, along with extensive notes."'  The fifth edition,
published in 2006 with Milton Regan as a new coeditor, doubled coverage
of the topic:  sixty-four pages were  devoted  to  a new  subsection  entitled
"Domestic  Violence."3 s 6  It also included  a new  section  under "No-Fault
Divorce"  on  the  recognition  of  interspousal  tort  claims  for  emotional
cruelty  filed  along  with  divorce  actions.3 5 '  The  successive  editions  of
Areen's  casebook can be used to guage the rise of governance  feminism:
352.  Goldstein  noticed  the affront.  In  1986, he  co-authored In the Best Interests of the Child, a
plea  to family  lawyers to  defer to psychoanalytic  expertise.  It  includes a  lengthy  attack  on  the trial
judge  in Rose v.  Rose for "assum[ing]  a professional  role  for which  he  was not  qualified....  He
assumed  the  role of expert in child development"  and ruled for Diane "despite  uncontroverted  expert
evidence"  - Goldstein's  own - in favor of Steven.  In a deft move, Areen  appended a long excerpt  of
this rambling ipse dixit condemnation  in the third edition of her casebook. JUDITH AREEN,  CASES  AND
MATERIALS  ON  FAMILY LAW 568  (3d ed.  1982)  [hereinafter AREEN,  FAMILY  LAW  (3d  ed.)] (quoting
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN,  ANNA  FRIED, ALBERT  SOLNIT &  SONJA  GOLDSTEIN,  IN THE BEST  INTERESTS  OF
THE CHILD 23 (1986)).
353.  AREEN,  FAMILY  LAW  (2d ed.), supra note 307, at 211-19  (excerpting  State v. Kelly, 97 N.J.
178  (1984)).
354.  Id. at 219-24 (excerpting Williams  v. Marsh, 626  S.W.2d  223 (Mo.  1982) (en banc)).
355.  See AREEN,  FAMILY  LAW (3d  ed.), supra note  352, at 261-93, where  she includes Raucci v.
Town ofRotterdam, 902  F.2d  1050  (2d Cir.  1990) (affirming  municipal  liability  under state  law for
failure to enforce a restraining order) and  Warren v. State, 255 Ga.  151  (1985)  (abolishing the marital
rape exception).
356.  JUDITH AREEN  & MILTON  C. REGAN,  JR., CASES  AND  MATERIALS ON FAMILY  LAW 281-345
(5th  ed. 2006) [hereinafter AREEN  &  REGAN,  FAMILY LAW  (5th ed.)].
357.  Id.  at 393-408.
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there is more and more  feminist law to teach.
If  anything,  the  fifth  edition  of  Areen's  Family  Law  casebook,
published  in  2006,  intensifies  its  commitment  to  concon  balancing  and
feminist  neoformalism.  A  new  opening  section  displaces  the  law  of
marriage with the question "What is a family?" and collects a rich array of
materials asking, basically,  whether,  as  more and  more people  enter into
family  and  care/dependency  arrangements  without  marriage,  we  should
extend  some  sort of legal recognition  to their arrangements.  This section
is neither sociological nor real realist but it  is functionalist:  its capstone is
Carl E. Schneider's  article  "The Channelling Function  in Family Law,"  a
classic argument that the normative functions of family law, especially the
function  of  channeling  people  into  socially  desirable  behaviors  and
institutions, should be the central  reference point  in deciding how deeply
law  should  follow  a  changing  society."'  Should  nonmarital  sexual
cohabitation  - which  he  assumes  arguendo is  immoral  - receive  legal
recognition? We have to decide case by case:
I doubt that so  far, at  least,  the American  family  has  become  so
deinstitutionalized  that the channelling function is no longer useful
or relevant  to family  law. But this  does not mean,  of course,  that
every use of the function is justifiable. What is needed, rather, is to
ask case by case whether the channeling function can plausibly be
said to work effectively.
359
Social-purpose functionalism is back, but now the institutions  (in addition
to the particular rules) have  many (rather than single) functions.360  So far
Schneider  revives  Llewellyn's  real  realism;  and  indeed  he  quotes  from
Llewellyn's  "Behind  the  Law  of  Divorce"  repeatedly.36'  But  with  a
difference:  Is  and  Ought  have  reunited;  the  problem  before us  is not  to
describe but  to  use  law  to  saturate  social  life  with  normative  guidance.
There will be costs, but they may not have to be bitterly high:  it might be
good, even for cohabitants, to deny cohabiting  couples legal recognition if
in  turn we preserve  the  channeling  function  of marriage  and usher  those
wayward  souls  into  a  more  stable  way  of life.  Llewellyn's  appetite  for
358.  Id. at  47-55  (excerpting Carl  E.  Schneider,  The  Channelling Function in Family Law, 20
HOFSTRA  L. REv. 495 (1992)).
359.  Schneider, supra note 358, at 519.
360.  "The  functions of law which  I posit are, of course, primarily  analytic constructs.  Legislators
may  not think in terms of them when  they write  statutes. Nor does  any crystalline  line divide  them.
On the contrary, they may often  overlap and even conflict. Further, a statute may and often does serve
more than one function." Id. at 497  n.5.
361.  Id.  at 501,  504-05,  506 n.25,  512, 531  n.95.
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paradox  and  and  his  enthusiastic  curiosity  about  social  resistances  are
gone;  Foote,  Levy and  Sander's attention  to problematic  informality  has
returned to center stage; but now we identify not with the lawyer at Child
Protective Services trying to work out a lifeplan for a desperate unmarried
teenage mother and her infant but with Policy itself, made from a panoptic
vantage  point  high  over  society  as  a  whole.The  tradeoffs  can  only  be
made by careful, wise balancing case by difficult case. Concon.
It  is  not  clear  that  Areen  and  Regan  would  agree  with  Schneider's
tentative  conclusion  that  fewer rather than more  institutional  options  for
intimate  and  dependent  relationships  is  the  right  way  to  go.  Their
materials include  a proposal to disestablish marriage altogether  in favor of
the  legal  recognition  of  dependency  relationships  whether  they  are
conjugal  or  not,36 2  and  a  highly  sympathetic  treatment  of the  Oneida
Community's  practices  of communal property  and  free  love.3 63 But they
share  with Schneider  the idea "we"  are in a position  to "decide"  how  far
legal  recognition  should  go:  3   "If we  expand  our  legal  categories  to
encompass  a  wider  range  of  relationships,  how  inclusive  should  we
be?",
6s And they are equally sure that defining "family" inextricably calls
for  assessments  of  Is  and  Ought:  "defining  this  term  is  as  much  a
normative as a descriptive  exercise. "366
Into this matrix Areen  and Regan pour  a sustained approach  to policy
decisions  through  feminism  and  rights.  After  the  modification  order  in
Rose v. Rose shifting custody of Jason from Diane and back to Steven, for
instance,  the Note  material  refers to  an  "excellent  overview"  of custody
modification  by  Joan  G.  Wexler,3 67  recording  its  conclusion  that
modification  can be  harmful to  the child  and  quoting  at  length from  its
denunciation  of  continuing  jurisdiction  over  divorced  families  as
"Orwellian[.]"  Allowing  modification  of  custody  orders  converts  the
noncustodial  parent  and  the  family  court  into  "Big  Brother." 36 '  The
imagined victim of this intrusion is the mother:
362.  AREEN  &  REGAN,  FAMILY  LAW  (5th  ed.),  supra  note  356,  at  19-28  (excerpting  LEGAL
COMMISSION  OF  CANADA,  BEYOND  CONJUGALITY:  RECOGNIZING  AND  SUPPORTING  CLOSE
PERSONAL ADULT  RELATIONSHIPS (2001)).
363.  Id.  at  39-46  (excerpting  WILLIAM  M.  KEPHART,  THE  FAMILY,  SOCIETY  AND  THE
INDIVIDUAL  (1977)).
364.  Id. at 2.
365.  Id.
366.  Id.
367.  Id. at 602-03  (excerpting  Joan  G.  Wexler,  Rethinking the  Modification of Child Custody
Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757 (1985)).
368.  Wexler, supra note 367, at 817.
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Has  she  nurtured  her  child  sufficiently  in a matter  acceptable  to
the  court?  Has  she  done  anything  else  that  in  the  court's  eye
constitutes  less than acceptable  parenting?  . . . . Any  rule of law
that puts the government  in a position to oversee  the most private
of matters  and  sensitive  of interests  raises  serious  constitutional
questions. 369
This  demand  for  constitutional  privacy  protection  is  entirely  missing
from the section  on domestic violence, where the casebook accepts almost
all the new tools for invading family privacy  in favor of victims of abuse.
These materials begin with a history of the marital  rape exception, laying
out  a  specifically  feminist  strategy  for  repeal;  and  then  present  cases
establishing  the precise  - by  now  highly  technical  - parameters  for  the
legal relevance of expert testimony on battered women's syndrome  in the
murder  trials  of a  women  who  have  killed their  male  partners;  holding
that BWS expert testimony can be invoked to toll the statute of limitations
in  a  woman's  tort  suit  against  her  husband  for  abuse;  and  interpreting
domestic  violence  protection  order  statutes  (who  can  seek  one,  against
whom,  when  the  relationship  is not  husband  and  wife?;  can  a husband
move  to  vacate  an  abuse  order  if the  wife  reestablishes  contact  with
him?).  The  section  ends  with  the  Supreme  Court's  rejection  of  an
argument that  a woman has  a due  process  clause property  interest  in the
effective  enforcement of a protection order against a husband known to be
violent.370  The strong implication is that a highly salutary  legal reform has
taken place and the question is how far it should extend. But the center of
the section is dedicated to an anguished consideration of mandatory  arrest
and  no-drop policies,  sought by many  feminist  advocates and adopted  in
many jurisdictions. First, does arrest deter?; whom does  it deter? And then
369.  Id.
370.  Excerpts  from the  following  occupy  AREEN  & REGAN,  FAMILY  LAW  (5th ed.), supra note
356, at  289-321: People  v. Humphrey, 921  P.2d  I (Cal.  1996)  (admissibility of BWS  testimony in a
murder defense); Ba  v. United States, 809 A.2d  1178 (D.C.  2002) (holding  a man criminally liable for
violating  protection  order despite  the  fact that the  plaintiff had  voluntarily  moved  in  with him for a
period  of  time);  C.O.  v.  M.M.,  813  N.E.2d  (Mass.  2004)  (citing  an  insufficiently  substantial
relationship  for plaintiff to maintain  the  action);  Mitchell  v. Mitchell,  821  N.E.2d  879  (Mass.  2003)
(containing a husband's motion to vacate a protection order); Turner v. Lewis, 749 N.E.2d  122 (Mass.
2001)  (holding that a grandmother  cannot bring an  action against a granddaughter who  does  not live
with her);  Giovone v. Giovone, 663 A.2d  109 (N.J.  1995) (admissibility of BWS  on behalf of a wife
suing her husband,  to toll  the  statute  of limitations);  R.  v.  Malott,  [1998]  S.C.R.  123  (Can.)  (BWS
testimony  in a murder defense); Jill  Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital
Rape, 88 CALIF.  L. REv.  1375  (2000).  The section ends with  Town of Castle Rock  v. Gonzales,  545
U.S.  748  (2005)  (holding  that  no  constitutionally  protected  property  interest  exists  in  effective
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the  real  kicker:  what  if the  strict  removal  of discretion  from  DV cases
leads to the arrest and conviction of women? What if requiring women to
pursue DV cases even though  they don't want to re-enact the domination
of abuse,  this time at the hands of the state?..'  Then and only then  do we
encounter  the  implication  that  anti-DV  legal  tools  intruding  on  family
privacy may have gone too far.
The  consideration  of alimony  similarly  pivots  on  the  needs  of wives
and  mothers.  In  a  concluding  section  on "Divorce  Awards  and  Gender
Roles,"  the  casebook  authors  warn:  "To  put  it  bluntly,  the  traditional
division  of  labor  within  households  often  leaves  the  husband  in better
financial  shape than  the wife at the time of divorce,"372  and then  offers a
lengthy excerpt from a specifically feminist reconsideration of alimony.37
The  casebook follows  this  quite elegant  synthesis  of ostensibly  opposed
feminist positions with the editors'  own protracted denunciation of current
property  division  and  alimony  law  for  directing judges  to  consider  too
many contradictory  factors:  "is  it really  plausible  to  contend  that  such  a
system  reflects the rule of law,  as opposed  to virtually unfettered judicial
discretion?"374  Areen  and  Regan  don't  say  but  they  do  imply  that  the
solution  - rules  protecting  rights  - should  emerge  from  a  basically
feminist  inquiry.  Too many  conflicting  considerations;  the man  deciding
will not be wise; it's time for some rights! Rights neoformalism.
Areen's transformation  of the field had two unforeseen  and unintended
consequences.  As  feminism  secured  its  grip  on the  field  and  generated
more  and  more of the law  it  contained,  men  fled.  Cases  in point:  Frank
Sander  first,  and  then Robert  Mnookin,  decamped  to  make  a new  field,
Alternative  Dispute Resolution  or Negotiation,  in which  they would not
have to face  the moralistic confrontations  that saturated  family law as the
culture  wars  moved  in.  The course  became  a women's  ghetto.  Thus was
371.  Excerpts  from  the  following  occupy AREEN  & REGAN,  FAMILY  LAW  (5th ed.),  supra note
356,  at  321-336:  U.S.  ATTORNEY  GENERAL'S  TASK  FORCE  ON  FAMILY  VIOLENCE  22-24  (1984)
(recommending  mandatory  arrest);  Liza  Mundy,  Fault Line, WASHINGTON  POST,  Oct. 26,  1997,  at
W8.  Mundy  presents  a  series  of  cases  in  which  mandatory  arrest  seemed  to  her  to  be  a  vastly
excessive  response to everyday  conflicts:  of the first  five of them, four  involve the  arrest of women
and  one of a son  who  had thrown  food at his father.  Mundy,  Fault  Line, supra. A note  on  no-drop
policies  is similarly conflicted,  entirely within a feminist  frame. Taking  away  prosecutors'  option  of
dropping  a  DV case  once  it has been  opened  has considerable  feminist support,  represented  by  one
citation,  but  feminist detractors  too:  it  can  "replicate  the  dynamics  of the  battering  relationship."
AREEN  & REGAN,  FAMILY  LAW (5th ed.), supra note 356, at 345.
372.  AREEN  & REGAN,  FAMILY  LAW (5th ed.), supra  note 356, at 758.
373.  Id. at 758-63  (excerpting  June Carbone  & Margaret  Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist
Ideology, Economic Change,  and Divorce Reform, 65 TULANE  L. REv. 953 (1991)).
374.  Id. at 763-69,  769.
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revived  a problem that has beset the field again and again  since Schouler:
it became  a degraded  field,  retardataire  for  all  the  vanguardism  of the
feminist  overhaul.  This  preserved  the  field  from  the  reductive
instrumentalism  and  the  presumption  of neoliberal  tenets  that  overtook
corporations,  the new  embodiment  of the  law of the  market, as law  and
economics  and  behavioral  economics  swept  the  curriculum,  but  it  did
nothing to  display the  crucial  role that  the family and its  law play  in  the
society-wide  distribution  of  welfare.  Men  are  coming  back  now,
especially  as  openly  gay  men  become  hireable  onto  law  faculties  and
bring  their  gender-bending  ways  and  their  investments  in  same-sex
marriage with them; but the sense that the field lacks prestige because  it is
marginal  to  the  grand  distributive  questions  of our time  persists. I offer
some thoughts about this distressing state of affairs in the Conclusion.
CONCLUSION
James  Schouler predicted in  1870 that the law of husband and wife and
of  parent  and  child  would  eventually  stand  alone  as  the  "law  of  the
family,"375  and  that  the  law  of  master  and  servant  would  evolve  to
embrace  all  the  various  relations  that  belong  in  the  market.  The
family/market  distinction that  he drew  was  not ideologically  innocent:  it
carried,  almost in  its DNA,376  the  ideas of laissez faire and the  separate
spheres.  In  Schouler's  era,  it  carried  the  idea  of fundamental  freedom
enshrined  in right for the market and duty determined  by the state for the
family. The legal form this took was the market as contract and the family
as status:
To  an  unusual  extent,  therefore,  is  the  law of family  above  and
independent  of the  individual.  Society  provides the home;  public
policy  fashions  the  system:  and  it remains  for  each  one  of us  to
place himself under rules which are, and must be, arbitrary.
So is the law of family universal  in its adaptation. It deals directly
with the individual. Its provisions  are for man and woman; not for
corporations or business firms."
375.  SCHOULER,  DOMESTIC RELATIONS  (1st ed.), supra  note  12,  at 7.
376.  Not quite: Savigny, who  is my earliest source  for the contract/family  distinction,  could  not
have  known  that it would  eventually  make  sense  in  the languages  of modem  industrial  capitalism,
global-scale  colonization,  and  separate  spheres  ideology.  For  an  account of how  American  jurists
translated  Savigny's idea into a classical  idiom, see Halley,  What is Family Law?: Part  1,  supra note
1, at 55-71.
377.  SCHOULER,  DOMESTIC RELATIONS  (1st ed.), supra note  12, at 7, 9.
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In this Part I have shown how, despite repeated attacks over the course of
the  twentieth  century,  Schouler's  idea  persisted,  transformed  across
successive  waves  of  legal  consciousness  to  fit  into  new  ideological
settings but carrying with it the market/family distinction.
But we have also seen three great waves of anti-FLE thinking. The first
started  in  the  Family  Court  movement  and  Pound's  social-purpose
functionalist  attack  on  classical  legal  thought  and  culminated  in
Llewellyn's  real  realist  assessment  of  divorce  and  in  the  Columbia
curricular reform project. It reached its most comprehensive  expression in
the  Jacobs/Angell  Report,  but  then died  out completely.  After  WWII  it
was  revived  by  enthusiasts  for  family  law  in  the  practicing  bar  and
eventually  produced  a casebook  - the  Foote,  Levy  and  Sander's  Cases
and Materials on Family Law - that exemplifies  what anti-FLE  thinking
can do in the vocabulary and consciousness of the social.
The third wave  had its fountainhead  not  in the practicing  bar but  in a
wide  social  movement:  feminism.  If Schouler  lived  in  a world  in  which
contract  was  free and  family was the  site of state-sanctioned  duty,  in the
family-law  world  envisioned  and  partly  constructed  by  third-wave
feminism,  the family  is  both the site of intensified  legal  supervision and
of fundamental  freedoms.  Feminists broke the hold of FLE to extend  legal
tools that govern  the market  and the public  sphere to the home:  tort law
and criminal  law on behalf of women against men. As Jeannie  Suk put it,
"criminal  law  comes home.""'  But they  also  revived FLE,  flipping  the
market/family  distinction  so  that  the family  is  the  site  of  fundamental
freedoms:  Roe v.  Wade as the new Lochner v. New York.379 When Justice
Douglas  defended  his  decision  in  Griswold v.  Connecticut from  the
attacks  for Lochnerizing  that he knew  were coming,  he shielded  himself
with Schouler's distinction, uncannily  unchanged  over almost  100 years.
"Marriage,"  he  wrote,  "is  a  coming  together  for  better  or  for  worse,
hopefully  enduring,  and  intimate to  the  degree  of being  sacred.  It  is  an
association  that promotes  a way of life,  not causes;  a harmony  in living,
not political faiths; a bilateral  loyalty, not commercial or social  projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions."3 so FLE was back. Again.
378.  Jeannie  Suk,  Criminal Law  Comes  Home,  116  YALE  L.J.  2  (2006).  For  a  more  extended
treatment,  see SUK, CRIMINAL AT HOME IN  THE LAW: How THE DOMESTIC  VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS
TRANSFORMING  PRIVACY  (2009).
379.  Roe v.  Wade, 410 U.S.  113  (1973);  Lochner v. New York, 198  U.S.  45 (1905).
380.  Griswold v. Connecticut,  381  U.S. 479, 486 (1965)  (emphasis added).
286 [Vol. 23:189
98
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss2/1Halley
I argue elsewhere that the same-sex  marriage  campaign has produced a
convergence  between  the  pro's  and  the  anti's  around  the  idea  that
marriage  is  status:  they  extol  the  sacredness,  permanence,
fundamentalness,  indispensability,  moral  stature  and  specialness  of
marriage.  38   All  of these  have  been  attributes  of marriage  imagined  as
status-not-contract  since  Joel  Prentiss  Bishop  introduced  the  idea  into
American  legal  thought  in  1852.382  The  pro's and  the  anti's are  making
marriage  more  conservative,  at least  in ideology. And  they  may make  it
more conservative  in fact. In the course of her decision recognizing  same-
sex  marriage  as  a  necessary  component  of  Massachusetts  law,  Justice
Marshall  repeatedly  described  marriage  as  "exclusive,"  once  even
describing  it  also  as  "permanent,"  despite  the  facts  that  Massachusetts
makes  divorce  relatively  easy  and  that  people  frequently  resort  to  this
state  facility.3 83  And  William  Eskridge,  one  of the  most  articulate  and
thoughtful  US  legal academics  promoting  same-sex marriage,  argued  for
a political deal between  the same-sex  pro's  and social conservative  anti's
in which same-sex marriage would be recognized in exchange for making
easy-to-get  interstate  divorces  constitutionally  invalid,  and  imposing  a
constitution requirement that all states make divorce more difficult:
[W]e  do  want  to  interrogate  and  ask  why  has  the  sanctity  of
marriage  declined, why do we have such  a high divorce rate. And
those  reasons  have  nothing  to  do  with  gay  and  lesbian  couples.
They  have  everything  to  do  with  the  ease  of divorce  in  today's
society.  And  so  indeed  my  advice  . . . would  be  to  work with
President Bush to amend  the Constitution  not to prohibit same-sex
marriages  but  to  make  it  more  difficult  for  people  to  divorce,
people of all orientations,  and to make it more difficult  for the Full
Faith and Credit clause to be used as a way of allowing  a husband
to leave to go to Nevada and get a quickie divorce that would then
be binding on the wife. 384
If same-sex  marriage  enthusiasts  really  mean  to  pursue  these  divorce
381.  Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage:  From Status/Contract to the Marriage  System, 6
UNBOUND:  J. OF THE L. LEFT  1,  4-12 (2010).
382.  For an  account  of what  marriage-as-status-not-contract  meant  to the  classical jurists,  see
Halley,  What is Family Law?: Part  I, supra note  1, at 36-48.
383.  "[I]t  is the  exclusive and permanent commitment  of the marriage partners  to one another,
not the begetting of children,  that is the  sine qua non of civil  marriage."  Goodridge  v.  Department of
Health,  440  Mass.  309,  331  (2003)  (emphasis  added).  The  majority  opinion  repeatedly  describes
marriage as exclusive.  Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 312, 313, 329, 331,  343.
384.  Talk of  the Nation, NPR (Mar. 9,  2004) (downloaded  from npr.org).  Thanks to Libby Adler
for bringing this interview  to my attention.
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reforms, they won't get any pushback from social conservatives.
Not  surprisingly,  the  family  law  casebooks  are  once  again  calling
marriage  status.3 85  We may  be  teetering  into  the  turn  that Jacobs  made
when  he  so radically  altered  his treatment of Maynard v. Hill - the  1888
Supreme  Court  case  locking  the  status/contract  distinction  into  the
classical  legal  order as  a matter  of positive doctrine  - between  the  first
and second editions of his casebook.
A  central  point  of  this  genealogy  is  that  the  family/market,
status/contract,  marriage/contract  distinction is  not a natural  or inevitable
part of our legal order or even our legal consciousness.  Humans invented
it,  and  over  time  they  have  bestowed  it  with  an  array  of ideological
significances  and  deployed  it for  ever-changing  ends.  It  has been  useful
for many progressive  projects of which I approve:  it lent legal legitimacy
to  the rise of divorce  in the nineteenth  century, and it helped justify a rise
of constitutional  privacy  rights  which  have  partially  liberated  women
from the unrelenting  "cycle of births."386  It doesn't have unilaterally good
effects, however.  The idea of marriage  as status  had a big role to play in
the unconscionably  long time it took women's marital  equality to advance
beyond  the Married  Women's  Property  Acts;  and  the  idea  that contract
was its opposite was a powerful boon to capital in its conflict with labor.
One of the costs of FLE for the field of family law is its implication that
the state and the market are agencies  for distribution and the  family is not.
FLE carries  an antidistributive bias for analysis of the family  and its law.
When  Jacobs  and  Angell  broke  up  the  status/contract  distinction,  they
were  suddenly  liberated  to  notice  the  crucial  importance  of  marital
property  rules  during  the ongoing  marriage  as distributive  forces  within
the family and between the  family and the market. Llewellyn  was able  to
notice how all the rules  of family  law eventually  morph  into bargaining
endowments  for  family  members,  even  if no  divorce  is  on the  horizon.
385.  DOUGLAS  E.  ABRAMS,  NAOMI  R.  CAHN,  CATHERINE  J.  Ross,  &  DAVID  D.  MEYER,
CONTEMPORARY  FAMILY  LAW  819-820  (2006);  HARRY  D.  KRAUSE,  LINDA  D.  ELROD,  MARSHA
GARRISON,  & J. THOMAS  OLDHAM,  FAMILY  LAW: CASES,  COMMENTS  AND  QUESTIONS  175-177  (5th
ed.  2003);  PETER  N.  SWISHER,  ANTHONY  MILLER,  &  JANA  B.  SINGER,  FAMILY  LAW:  CASES,
MATERIALS  AND  PROBLEMS  2-3  (1998);  WALTER  0. WAYRAUCH,  SANFORD  N.  KATZ,  &  FRANCES
OLSEN,  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  ON  FAMILY  LAW:  LEGAL  CONCEPTS  AND  CHANGING  HUMAN
RELATIONSHIPS  89-90  (1994);  D. KELLY  WEISBERG,  MODERN FAMILY  LAW:  CASES AND  MATERIALS
114-115  (3d  ed.  2006); see also, MILTON  C.  REGAN,  FAMILY  LAW  AND  THE  PURSUIT  OF  INTIMACY
(1993).
386.  Gayatri  Spivak,  Can the  Subaltern Speak?, in  MARXISM  AND  THE  INTERPRETATION  OF
CULTURE 271,  303 (Cary Nelson  & Lawrence  Groosberg eds.,  1988) (quoting  PANDURANG  VAMAN
KANE,  HISTORY  OF  DHARMASATRA  (ANCIENT  AND  MEDIEVAL  RELIGIOUS  AND  CIVIL  LAW  IN  INDIA)
(1962-75)).
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Jacobs and Angell were able to dethrone  the adjudicated case and suggest
ways  to bring the vast expanse  of administrative  law that manages  family
life in minute daily ministrations, pervasive  surveillance, and intense, life-
changing  reclassifications.  Though  Jacobs  lost  faith  in  this  project  and
allowed FLE to restructure  the  second edition of his Domestic  Relations
casebook,  in  1965  Foote,  Levy  and  Sander revived  their  ideas and  fully
implemented  them.  Indeed,  Foote,  Levy  and  Sander  graphically  display
the state's  ruthless use of family  law  duties of support to divest  itself of
responsibility  for  human  subsistence.  The  paternity  action,  in  their
representation of it, is not about social control or about justice for women
and  children  but  about  the  family  as  a  highly  coercive  private  welfare
system.
FLE ratifies family privacy (except where it does not), and suggests that
the  exchanges  into,  out of, and  especially  within  the  ongoing  family are
not  legal. Jacobs  and  Angell  resisted  this  idea:  the  common  law  and
community  property rules  allocating property between  husband  and wife
were a major topic for them. They even understood that this part of family
law  was economic. I don't  think  they  had  any  idea  how  transformative
this  idea was.  Husband  and  wife,  parent  and  child,  master  and  servant,
and  corporations  had  belonged  among  the  "private  oeconomical
relations"387  for Blackstone, but the  classical  legal  order had denied this.
Master  and  servant  and  corporations  migrated  to  the  market,  and  "the
economy"  became  their  medium.  The  word  "economic,"  which  in
preclassical  English  had referred  exclusively  to the household,  gradually
disinherited  the residential  space and  referred to anything  "relating to the
development  and  regulation  of the  material  resources of a community  or
state"388 : the market. Meanwhile the word "family,"  which in preclassical
usage had referred to master and servant just as firmly as  it did to husband
and wife and parent and  child, became for the classics what we  now  call
the  nuclear  family,  precisely  not  the  market.389  Seeing  the  family  as
economic was  a  major  anticlassical  breakthrough.  Llewellyn  followed
suit, insisting that, even in harmonious  marriages, at some point someone
387.  1  WILLIAM  BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE  LAWS  OF  ENGLAND  410  (photo.  reprint
1979) (1765).
388.  Economic Definition B.L.a,  B.Lb, B.4.a,  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY  ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/59385  (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). For a more
detailed account, see  Halley,  What is Family Law? Part  I, supra  note 1, at 8-9,74-75.
389.  Family Definition 1.1.a, 1.2.a, OXFORD  ENGLISH DICTIONARY  ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/67975?redirectedFrom-family#  (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). For a
more detailed account, see Halley,  What is Family Law? Part  1, supra  note 1, at 82-83.
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puts his or her foot down, "and law provides  the footing."3 90 Foote, Levy
and Sander  devoted  an  entire  chapter  to the property rules governing  the
"Going Family."39 1 For Areen, seven pages were enough.392
This atrophy  of familial  property  law  means  that  the  most  important
background  rules  against  which  all  ongoing  marriages  buy  homes  and
cars,  take  out  loans,  receive  inheritances,  give  gifts,  make  investments,
pay  for  college,  suffer  foreclosure,  begin  retirement,  go  onto  Medicare,
consume  uninsured  nursing  and hospital  care,  and  go  bankrupt  are not
taught in the Family Law course. These are the rules, too, that determine
the contents  of a married  decedent's (and thus  the contents  of his or her
surviving spouse's)  estate.  If roughly  half of the marriages  formed  in the
United States  are dissolved not through  divorce but through death of one
of the spouses,393  omitting these rules means that the basic  contemporary
family  law  course  ignores  the  exit rules  of half of the  marriages.  Death
differs from divorce, moreover, in the salience  of law as the decider:  there
are  no  settlement  agreements  in  probate.  The  division  of  coverage
between  Family Law  on one  hand,  and  Trusts  and  Estates  on the  other,
means that teaching  the comparison of property allocation at divorce and
at death - surely a basic question about how our family law system works
- is unduly  difficult.  The  division  of intellectual  labor  between  Family
Law  and  Poverty  Law  or  Welfare  Law  (if the  latter  is  taught  at  all)
obscures  the  state's  constant,  conscious  use  of the  family  as  a private
welfare  system. Family  Law teachers:  start looking for this  theme  in the
interstices  of the  casebook  you  teach,  and  you  will  see  it  everywhere!
Feminist  identity  politics  is  obsessed  with  the  homemaker  wife's
distributional  fate at the time of divorce, despite the fact that women with
no role in the paid workforce  are a steeply declining demographic.
394  And
390.  Llewellyn, Behind the Law ofDivorce, supra note  136, at 1305.
391.  FOOTE, LEVY & SANDER,  FAMILY LAW, supra note 253,  at 297-366.
392.  AREEN, FAMILY  LAW (1st  ed.), supra note 305,  at 193-99.
393.  Divorce rates are notoriously difficult to measure.  See CENTER FOR  DISEASE CONTROL  AND
PREVENTION,  NATIONAL  CENTER  FOR  HEALTH  STATISTICS,  National Marriage  and Divorce  Rate
Trends, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriagedivorcetables.htm  (last visited Aug.  19,
2011). The extremely rough measure used above  is taken from Lynn A. Baker & Robert Emery,  When
Every Relationship  is  Above  Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at  the  Time  of
Marriage,  17  Law.  &  Hum.  Behav.  439,  443  (1993)  (deeming  study  subjects  to  be  accurate  in
estimating the likelihood that any particular marriage will end in divorce  as 50%).
394.  According to  U.S.  Department of Labor statistics, the percentage of American women in the
paid  workforce,  employed  and  unemployed  combined,  climbed  from  approximately  48%  to
approximately  67.2%  between  1973  and  2010.  DEPARTMENT  OF  LABOR,  BUREAU  OF  LABOR
STATISTICS,  Employment  & Earnings:  January  2011, at 195,  available  at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/empearn201101  .pdf (last visited Aug.  19, 2011).
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this  emphasis  crowds  out  attention  to  the  distributions  affecting  their
husbands,  working  women,  and the  second or third "chain"  families  that
both  spouses are likely to form. Now  that FLE  is back again,  the picture
that  most  current  casebooks  paint  of the  economic  family  is  seriously
partial.
FLE also obscures distribution by class. In a famous article published in
1964,  Jacobus  tenBroek  exposed  our  "dual  family  law  system."395  He
made it glaringly clear how, ever since the Elizabethan Poor Law, Anglo-
American  legal  systems  have  maintained  one  family  law  for those  with
means and another  for the poor. Jacobs  and Angell,  and Foote,  Levy and
Sander,  were  as interested  in the  latter as  they were  in the  former;  and
satisfying that curiosity required them,  in turn, to study  family courts and
a broad  range  of experts  and  institutions  involved  in  managing  deviant
families  and  family  members.  The  contiguities  of  family  law  with
employment,  juvenile  delinquency,  foster  care  and  adoption,  welfare
provision,  legal  management  of people  with  psychiatric  disorders,  and
education  became  as  important  as  the  rules  of divorce.  FLE,  when  it
regains  ascendency,  tends to foster a trend back to  adjudication  and back
to families well off enough  to  go  to court  to  solve  their disputes.  At the
level of description, it carries a class bias.
Finally,  FLE  came  into  American  legal  thought  in  the  form  of  the
marriage/contract  distinction,  construed  as  the opposition  of duty-soaked
status  and  individualistic,  laissez  faire  contract.  This  ideological
implication  has  many  regrettable  consequences,  but  I  will  limit  myself
here  to  two. First,  it  sets  up family  law  as  altruistic  and contract  law  as
individualistic,  and  fosters  the  idea that  contract  in family  is  always  an
intrusion of individualism  into a  legal  space that should be solidaristic. A
large Is/Ought  conflation  plagues this preoccupation  of the  field:  we are
continually  asked,  "Should family  law  be  status  or  contract?",396  as  if
those  alternatives  weren't  ideologically  inter-implicated  to  the  point  of
being  mutually  constitutive.  All  the  ways  in which  contract  law  fosters
solidarity  and  family law  enables  individual  freedom  are ruled out from
the  start.  This  is  a  serious  descriptive  deficit.  Even  worse,  it  ratifies
neoliberal fantasies about the freedom of contract.
And  second,  this  ideological  allocation  ratifies  the  centrality  and
specialness of marriage.  For Jacobs and Angell, breaking the hold of FLE
395.  Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and
Present  Status, 16 STAN.  L. REV. 257 (1964).
396.  See supra note 385.
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meant  taking  seriously  the domestic  dependencies  that actually  occur  in
the world. Jacobs was at one point almost ready to acknowledge  that three
men  living  together  could  be  a  family.  For  Llewellyn,  marriage  was
surrounded  by  informal  bonds  that duplicated  its  functions:  indeed,  pair
marriage  meant  that  "extra-marital sex  desire  can  specialize  on sex." 397
Foote, Levy and  Sander began  their casebook not with marriage  but with
the problem of illegitimacy. Until its most recent edition, which includes  a
wonderful  chapter  asking  "What  is  a Family?"  and  considering  a  wide
range  of nonmarital  family  forms, the Areen  casebook has been,  almost
entirely,  a casebook on marriage,  divorce,  and the parent/child/state  triad.
I think  it  is  safe  to  generalize  that  contemporary  family  law  casebooks
vastly lag behind social developments. We  should be asking, "What  is the
family  law  of unmarried  people?",  not  because  we  need  to  "recognize"
them and  honor the  family forms they chose but because  they  are  there.
Finally, the emphasis on marriage  distorts the distributive effects  even of
marriage  which,  of course,  distributes not  only into,  out of and between
marital families but between marital and nonmarital ones.
FLE thus has  a series  of problematic  effects  on the  field of family  law
at  the  level  of  description.  What  about  prescription?  Is  there  any
necessary  redemptive  or  liberatory  flavor  to  the  attack  on  FLE?  It  is
important  to  recall  that  the  Family  Court  movement,  one  of  the
fountainheads of anti-FLE thinking, was at once progressive and intensely
devoted to state-based social control  of the problematic  masses.  And it is
equally  important  to  recall  that,  when both  Goldstein  and  Katz,  on  one
hand, and Foote, Levy and  Sander on the other, set up expert judgment as
the  all-wise substitute  for all-knowing  social-purpose  functionalism,  they
set  themselves  up  for  the  kind  of reversal  inflicted  on  Goldstein  by
Areen's sly exposure of his biases. The left/right politics of the field seem
resilient enough to make use of FLE and of attacks on it. FLE can still be
very  useful,  moreover:  for instance,  I am  not proposing  to  abolish  the
course, partly  for  fear that  if we  did that,  all  consideration  of sexuality,
gender and the  sheer craziness  of life would drop  out of the non-seminar
law  curriculum  altogether.  At  the  moment,  though,  my  strong  hunch  is
that  conservative  trends  coursing  through  both  feminist  and  same-sex-
marriage culture-wars  struggles  over the  field suggest  that attacking FLE
is  a  good  leftist  move  and  can  produce  significant  advances  in
progressive/leftist  analyses  of the roles  of the  family  and  its  law  in  the
397.  Llewellyn, Behind the Law ofDivorce, supra note 136, at 1297.
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distribution of human welfare.3 9 8
398.  For some thoughts  on how to do  it, see  Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage,  Part  I, supra
note 381,  and Halley & Rittich, Critical  Directions, supra note 2. Readers of the latter may note  that
the  Up  Against Family  Law  Conference  that  Rittich  and  I helped  organize  developed  tools  very
similar to,  some  of them identical  to, those  invented  by the  Columbia curricular  reformers  and  by
Foote,  Levy and Sander. The odd fact  is that, at that time, we were completely unaware of any of the
precursors  showcased  in this  genealogy  except  Llewellyn's  Behind the Law of Divorce, supra note
136.  1  would suggest that  this congruence  makes manifest that the basic deficits of the status/contract
distinction and the FLE it constructs have been remarkably stable across  large shifts in legal ideology.
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